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Chapter VI The Building Transaction in context 
This chapter serves as a bridge between the general 
economic theories of contractual governance and our specific 
analysis of the Joint Contracts Tribunal Standard Form of 
Building Contract (1980) (JCT80). It aims to provide a context 
for analysis of JCT80 and to locate in that context, sources 
of the transaction costs which shape the governance of 
building production. The discussion is divided into three main 
sections. Part A describes the structure of the building 
industry and the nature of its products. It will be seen that 
the fragmentation of the construction industry is associated 
with a distinctive' relationship between firms which are 
involved in building production. Part B focuses on the 
organisation of the process of construction in the UK. This 
section describes the development of the Contracting System 
of building production and highlights some of the problems of 
co-ordination and governance which arise within this 
institutional setting. Part C consists of a brief history of 
the Joint Contracts Tribunal and a description of the 
transactional roles and relationships of participants in 
projects governed by JCT80. 
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A. The Construction Industry and Its Products 
The physical nature of the product, its diversity 
and often complexity, as well as the wide 
geographical spread of demand for it and the 
fluctuations in demand, have together moulded the 
structure of the industry and determined the process 
of creating a construction good from the clients 
need to the production on site. 
The construction industry and its products pervade our 
daily lives-The built environment is a container of almost 
all other economic activities and an expression of cultural 
values. It structures social interaction and shapes access to 
essential resources. The construction industry is also an 
important instrument of economic policy. The state continues 
to be heavily implicated in managing demand for construction 
products by means of direct investment in the built 
environment and through the manipulation of financial 
incentives for private investment2. 
The outputs of the construction industry are investment 
goods which generate a flow of production of other goods, 
services or amenities over a period of time. Products of 
construction are a means to further production, and they 
create the physical infrastructure which enables goods and 
1 Patricia M. Hillebrandt, Analysis of the British Construction Industry (London: Macmillan, 1984) 
at 2. 
2 In 1985, for example, 32 % of all new construction work was undertaken for the public sector, 
Housing and Construction Statistics (London: HMSO, 1985). Incentives for private investment into 
building production may be directly manipulated through instruments such as investment allowances on 
new buildings for construction, and indirectly shaped by policies governing interest rates. 
276 
services to be distributed. The construction industry is an 
integral component of social investment in services such as 
health care and education, and its output is directly consumed 
in the form of shelter. 
Whatever their precise form or intended use, the products 
of construction are large and heavy and they normally have a 
fixed location. Construction outputs are usually custom-built 
to a particular specification, the production cycle is 
extraordinarily lengthy and the end product is largely created 
from labour resources and the outputs of other industries. 
Furthermore, relative to other manufactured goods, buildings 
have a high cost of production and are unusually durable3. 
These characteristics are said to have an important effect on 
the structure of the industry, and in particular, to explain 
the predominance of small firms4. The primary consequence of 
durability, together with high costs of production, is that 
there exists a large stock of buildings in use and potentially 
available for other uses. The industry, therefore, has 
relatively little power to control its market by generating 
new demand for its products5. The demand-driven character of 
building production is thought to cause uncertainty about the 
3 As noted by Patricia Hittebrandt, the unique character of the construction industry is derived 
from a distinctive mixture of characteristics. ALthough many individual features of construction 
products, or the uses of the outputs or the nature of demand may be found in other industries, they 
are combined to unique effect within construction: Hittebrandt, Analysis of the British Construction 
Industry, supra, note 1. 
4 In 1989, for example, 186 391 out of the 201 076 firms in the industry employed fewer than eight 
employees: Housing and Construction Statistics (London: HMSO, 1989). 
5 D. Bishop, "Productivity in the Construction Industry", in Dennis Turin, Aspects of the 
Economics of Construction, (London: George Godwin, 1975). 
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future and hence to inhibit capital investment and deter 
growth by means of increases in the size of existing firms6. 
The image of an industry responding to fluctuations in 
demand through the classical market mechanism of entry and 
exit of new firms can be misleading7.. Although the 
construction industry is known for high rates of birth and 
death of small firms, the production of new buildings and 
physical structures is dominated by larger enterprises. In 
1989, for example, firms employing more than 115 workers 
constituted less than . 3% of the total number of construction 
companies but their share of new building work amounted to 
over 40%$. 
Statistics which relate volume of work to the size of 
a building firm, however, may be an unreliable guide to the 
participation of different types of firm in the manufacturing 
and delivery of the industry's products. The Contracting 
System which dominates building production in the UK has 
created a distinctive relationship between firms of different 
sizes. Medium and large construction companies function as 
general contractors (gc. s), responsible for organising labour 
resources and managing the process by which materials are 
assembled into a finished building. These firms maintain 
6 Ibid. 
7 C. G. Powell An Economic History of the British Building Industry: 1815-1979 (London: 
Architectural Press, 1980); Patricia M. Hillebrandt, Small Firms in the Construction Industry, 
Committee of Inquiry on Small Firms, Research Report #10 (London: HMSO, 1970); HiLLebrandt Economic 
Theory and the Construction Industry (London: Macmillan, 1974). 
8 Housing and Construction Statistics, Department of the Environment (London: HMSO, 1989). 
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demand for their resources by undertaking a number of 
projects, and seeking new contracts to replace those which are 
close to completion. Despite the numbers of workers which they 
may employ, gc. s rarely supply a full complement of labour 
resources for any particular contract from their permanent 
staff, nor do they produce the necessary material components. 
Both general resources and specialised inputs for individual 
projects are procured, instead, through sub-contracting. The 
typical pattern of manufacturing industries, whereby the 
growth of a firm signifies the internalisation of production, 
therefore, is reversed in building production. In this 
industry, as the size of the firm increases, so also does the 
extent of sub-contracting as a proportion of its actual 
production work on any project. 
B. The Process of Building Production 
1. The Development of the Contracting System 
Ways must be found to improve the overall efficiency 
of a unique system of relationships between 
participants pursuing slightly different objectives 
but reluctant to admit it, exercising partial 
control for part of the time but pretending to be 
fully in charge, suspecting all other participants 
of unscrupulous practices and therefore barricading 
themselves behind contractual and administrative 
defences, the net result of which is to stifle 
initiative, slow down the pace of work and increase 
9 Ronald H. Coase, "The Nature of the Firm" (1937) 4 Economica 386; see chapter V., supra. 
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uncertainty10 
The organisation of building production in the United 
Kingdom is a matter of continuing controversy. Contemporary 
practice has been criticised in government reports and 
industry studies and by academic commentators11. The process 
by which buildings are produced is said to inhibit innovation, 
encourage inefficiency and to be very nearly ungovernable. 
Despite the persistence and severity of such charges, the 
"Contracting System" of building production has proven 
remarkably resistant to change12. 
The Contracting System emerged during the early decades 
of the nineteenth century. It has been described as the 
practice which broke the power of independent craftsmen and 
the building guilds, and interpreted as the building 
industry's substitute for the class relations of the 
10 Turin, Aspects of the Economics of Construction, supra, note 5 at xi. 
11 See, for example, Report on the Management and Placing of Building Contracts (The Simon Report) 
Ministry of Works (London: HMSO, 1944); Survey of the Problems Before the Construction Industries (The 
Emmerson Report) (London: HMSO, 1962); The Placing and Management of Contracts for Building and Civil 
Engineering Work (The Banwelt Report) Ministry of Public Buildings and Works (London: HMSO, 1964); The 
Public Client and the Construction Industries (The Wood Report) (London: HMSO, 1975); Marian Bowley 
The British Building Industry: Four Studies in Response and Resistance to Change (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1966) Michael Ball, "The Contracting System in the Construction Industry" Birkbeck 
College Discussion Paper #85 (1980); Michael Ball Rebuilding Construction: Economic Change in the 
British Construction Industry (London: Routtedge, 1988); L. Gordon Bayley Building: Teamwork or 
Conflict? (London: George Godwin, 1973); Interdependence and Uncertainty, Tavistock Institute of Human 
Relations (London: Tavistock Publications, 1966) (Report commissioned by the Building Industry 
Communications Research Project); EDC for Building, Faster Building for Industry, (NEDO) (London: HMSO, 
1983). 
12 Ball, writing in 1985, identified a takeover trend within the construction industry that might 
accelerate the growth of project management contracts in which the gc has full control over the 
management of the transaction: Rebuilding Construction, supra, note 11. For interesting assessments 
of the building transactions governed by project management contracts in the US, see, the symposium 
"Construction Management and Design-Build/Fast Track Construction" (1983) 46 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 1-180. 
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factory13. The genesis of the system is commonly associated 
with the emergence of the "master builder" during the massive 
public building programme of the early nineteenth century14. 
Master builders were an organisational innovation which 
enabled clients to avoid contracting with craftsmen from each 
of the individual construction trades. Responsibility for 
acquiring and assembling labour and materials was assumed by 
a single firm, the owners of which would rely on a combination 
of direct employment, manufacturing, and subcontracting to 
meet their commitments to the client15. 
The organisation of input from different trades by a 
central co-ordinating agency is only one aspect of the 
contracting system. Its second distinctive feature - the 
separation of design and supervision of a project from 
production - is associated with another nineteenth century 
phenomenon, professionalisation16. Architects moved quickly 
13 E. W. Cooney "The Origins of the Victorian Master Builders" (1955) 8 Economic History Review 
167; Ball Rebuilding Construction, supra, note 11; L. Clarke "The Production of the Built Environment: 
Backward or Peculiar? " (1985) 6 The Production of the Built Environment: Proceedings of the Bartlett 
International Summer School 2-3-2-7; Peter Kingsford, Builders and Building Workers (London: Edward 
Arnold, 1973); J. McKenna & R. Rodger "Control by Coercion: Employers' Associations and the 
Establishment of Industrial Order in the Building of England and Wales, 1860-1914" (1985) Business 
History Review 203; on the decline of the guilds, see R. A. Leeson, Travelling Brothers (London: Allen 
& Unwin, 1979). These writers challenge the conventional idea that the relative lack of 
industrialisation / mechanisation in building production indicates that the construction industry did 
not experience an industrial capitalist revolution. Their point is that capitalist relations and 
innovations in production took the form of changes which were primarily organisational rather than 
technological. 
14 For a vivid discussion of this building programme see, John Summerson, Georgian London 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962), see, in particular, chap. XV "Public Works after Waterloo"; see also, 
Cooney, "The Origins of the Victorian Master Builders", supra, note 13. 
15 Cooney, "The Origins of the Victorian Master Builders", supra, note 13; M. H. Port "The Office 
of Works and Building Contracts in Early Nineteenth-Century England" (1967) Economic History Review 
94; Kingsford Builders and Building Workers, supra, note 13; Hermione Hobhouse Thomas Cubitt: Master 
Builder, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1971). 
16 Bowley The British Building Industry: Four Studies in Response and Resistance to Change, supra, 
note 11; Barrington Kaye, The Development of the Architectural Profession in Britain (London: Allen 
& Unwin, 1960). 
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during the early eighteen-hundreds to dissociate their role 
as designers and advisers to clients from the production 
operations of the master builders. The Institute of British 
Architects was founded in 1834, and by 1837 had received 
charter status. The Institute extended existing informal 
restrictions on entry to the profession, campaigned for 
education and training programmes, and regulated relationships 
between architects and other members of the building 
industry17. Of particular significance to the growth of the 
Contracting System, was the Institute's insistence that 
architects remain economically independent of building 
firms18. This practice is said to have developed as a way of 
encouraging clients to trust architects, who, in their role 
as overseers of building projects, occupied a potentially 
ambiguous position between client and general builder19. Its 
primary organisational consequences, however, were to entrench 
the separation of building design from building production, 
and conflate the responsibilities of architects and builders 
for the management of building production. 
A third institutional innovation of the nineteenth 
century concerned the use of contracts to facilitate control 
over the costs of building production. Under the earlier 
17 Ibid. 
18 
In 1887, the formal separation of the economic interests of architects and builders was 
enshrined in the charter of the Institute. The process of professionalisation was completed in 1931 
with the institutionalisation in legislation of a licensing regime: Powell, An Economic History of the 
British Building Industry: 1815-1979, supra, note 7. 
19 Cooney, "The Origins of the Victorian Master Builders", supra, note 13; Port, "The Office of 
Works and Building Contracts in Early Nineteenth-Century England", supra, note 15. 
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system of separate contracting, the pricing of clients' 
contracts with individual craftsmen would normally be based 
on a unit rate for the input which was in fact supplied20. 
Even if some attempt to estimate quantities had been made in 
advance, the actual payment to contractors would be derived 
from measurement of their work after it had been completed 
21 
One important consequence of this method of pricing was that 
realised production costs might have at best a tenuous 
connection with clients' expectations 
22. Secondly, the 
"measurement and value" system gave surveyors a vital role in 
building production23. Surveyors were not only responsible for 
final measurement of each contractor's work, but would also 
be expected to verify that the quality of materials (and 
workmanship) supplied, justified payment at the contractual 
rate 24 . 
During the early decades of the nineteenth century, the 
practice of "measure and value" contracting was swept away. 
The system with which it was replaced, "contracting in gross" 
on the basis of competitive tendering, was, at first, scarcely 
less controversial. It was thought that builders who had 
tendered on an ex ante agreed price basis would be likely to 
20 Cooney, "The Origins of the Victorian Master Builders"; David Yeomans "Managing Eighteenth- 
Century Building" (1988) 4 Construction History 3. 
21 Ibid. 
22 
As noted by Yeomans, not only would it be much more difficult to observe and measure quantities 
on an ex post basis, but there existed enormous regional and trade-based variations in the practices 
of measurement: Yeomans, "Managing Eighteenth Century Building" ibid. 
23 ibid., see also, Port, "The Office of Works and Building Contracts in Early Nineteenth-Century 
England", supra, note 15. 
24 
Yeomans "Managing Eighteenth-Century Building", supra, note 20. 
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underestimate the costs of production, either in a deliberate 
attempt to beat the competition, or out of fear that clients 
would be deterred from building if they knew the true cost, 
or simply because builders did not have sufficient information 
at the time of preparing their bids. It was argued that 
builders, having under-priced their bids, would attempt to 
make up differences between the contract price and the real 
costs of production by skimping on performance, or claiming 
that the contract did not cover all of the work required for 
production. George Saunders, for example, in giving evidence 
before the Commissioners of Inquiry into the conduct of 
business in the Office of Works asserted that: 
Contractors ... are frequently not scrupulous about the amount they agree for; and before the building 
is far advanced will find out what quantity, and 
what kind of work can be done for that sum to make 
it a profitable concern, taking advantage [of] as 
much of the omission in the specification as will 
answer the purpose, and laying the employer under 
the necessity of giving orders which will wholly 
set aside the contract, or allow the contractor to 
make such extra charges as he shall require25. 
In response to these concerns, it was argued that the 
economic imperatives faced by the master builders would 
prevent egregious abuse of ex ante pricing and that any 
residual problems could be dealt with by ensuring that 
25 Report of the Commissioners of Enquiry into the Conduct of Business in the Office of Works 
Parliamentary Papers 1812-1813, quoted in Port, "The Office of Works and Building Contracts in Early 
Nineteenth-Century England", supra, note 15 at 98. 
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adequate information was available at the tender stage26. The 
case for economic incentives was built on three main 
arguments27. First, it was thought that gc. s who needed a 
regular programme of work in order to maintain their 
establishment of permanent employees would be unlikely to 
skimp on production for fear of alienating major clients. 
(This. argument was believed to be particularly forceful in 
view of the volume of government contracting that was underway 
at the time28. ) Secondly, the permanent workforce of the 
master builders together with their ability to offer on-going 
business to sub-contractors, it was argued, enhanced gc. s' 
power to control the costs of production. These firms, 
therefore, were thought to be in a good position accurately 
to predict a large proportion of building costs. Finally, the 
volume of work available to gc. s, it was said, meant that they 
had the capacity to bear an occasional loss on an individual 
contract. As a result, gc. s were believed to be less likely 
to attempt to recover for erroneous estimates during 
performance of a contract, especially, where aggressive 
pursuit of claims might alienate a major client. 
The practice of "contracting in gross" with master 
builders on the basis of a tendering process also appealed to 
government departments responsible for implementing and 
26 See, for example, the evidence of John Nash quoted in the Report of the Select Committee on 
the office of Public Works and Public Buildings (Parliamentary Papers, 1828, IV) at 58-9. 
27 Report of the Select Committee on the office of Public Works and Public Buildings, 1828, supra. 
28 supra, note 14. 
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managing the programme of public building29. As is apparent 
from the government reports of the time, the new system was 
perceived to offer far better control over budgets and 
accounting than could be obtained by "measure and value" 
contracting with separate trades30. 
By the middle of the nineteenth century the main planks 
of the contemporary Contracting System were in place. Client- 
developers would hire an architect to design their project, 
advise on potential contractors and act as a supervisor of 
production. Upon completion of the drawings, the client would 
hire a Quantity Surveyor to formulate a detailed specification 
of the inputs which would be required to complete the building 
project. This specification - the Bill of Quantities - 
together with the architect's drawings, would be made 
available to gc. s who intended to bid for the project. Gc. s 
would formulate tender bids based on the documentary 
information, and offer both a lump-sum price for the entire 
project, and a list of prices for each item in the Bill. Upon 
formation of the contract between client and gc, the priced 
Bill of Quantities of the successful bidder became part of the 
29 Cooney talks about the importance of government reports and the building programme to the 
organisational innovations in fairly idealist terms. He comments, for example, that: "during the first 
half of the nineteenth century, the industry's customers, including public bodies, came to believe that 
the best basis on which to arrange for building was to obtain competitive tenders for the work to be 
carried out by one builder at fixed cost--: Cooney, "The Origins of the Victorian Master Builders", 
supra, note 13 at 174. 
30 Commissioners of Military Enquiry. 4th Report, (Parliamentary Papers, 1806-7,11); Report of 
the Commissioners of Enquiry into the conduct of Business in the office of works (Parliamentary Papers, 
1812-13, V); Report of the Select committee on the Office of Public Works and Public Buildings (1828), 
supra, note 26; Report of the select committee on Windsor Castle and Buckingham Palace, (Parliamentary 
Papers, 1831, IV). 
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contract documents. The contract between client and gc was in 
essence a two-part commitment by the builder. Gc. s undertook 
to procure the quantities of labour and materials resources 
stated in the Bills for the prices tendered and to co-ordinate 
on-site assembly of resources to produce the building as 
defined by the drawings and specification. 
2. The Organisational Characteristics of Building Production 
The institutional setting of construction projects, as 
constituted by the structure of the industry and the 
contracting system, may be viewed as both a source of, and a 
response to, the costs of organising building production. In 
order to analyse the specific transactional implications of 
JCT80, therefore, it is necessary to identify general sources 
of transaction costs in the process which the contract 
purports to govern. 
Construction is a complex production process which 
entails the collection and assembly of disparate resources at 
a fixed location. Three aspects of'this process stand out as 
potentially significant sources of organisational and co- 
ordination costs: the interactive nature of production, its 
time-scale, and site-specificity. 
The interactive aspect of construction appears in the 
collaborative nature of building production and also in the 
extent to which the performance of any one resource-supplier 
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shapes the conditions under which others perform31. 
Interactive production complicates the process of co- 
-ordinating activities in that building projects cannot be 
managed effectively as if tasks were wholly discrete and self- 
contained. Decision-makers must, instead, confront the 
dependence of each participant on the quality and timeliness 
of performance by others and recognise that disruption in one 
part of a project may have complex and far-reaching 
repercussions. 
Interdependence also compounds the costs of reacting to 
disruptive events and responding to information which emerges 
during production. Details of the event or the new information 
must be communicated throughout a network of participants. 
Moreover, adjustment decisions will need to take account of 
the implications of different options for a number of actors 
and changes which are implemented will generally entail 
widespread revision of plans and operations. 
Finally, the interactive nature of production may make 
it difficult to use ex post observation as a means of locating 
responsibility for poor quality input. Building production 
melds the separate contributions of input suppliers into one 
product with the result that failures in the performance of 
a building cannot readily be traced to individual actors. The 
transformative nature of interdependence, in effect, destroys 
31 See, generally, the discussion of transactional clustering and "team" production supra, chapter 
V. 
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the mechanism of direct accountability upon which ex post 
monitoring of performance is based32. 
The problems of interdependence are exacerbated by the 
fragmentation of the construction industry and the resulting 
economic autonomy of resource suppliers. While architect, gc, 
sub-contractors, and materials suppliers might be expected to 
act as if they were a united team, each actor's participation 
in building production is driven by a distinct profit stream. 
As a result construction projects are exposed to the risk that 
an individual input supplier may attempt to improve its own 
position by shifting some of the costs of participation onto 
another participant33. Such strategic behaviour may be 
manifested in refusals to co-operate in adjustment of the 
transaction to take account of new information. Alternatively, 
an opportunistic participant may take advantage of the 
client's inability readily to distinguish between interactive 
performances by "cheating" on the quality of input which it 
supplies. 
Time is another important characteristic of construction 
projects. The production of "major works" is seldom completed 
in less than eighteen months34 and while many participants are 
32 Ibid. 
33 Supra, chapter II, see also the discussion of implicit and explicit forms of opportunism in 
our analysis of relational contracting, supra, chapter IV. 
34 
Data on construction times is scattered, and analysis is complicated by differences in the 
definitions of production times. Some useful tables are to be found in Faster Building for industry, 
supra, note 11; How Flexible is Construction, EDC's for Building and Civil Engineering, NEDO (London: 
HMSO, 1978); Hillebrandt, Analysis of the British Construction Industry, supra, note 1; see, also, RIBA 
"Inquiry into the Building Timetable" (1958) 65 RIBA Journal 350. 
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involved for only part of the process, arrangements between 
client, architect and gc span the entire production phase. The 
time element of construction creates three main problems of 
governance. First, relationships between resource suppliers 
evolve as participants learn to work with one another on the 
particular project. A structure of governance may be required, 
therefore, to accommodate significant changes in the basis of 
association between participants35. For example, even if a gc 
and architect have a history of collaboration, the experience 
of working together on a specific project for a new client 
adds to each actor's knowledge of the other. This information 
provides a foundation for the working relationship between 
architect and gc, and shapes the possibility of co-operation 
between them. While the relationship between architect and gc 
may be enhanced or soured by the knowledge gained during a 
transaction, successful completion of the project, from the 
perspective of the client, requires the structure of 
governance to preserve commitments to co-operate in pursuit 
of clients' interests. 
Secondly, the time-scale of building production is a 
source of uncertainty for participants36. Viewed from an ex 
ante perspective, the primary effect of uncertainty is to 
create a risk that changes in the economic environment of 
building production will increase the costs of executing the 
35 Supra, chapters IV and V. 
36 Supra, chapter II. 
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transaction. Uncertainty, therefore, forces participants to 
confront the possibility that the project will not be 
completed on the terms originally envisaged, and formulate 
governance provisions for managing risks. 
Third, the duration of a construction project compounds 
the costs of procuring and co-ordinating supplies of input37. 
Decisions about the timing of supplies if taken at the 
beginning of a project may be highly prone to error. Not only 
are decision-makers unable to control the environment of 
production, but they also do not know whether their work will 
be hampered by other participants. Even the most carefully 
laid plans, therefore, may be thwarted by uncontrollable 
environmental conditions or unexpected internal conflicts. 
Error costs may be curtailed, perhaps, by postponing decisions 
to procure supplies until close to the time when the input is 
needed. This approach, however, entails other costs. In 
particular, a failure to make sufficiently precise 
arrangements in advance may result in input suppliers not 
being available when required, or higher prices than had been 
anticipated38. 
37 See, generally, chapter II, supra, for discussion of this aspect of uncertainty; compare 
classical and relational mechanisms for managing risk, described, supra, chapters III and IV. Analysis 
of risk-management under JCT80, is to be found, infra, chapters VII and VIII. 
38 As is apparent from the "firm offer" problem, the costs of making adequate and precise 
arrangements in advance may be shaped by the governing legal regime. However, the extent to which any 
particular, legal ground rule, is a source of undesirable and avoidable costs, is more debateable. 
With respect to the issue of whether the unenforceability of sub-contractors bids which are used by 
gc. s in preparing their own tender bids, compare, for example, the interpretations of Fritz Schultze, 
"The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business Practices in the Construction Industry" (1952) 19 
University of Chicago Law Review 237; Malcolm Sharp, "Promises, Mistakes and Reciprocity" (1952) 19 
University of Chicago Law Review 286; The Law Commission, "Firm Offers" Working Paper #60 (London: 
HMSO, 1975) Richard Lewis, "Contracts between Businessmen: Reform of the Law of Firm Offers and an 
Empirical Study of Tendering Practices In the Building Industry" (1982) 9 Journal of Law and Society 
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The site-specificity of the construction process is also 
implicated in the transaction costs of governing building 
production39. Clients supply a fixed resource, land, while 
other participants are organised around mobile units for the 
supply of expertise, materials and labour. As a result, a high 
proportion of clients' costs are dedicated to a specific 
transaction, located in a particular place, and cannot readily 
be transferred to another project. The relative immobility of 
clients' investments opens up the possibility of opportunistic 
attempts to redistribute shares in the transactional surplus 
during production. 
Locational specificity may also create problems for 
planning and control of the production process. Some 
characteristics of a site emerge only after production has 
started and the information which materialises may create a 
need for substantial changes to future operations and 
revisions to plans which have already been acted upon. 
Similarly, site-based production is vulnerable, to 
environmental conditions which may also force participants to 
review existing arrangements and expectations. 
These specific sources of transactions costs in building 
production are linked to the problem of uncertainty, a 
153; and the Alberta Court of Appeal in Northern Construction Co. Ltd. v. Gloae Heating & Plumbing Ltd. 
(1986) 27 DLR (4th) 264. 
39 See, generally, chapters II and IV, supra, for discussions of Idiosyncratic investment. Note 
that with respect to building production, the uniqueness of a site is defined as much by the 
institutional framework of public regulation of land-use as by physical characteristics. Building 
design may be constrained by physical and regulatory limits on the use of a site; and the supply and 
management of inputs during construction may need to take some account of features of the site and 
environmental, public health controls and occupational health and safety standards. 
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pervasive feature of the construction process40. Uncertainty 
undermines planning, inhibits reliance and impedes co- 
operation. It is manifested in the transaction costs of 
organising operations, adapting to change and maintaining 
financial control over production costs. 
In addition to uncertainties derived from economic 
actors' inadequate prior knowledge of a site and lack of 
control over environmental conditions, the organisation of 
building production may be impaired by participants' 
misgivings about one another 41. The process of construction, 
as constituted by the Contracting System, is based on the 
premises that participants share a common objective and accept 
a common set of "rules" for achieving their objective 42 
Moreover, the Contracting System creates "intimate"43, 
interdependent, and potentially unequal, relationships during 
execution of the transaction. Given these characteristics of 
building production, participants' doubts about the 
reliability or competence of others engaged on the project may 
be devastating. Such uncertainties may provoke a climate of 
40 Tavistock, Interdependence and Uncertainty: A Study of the Building Industry, supra, note 11; 
Turin, Aspects of the Economics of Construction, supra, note 5. 
41 See generally, Tavistock, Interdependence and Uncertainty, ibid., see, chapter VII, infra for 
a development of this problem of "participant uncertainties". 
42 It is important to recognise that building production is governed by both informal and formal 
rules, and that informal rules may be at least as important to the success of a project as the formal 
rules of the contract and governing legal culture. Indeed the Tavistock project suggested that 
construction projects could not be completed unless the participants developed informal rules which 
frequently contradicted the formal rules of the transaction, Interdependence and Uncertainty, supra, 
note 11, see also, Turin, Aspects of the Economics of Construction, supra, note 5. 
43 
This characterisation was used by Daintith to describe relationships between participants In 
iron-ore markets, Terence Daintith, "The Design and Performance of Long-Term Contracts" in Contract 
and Organisation Daintith and Gunther Teubner (eds. ) (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986). 
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suspicion, obstruct communication channels and prompt economic 
actors to engage in transactional practices designed to secure 
protection against, rather than co-operation with, other 
participants. 
C. Introduction to the Joint Contracts Tribunal Standard Form 
of Building Contract 
1. History of the Standard Form of Building contract 
As stated by John Parris, "the Joint Contracts Tribunal 
is ... no longer a joint body and has never been a 
tribunal 144. It is, rather, a standing committee, composed of 
trade associations with interests in the process of building 
production, which is responsible for drafting and revising 
standard form contracts. The agency includes representatives 
of public sector clients, construction professionals, and 
owners of both general contracting firms and firms which 
45 specialise in sub-contracting. Its contracts are, in effect, 
negotiated standard form arrangements, embodying those 
44 John Parris, The Standard Form of Building Contract: JCT80 (London: Collins, 1985) (2nd ed. ) 
at 3. 
45 
At the time when JCT80 was drafted, the agency consisted of representatives from 12 
constituencies: the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA), the Royal Institution of Chartered 
Surveyors (RICS), the Building Employers Confederation (BEC), the Association of County Councils, the 
Association of Metropolitan Authorities, the Association of District Councils, the Greater London 
Council, the Committee of Associations of Specialist Engineering Contractors (CASEC), the Federation 
of Associations of Specialists and Sub-contractors (FASS), the Association of Consulting Engineers 
(ACE), the Scottish Building Contracts Committee, and the Building Property Federation (BPF). (Note 
that CASEC, FASS & ACE, are themselves federations of trade associations). The most significant change 
in membership since that time was caused by the demise of the Greater London Council and the 
Metropolitan Counties as Local governmental authorities. 
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compromises of interests which have proven acceptable to the 
membership46. 
The practice of creating negotiated standard forms of 
contractual governance for building production grew out of 
conflict between builders and architects during the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century47. The primary source of 
friction was the extent of builders' obligations under the new 
system of "contracting in gross"48. This issue involved two 
related concerns which were collapsed into a single complaint 
of unfairness. First, transactions between client and builders 
were treated by courts as "entire" contracts49, with the 
result that the risk of disruptive contingencies was 
presumptively allocated to builders50. Secondly, builders 
complained that clients' consultants seldom prepared a 
detailed specification and full set of design drawings in time 
for the tendering process and that in the absence of a uniform 
system of ex ante measurement, the documents, when available, 
were not a reliable basis on which to formulate a contract 
price51. Builders maintained that as a direct consequence of 
46 Norman Royce, "Producing a Standard Form of Contract" (1984-5) 1 Construction Law Journal 255. 
Royce is the Chair of the Joint Contracts Tribunal. in this article he reflects upon the process of 
revising and drafting standard form contracts. He notes that the Tribunal "works on the basis of common 
consent and no votes are taken-- (at 259). He also makes the points that achieving consensus among the 
representatives is hard, but only the first step. Once provisions have been agreed, the representatives 
must take proposals back to their associations for approval. 
47 Dennis F. Dolan, The British Construction Industry - An Introduction (London: Macmillan, 1979). 
48 Ibid., see also, Port, "The Office of Works and Building Contracts in Early Nineteenth-Century 
England", supra, note 15. 
49 Cutter v. Powell (1795) 2 Sm. LC. 1. 
50 See, for example, Apple v. Myers (1867) LR 2 CP 651. 
51 Raymond W. Postgate, The Builder's History (London: Labour Publishing, 1923); Port, "The Office 
of Works and Building Contracts in Early Nineteenth-Century England", supra, note 15. 
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inadequate information at tendering, they were routinely 
forced to revise their plans and procure additional input 
during execution of a project52. Moreover, it was alleged that 
the combination of poor professional practice and the doctrine 
of entire contracts, led courts to hold builders accountable 
not only for uncontrollable contingencies, but also for the 
inadequate preparatory work of clients' consultants53. 
As the pace of construction increased with urbanisation 
and construction projects developed in size, builders' 
concerns about the unpredictable nature of their costs became 
more urgent. In 1866, The General Builders' Association, at 
its annual general meeting, adopted a report which recommended 
that all "contracts should be specific and definite in their 
terms"54. The call was taken up by the London Builder's 
Society, which in 1870 created a model contract in 
consultation with the Royal Institute of British Architects 
(RIBA)55. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Some indication of the legal community's lack of sympathy with the builder's concerns can be 
found in commentary of the time. writing in 1891, A. A. Hudson, commented that: 
Conditions in building contracts are often called unreasonable and oppressive. Such 
conditions, as a rule, merely provide that the builder or contractor shall take every 
risk, and shall abide by the decision of a third party directly interested in pleasing 
his employer by his decision. All risks and contingencies are capable of being 
adequately compensated by payment... the builder, therefore, has two alternatives - 
either to charge for the risk or not to undertake it. An employer or building owner, 
if he cannot pay the price asked, may take the risk himself, but if he contracts that 
the risk shall be borne by the builder, it would be very unreasonable to ask him to 
pay twice over. 
Building and Engineering Contracts Alfred A. Hudson (London: 1891) at 3. 
54 Dolan, The British Construction Industry, supra, note 47. 
55 This contract is reproduced in The Architect's legal Handbook E. Jenkins and J. Raymond 
(London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1880) (3rd ed. ) at 224-229. It specifies the standard of gc. s' 
performance, provided for the architect to supervise building operations, establishes a system of stage 
payments, stipulates when title to unfixed materials is to pass to the client, and incorporates an 
embryonic version of the present machinery for adjusting the time constraint. The contract also 
contains an arbitration clause. 
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This sixteen-clause package of terms for governing 
transactions between clients and builders, created by 
representatives of architects and builders working in the 
London area, seemed to pave the way for a national contract. 
However, it was not until 1903 that representatives of the 
RIBA, the National Federation of Building Trades Employers 
(NFBTE)56 and the Institute of Building (IOB) agreed to 
publish a standard contract for national use. Moreover, even 
at the point of publication of the standard form, there was 
dissension between the constituent associations. Differences 
over issues such as the incorporation of a Bill of Quantities 
into the contract and the appropriate scope of the arbitration 
clause, were finally compromised in 1909, when the three 
associations endorsed what was then known as "the RIBA form 
of contract"57. 
The rudimentary co-operation of the period did not extend 
to the institutionalisation of a process for monitoring and 
revision of the standard form contract. Thus, upon realising 
that the contract of 1909 would not be adequate for the 
extensive post World War I building programme, the NFBTE 
simply gave notice to the RIBA that it intended to withdraw 
its support. This move gave rise to another process of 
consultation and discussion orchestrated by an ad hoc 
56 Now known as the Building Employers Confederation (BEC). 
57 
According to Dotan, the main difficulties arose in working out the appropriate scope of the 
arbitration clause and in deciding whether to incorporate a Bitt of Quantities into the contract: 
The British Construction industry, supra, note 47. 
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committee of contractors, architects and quantity surveyors58. 
Difficulties in gaining acceptance for the draft contract of 
this Committee prompted the decision to create a standing 
institution - the Joint Contracts Tribunal - with a mandate 
to formulate, monitor and revise a standard form of building 
contract 59 
The contract that was published in 1931 was substantially 
rewritten in 193960, by which time local government bodies 
were coming to accepted its basic scheme of rights, duties, 
risks and procedures. The incorporation of local government 
interests into the drafting agency led to the current 
bipartite system of Private and Local Authority editions of 
the main forms of contract. Over the last forty years the 
agency has expanded its membership to accommodate the 
proliferation of trade associations representing different 
groups of building producers61. 
Since the redrafting of the traditional contract in 1980, 
the JCT has made substantial progress toward its current 
objective of producing a range of contracts to accommodate 
variations in construction projects62. The analysis in this 
thesis focuses on the standard "main" form of contract - the 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 The 108 had withdrawn from the drafting agency in 1931, so this draft was prepared by 
representatives of the RIBA and NFBTE only: Parris, The Standard Form of building Contract: JCT80, 
supra, note 44. 
61 
supra, note 45. 
62 The agency currently offers 10 standard forms of contractual governance which are intended to 
take account of differences in size and organisational structure of construction projects. 
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"With Quantities" edition63. This contract is intended to 
govern large projects, located within the institutional 
setting of the traditional Contracting System. Such 
transactions are predicated on a clear separation between 
responsibilities of professional advisers to the client for 
design, general supervision, cost control and certification, 
and gc. s' obligations to procure, assemble and manage the 
resources necessary to produce the building. 
2. Current Form: Participants and Players 
The Joint Contracts Tribunal Standard Form of Building 
Contract "With Quantities" is stated to be a contract between 
a client (or employer), and a gc. In addition to its 
provisions for the relationship between the two signing 
parties, JCT80 attempts to govern some aspects of the 
participation in building production of persons drawn from 
eight different classes of construction actors. The contract 
names as "non-party" participants: an architect, a quantity 
surveyor, a local authority, other statutory agencies, two 
types of domestic sub-contractor, work persons directly 
engaged by the client, nominated sub-contractors and nominated 
suppliers. All except those directly engaged by the client are 
63 The phrase "With Quantities" indicates that gc. s' input to the project is defined by a Bill 
of Quantities, a document drawn up by the client's Quantity Surveyor on the basis of details and 
drawings supplied by the design professionals: infra; see also chapter VII. 
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directly involved in execution of the "Contract Works""; and 
every participant, apart from the local authority and the 
statutory agencies, supplies input by way of a contractual 
relationship with the gc or the client. Under the provisions 
of JCT80, one class of participants - the nominated sub- 
contractors - has a contractual relationship with both client 
and gc. The basic system of contractual relationships is shown 
in figure 1. 
1Architect 
Quantity Surveyor 
Client---` Directly Engaged Contractors 
Jý 
. 
AGeneral Contractor `-- -- . Dom. Sub. C I 
+Nom. Supp. 
~ýýNominated 
Sub-Contractor 
Figure 1 The Structure of Contractual Relationships 
64 le. the building project as defined by the contract documents available to the gc at the time 
of tendering: infra, chapter VII. 
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Of as much significance to our analysis as the system of 
contractual relationships is the structure of management 
responsibilities instituted by JCT80. The standard Conditions 
of Contract consist of a complex package of procedures for co- 
ordinating the process of building production. These 
procedures purport to regulate the transaction throughout the 
process of production on-site. As is shown in figure 2, JCT80 
deals with potential co-ordination conflicts by ordering 
control over building production as a hierarchical system of 
full and partial relationships of authority to manage. 
'ARCHITECT 0 #**ýý 
Gý 
" 
#G DE 
NSC NS 
DSC 
key ---; = management relationship 
--->= partial management relationship 
Figure 2 The Structure of Management 
Relationships. 
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JCT80 attempts to maintain participants' accountability 
for the inputs which they supply by integrating the 
transactional roles of resource suppliers into its network of 
rights, obligations and powers. In pursuit of this objective 
the contract relies on two mechanisms to circumvent the 
doctrine of privity. First, the management roles of the 
architect, (and the QS) are situated in the institutional 
context of the legal concept of agency. Secondly, the JCT has 
developed a "cost-pass-through" strategy which, in effect, 
uses the client and the gc as conduits for channelling rights, 
directions and liabilities to other participants with whom 
each party has a contractual relationship 65. 
a. The Client 
The client's decision to procure a building triggers the 
entire process governed by JCT80. The client hires the 
architect and the quantity surveyor to the project, and is 
accountable to the gc for the manner in which the consultants 
exercise their contractual powers and discharge their duties. 
Clients are also responsible for the operation of the process 
by which nominated sub-contractors are appointed, and will be 
liable to the general contractor for disruptions caused by 
direct employees or nominated sub-contractors. 
65 Infra, see also, chapter IX. 
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Conventional models of the construction process depict 
clients as heavily involved in the early stages of decision- 
making before the building contract is let66. Clients are 
expected to generate information for the architect and other 
members of the design team, participate in modifications of 
early design proposals and make the final decisions about the 
building concept. The client is also responsible for securing 
financing for building production and, in collaboration with 
the quantity surveyor, is expected to work out a programme for 
governing expenditure during the project. Finally, although 
the tendering documents are prepared by architect and quantity 
surveyor, the client is in charge of the process by which the 
contract is let, and makes the final selection decision with 
respect to the gc. 
Once the contract with the gc is formed, the client's 
role is dramatically diminished. Clients may be involved in 
the selection of direct employees, they may participate in the 
appointment of nominated sub-contractors and suppliers and in 
some decisions about adjustments to the transaction during 
execution67. The client, is not, however, expected to take part 
in management of the production process. Indeed, in a graphic 
portrayal of a "model" relationship between clients and 
66 See, for example, EDC for Building, Before You Build NEDO (London: HMSO, 1974); Preparing to 
Build: R&D Building Management Handbook, Ministry of Public Building & Works (London: HMSO, 1965); 
Faster Building for Industry, supra, note 11; EDCs for Building and Civil Engineering, The Public 
Client and the construction Industry, NEDO (London: HMSO, 1975). 
67 See, for example, the discussions of changes to the specification during production, under the 
Variation procedure, in chapters VI1 & VIII, infra. 
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building producers working on a site, one industry Report 
asserted that the client: 
... must on no account say anything to anybody that 
might be construed as an instruction. It is 
fundamental to the efficient management of any 
undertaking that instructions should come through 
one channel only, and in a building operation that 
channel must be the designer. If the client has any 
point to make he should put it to the designer, who 
will look into its implications in terms of cost, 
design and delay and discuss them with him before 
giving any formal instruction to the builder. 
b. The General Contractor 
The general contractor is the central co-ordinating agent 
of building production. Its basic undertaking to the client 
is to ensure that, subject to the contractual provisions for 
contingencies, those parts of the building which were defined 
in the documents upon which it tendered, are constructed for 
the price agreed and within the time stated in the contract. 
However, gc. s in transactions governed by JCT80 do not 
undertake to produce the building themselves, nor is it 
likely, given the working rules of the contract, that the 
client's financial commitment is limited by the tender price 
which was accepted69. 
The primary function of the gc is best expressed in the 
idea of managing the process of construction, subject to the 
68 Preparing to Build, supra, note 66 at 23. 
69 Infra, chapter V11I. 
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direction and supervision of the architect70. Gc. s make 
arrangements for labour and materials to be supplied to the 
site, engage in production of some parts of the building and 
organise assembly of resources supplied by others. In this 
latter role, gc. s are expected to maintain communication 
between the architect and other resource suppliers and to 
notify the client, through the architect, of any problems with 
the site, execution of the design, or access to resources. 
The second role of the gc within construction projects 
governed by JCT80 is to act as a "cost-pass-through" 
mechanism. As noted above, this function may be seen as a 
strategy for integrating autonomous resource suppliers within 
a single framework of governance. It involves the gc assuming 
liability to the client for time, quality, and price 
dimensions of performance by each of the participants with 
whom it contracts. The theory behind this structure of 
accountability is that in the event of a problem with any 
70 The relationship between the supervisory roles of architect and gc is one of the more 
contentious issues raised by the organisation of building production. The 1939 edition of the main 
contract is the Last version specifically to state that the architect is empowered generally to "give 
directions" to the gc. Under JCT80 the architect is formally required to issue Instructions in 
particular circumstances, and the gc has an absolute contractual duty to comply with all but one type 
of properly issued instruction that the architect is expressly empowered to issue: clause 4.1, (infra, 
chapter VIII). The dominant view within the legal Literature is that apart from the situations where 
the contract specifically authorises instructions, the architect does not have the power to direct the 
work of the gc, and that the gc is entirely responsible for the organisation of a project and 
production methods: Parris, The Standard Form of Building Contract: JC780, supra, note 44; Ian Duncan 
Wallace "Anns Beyond Repair, ' (1991) 107 Law Quarterly Review 228; Duncan Wallace "Defective Work: The 
New flavours" (1990) 6 Construction Law Journal 87. By virtue of their contracts with clients, however, 
architects are required to provide sufficient supervision to ensure that the client obtains a building 
which corresponds to the decisions that were made during planning. Moreover, gc. s may wish to seek the 
protection of Architect's Instructions for some or all of the production process. The purpose of so- 
doing would be to open up the possibility of shifting part of the risks of defects or delay during 
production from their shoulders. Further complications are raised by the participation of nominated 
sub-contractors in building production and the rote of the Clerk of Works. Chapter IX, infra, addresses 
some of the problems raised by the JCT's strategy of using contratuaL duties and sanctions as 
instruments for implementing supervisory responsibilities. 
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particular aspect of the building, the client is to seek 
redress from the gc, who would in turn enforce its contract 
with the specific resource supplier. The cost-pass-through 
mechanism also works in the opposite direction. That is to 
say, JCT80 assumes that the gc is accountable to sub- 
contractors and suppliers for disruptions caused by actors for 
whom the client is responsible to the gc, and risks which are 
allocated to the client. Sub-contractors and suppliers whose 
connection to the project is based exclusively on a contract 
with the gc, are expected to make contractual claims against 
the gc. The gc may in turn make a claim against the client, 
who would, where appropriate, recover from the actor whose 
failure caused the problem. 
c. Architect 
Of the non-party participants in a construction project, 
the architect plays a dominant role7l. Architects are hired by 
clients to be involved at all stages of a project from the 
initial decision to build until after the completed structure 
is in users. In direct contrast with the primary construction 
trend of increasing specialisation and fragmentation, the 
architect supplies a diverse range of services, incorporating 
71 See, generally, Kaye, The Develorrent of the Architectural Profession in Britain, supra, note 
16; Andrew Saint, The Image of the Architect (London: Yale University Press, 1983); EDCs for Building 
and Civil Engineering The Professions and the Construction Industries NEDO (London: NM50,1976). 
n The RIBA publishes a standardised set of Conditions of Engagement which is generally used to 
govern the relationship between client and architect. 
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design, managerial and administrative functions73 . The range 
and scope of the contemporary architect's responsibilities in 
building production have led some commentators to doubt the 
continuing viability of this role. Powell, for example, 
writing about the increasing demands on the architects 
profession since 1940, questions "whether any human agency 
could ever reconcile interests as disparate as those with whom 
Architects work"74. 
Historically, the architect had sole control over 
building design. This role entailed the formulation of plans 
for a structure that would meet as many of the client's 
requirements as was possible, given technological, cost and 
timing constraints. The architect was expected to interpret 
a client's needs and preferences, develop, and assist in the 
evaluation of, different options and translate the client's 
final choice into a blueprint for production 75 . 
Recent trends such as the decreasing supply of land, 
increasing standards of living, and the development of new 
methods and materials of construction, have, to some extent, 
changed the basis of building design76. Technology and 
73 Kaye, The Development of the Architectural Profession in Britain, suvra, note 16; Saint, Ihs 
Image of the Architect, supra, note 71; EDCs for Building and Civil Engineering The Professions and 
the Construction industries, soars, note 71. 
74 Powell, An Economic History of the British Building industry: 1815-1979, stara, note 7. 
75 Kaye, The Development of the Architectural Profession in Britain, swra, note 16; EDCs for 
Building and Civil Engineering The Professions and the Construction Industries, suPre, note 71; P. A. 
Stone Building Economy: Design Production and Organisation -A Synoptic View (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 
1983); Bowtey, The British Building Industry: Four Studies in Response and Resistance to Change, sURra, 
note 11. 
76 Stone, Building Economy, ewre, note 75. 
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engineering, in many instances, are at least as significant 
as aesthetics to the design decisions of clients who have 
major building projects. This transformation has been met, in 
part, by diversification of the design function, with the 
result that contemporary building projects typically make use 
of packages of design services, labour and materials supplied 
by specialists in particular aspects of building 
technologiesn. The current role of the architect during the 
planning phase, therefore, has shifted from pure design 
development in consultation with the client, to management of 
a team process. That is to say, architects' traditional 
responsibility for the basic building concept has been 
supplemented by the functions of co-ordinating the plans of 
different designers and managing communications between 
designers and the client78. 
In addition to their responsibilities with respect to 
design, architects usually handle the preliminary 
administration of a project before work begins on the site 79 . 
This process may involve negotiations with the local planning 
authority, and will include consulting with the quantity 
surveyor, organising the tendering process for letting the 
project and advising the client with respect to the selection 
77 ]bid. For development of this point, see the discussion of nominated sub-contractors, infra. 
78 one important question raised by this change is how far architects should remain legally 
accountable to clients for the quality or performance of the entire building concept which is produced 
by the team of designers: see, chapter IX. infra. for discussion of this issue. 
79 EDCs for Building and Civil Engineering The Professions and the construction Industries, Supra, 
note 71. 
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of a gc and appointments of nominated sub-contractors and 
suppl iers80. 
The architect does not have a formal contractual 
relationship with any of the building producers. However, 
JCT80 accords her extensive powers, and sometimes duties, to 
administer and supervise the Contract Works. The powers are 
primarily to be exercised on behalf of the client but many of 
the duties require the architect to make decisions as if she 
were independent of the client8l. Architects' authority with 
respect to decisions involving the gc, and through the gc, its 
sub-contractors and suppliers, is derived from the working 
rules of the contract between client and gc. That is to say, 
the gc's undertaking to ensure construction of the building 
incorporates a commitment to work within a framework of 
"direction" and supervision by a project architect82. In view 
of the importance of a good working relationship between 
project architect and the gc, the premise of JCT80 is that the 
gc may veto the client's choice of architect to the project". 
Supervision entails monitoring the performances of input 
80 These processes are described more fully in Chapter VII, infra. 
81 This "quasi-judicial" role of the architect, as formulated in Chambers v. Goldthorpe 119011 
1 KB 624, was originally associated with the view that architects were not legally accountable to 
clients or gc. s for the manner in which they performed certification duties. In $utctfffe v. Thackrah 
119741 AC 727, the House of lords laid to rest this fallacy of immunity, and held the architect liable 
to the client for losses arising from negligent certification, see chapter VIII, infra. At one time 
It looked as if architects' might also be directly accountable to gc. s for negligent under- 
certification. Although this avenue of redress may have been closed by recent developments in the area 
of liability for economic toss in torts, the cost-pass-through mechanism provides a potential means 
of protecting gc. s' interests and sanctioning architects where improper exercise of certification 
powers results in toss to the gc. 
82 
supra, note 70. 
a3 Article 3a & 3b 
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suppliers at various stages during the project84. The project 
architect may be required to clarify performance standards and 
will be expected to verify that contractual standards have 
been met. In addition, she may be called upon to resolve 
conflicts between input suppliers over the co-ordination of 
on-site activity. 
As the administrator of a building project, the architect 
is empowered to direct the gc as to when specific activities 
should be executed. The architect is also responsible for 
transmitting information between client and gc and operating 
the contractual procedures for adapting to contingencies 85. 
Formal governance of the relationship between client and 
architect is based on a contract which is situated in the 
context of professional norms. Since the Architects' 
(Registration) Act 1931, the title of architect has been 
protected and the profession closed to persons who are not 
registered to practice. Under the 1931 Act the RIBA was the 
licensing authority, but disaffection with the RIBA led to the 
creation of the Architects' Registration Council of the United 
Kingdom (ARCUK) which now performs all licensing functionsU. 
ARCUK has powers to discipline those on the register and these 
powers include the sanction of withdrawal of a license87. In 
8' Supra, note 70; see also, chapters VIII & IX, of a. 
85 Chapter VIII, infra. 
86 Architect's (Registration) Act 1938; Architect's (Registration) Act. 1969. The Council is made 
up of representatives from the RIBA, the Incorporated Association of Architects and Surveyors, the 
Architectural Association and the Association of Building Technicians and representatives of 
"unattached" architects. 
87 Disciplinary proceedings and their outcomes are reported in the Annual Reports of ARCUK. 
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addition the professional institutes8a publish codes of 
professional conduct, which, in theory, at least, are 
"designed not only to uphold the dignity and integrity of the 
professions and to prevent any conflict of interests with 
professional duty, but also to protect the interests of the 
public"89. To this purported end, the codes regulate 
conditions of engagement for professional services, the terms 
on which architects are permitted to compete with each other 
both before and during a construction project and 
advertising90. The codes also specify the circumstances in 
which architects may have a business connection with any other 
parts of the construction or property development industries, 
and the terms on which architects may adopt corporate 
status91. 
88 The RIBA, RIAS (Scotland), RIAI (N. Ireland). 
89 Arthur J. Willis & W. N. B. George, in collaboration with Christopher J. Willis & N. P. Scher Th, 
Architect in Practice, (London: Granada, 1981) (6th ed. ) at 2. 
90 The "public Interest" element of such claims is open to challenge: see, generally, The 
Monopolies Commission, A Report on the General Effect on the Public Interest of Certain Restrictive 
Practices so far as they Prevail in Relation to the Supply of Professional Services (London: HMSO, 
1970); Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Architects' Services: A Report on the Supply of Architects' 
Services with Reference to Scale Fees (London: HMSO, 1977); The Director General of Fair Trading, Thq 
Advertising and Charging Rules of the Professions Serving the Construction Industry, Office of fair 
Trading (London: HMSO, 1986); Robert Dingwall & Paul Fenn "'A Respectable Profession'? Sociological 
and Economic Perspectives on the Regulation of Professional Services" (1987) 7 International Review 
of Law & Economics 51. 
91 The important prohibition against architects having any financial interest in building firms, 
supra, was lifted in 1984. 
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d. The Quantity surveyor 
Quantity Surveyors (QS) are project accountants, 
responsible for cost-control92. Many building firms employ 
quantity surveyors full-time or on a consultancy basis. With 
respect to JCT80, however, the only QS who is relevant to the 
process of building production is the person engaged by the 
client to monitor financial expenditure during the project93. 
The project QS is normally hired at an early stage in design 
planning. At this stage the QS Is primary role is to assist the 
client to grasp the production cost implications of the 
architect's proposals94. Upon completion of the design phase 
of project planning, the QS prepares the Bill of Quantities 
(the Bill). This document lists the precise quantity of input 
required for the building(s) defined by the architect's 
drawings and is sent to all firms who intend to bid for the 
project. 
Once production has started, the QS Is general role of 
cost control is translated into specific responsibilities to 
measure the Works for valuation. JCT80 expressly requires the 
QS to assess the cost of any changes to the initial plans on 
which the gc had based its bid95 and produce a final 
92 See generally, EDCs for Building and Civil Engineering, The Professions and the Construction 
industries, supra, note 71; Francis M. L. Thompson, Chartered Surveyors: The Growth of a Profession, 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968); Dolan, The British Construction Industry, supra, note 47. 
93 As in the case of the architect, appointment of the clients consultant as the GS to the project 
Is expressly made contingent on the contractor's agreement to the candidate: Article 4, JCT80. 
94 Preparing to Build, supra, note 66. 
95 Such changes are governed by Clause 13, the Variations clause of JCT80. 
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accounting of all such changes and their costs96. In other 
instances, JCT80 empowers the architect to delegate particular 
tasks of measurement and evaluation to the QS97. Under the 
price variation clauses, for example, the architect may 
instruct the QS to negotiate adjustments for specified 
contingencies with the gc. Similarly, the architect may direct 
the QS to settle contractual claims made by the gc (or a 
nominated sub-contractor) for disruption caused by events for 
which the client is contractually responsible. 
JCT80 places the QS in a delicate position. In some 
instances, the QS is expected to negotiate "binding" 
agreements with the gc on behalf of the client. These 
agreements fall within the usual scope of a QS's authority as 
an agent and commit the client to the terms agreed whether or 
not the client had prior knowledge of the issue98. In such 
situations the QS would be expected to act in pursuit of the 
client's interests alone. On other occasions, as for example 
where the gc claims compensation for disruption costs which 
are caused by a participant for whom the client is 
contractually accountable 99 , the role of the QS 
is viewed as 
quasi-arbitral and the decisions of the QS are governed by a 
96 Clause 30.6.1.2. 
97 Note that there is no formal contractual relationship between architect & OS. 
98 For example, each of the three alternative fluctuation clauses includes a term which provides 
for OS and gc to agree how much should be paid to the gc in the event of particular contingencies. This 
agreement is stated to be "binding for all the purposes of this contract" (the standard JCT formula 
to preclude arbitration on the issue). As this provision requires the client to accept as binding an 
irrevocable commitment made without her prior knowledge, one would assume that the QS is expected to 
act solely in the interests of the client when negotiating with the gc. 
99 Clause 26. 
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1oo. 11norm of "impartiality 
e. Domestic Sub-Contractors 
Domestic sub-contractors (dsc) are engaged by the gc. 
Some dsc's supply a combined package of labour resources and 
materials inputs, others are engaged solely for the purposes 
of obtaining labour101. JCT80 constructs dsc. s as a means for 
the gc to fulfil its contractual undertakings to the client. 
Selection of dsc's and the terms of their sub-contracts, for 
example, are treated as issues for the gc and dsc alone102. The 
gc is responsible for co-ordinating the activities of a dsc, 
accountable to both client and affected nominated sub- 
contractors for any delay or disruption caused by dsc. s and 
answerable to the client for the quality of input which is 
supplied by dsc. s. 
100 Sutcliffe v. Thackrah, supra, note 81. 
101 There is nothing in JCT80 to distinguish between the traditional domestic sub-contractor which 
specialises in a particular building trade (carpenters, glaziers etc. ) and the contemporary phenomenon 
of labour-only-sub-contracting. In economic terms, however, there are important differences between 
these two forms of sub-contractor. The traditional sub-contractor is the inheritor of the craftsmen 
of the building industry, and may be explained in terms of conventional division of labour arguments. 
The interesting point to recognise is the relative decline in their power and prestige under the 
organisational innovations of the Contracting System: Port, "The Office of Works and Building Contracts 
in Early Nineteenth-Century England"; Leeson, Travelling Brothers, supra, note 13. The Labour-Only- 
Sub-Contractor, by contrast, by contrast, is a recent phenomenon which has developed as a means for 
gc. s to avoid the costs of employing a permanent workforce: see Ball Rebuilding Construction, supra, 
note 11, especially, chapter 11. 
102 Note that although the client does not have the explicit contractual power to object to the 
identity of a dsc selected by a gc, the client, through the architect, may veto the use of a dsc for 
a part of the Works. See chapter VII, infra, for analysis of the contractual veto powers. 
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f. Nominated sub-Contractors 
Nominated sub-contractors (nsc. s) are a distinct class 
of specialist input suppliers, selected by clients or 
consultants to produce particular components of the finished 
building. Their role in building production evolved as a means 
of enabling clients to add distinctive details to the basic 
carcass of a building. Historically, nsc. s were finishing 
craftspersons who might specialise in external facings or 
interior fittings. Under the traditional Contracting System 
nsc. s would be brought into a project during the final stages 
of construction and the gc would direct the specialist's 
operations as part of its ordinary functions of management and 
co-ordination. While clients might have attached great 
importance to the identity of a nominee, the input supplied 
under a nominated sub-contract was of the same kind as that 
supplied by the gc - labour, materials and assembly 
services103. 
Within this model, integration of the nsc into the 
building transaction was quite straightforward. Clients, at 
the time of tendering for a gc, would signal their intention 
to use a nsc for a defined portion of the project by labelling 
relevant entries in the Bill "prime cost" items. This 
designation operated as an instruction to tenderers to ignore 
103 Ian Duncan Wallace (ed. ). Hudson's Building Contracts and Engineering Contracts: Including 
the Duties and Liabilities of Architects. Engineers and Surveyors (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1970) (10th 
ed. ). 
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these items when preparing their bids. Upon entering into the 
main contract with the client, a gc implicitly committed 
itself to procure the labour and material components of the 
prime cost items by way of sub-contracts with specialists 
nominated by the client. Once production had reached the stage 
when the prime cost work was imminent, the client would decide 
upon the identity of the specialist and make the nomination. 
The gc and the nominee would then negotiate the terms of their 
contract. 
Traditionally, this transaction between gc and nsc 
constituted the only connection recognised in law between the 
nsc and other participants in the project. The formal scheme 
of nominated sub-contracting, therefore, meant that gc. s who 
did not participate in the decision to use a nsc, nor in 
selection, were linked to the specialist by means of a package 
of contractual rights and obligations negotiated "in the 
shadow of" the nomination. Whereas the relationship between 
the specialist and the appointing client was not viewed as a 
source of any rights or obligations. 
The modern function of nominated sub-contracting on many 
building projects is quite different. Nomination is used as 
a means of integrating suppliers of specialised building 
technology and engineering services into the design and 
execution of a building project104. Nsc. s frequently supply a 
104 lbid; see also, Stone, Building Economy! Design. Production and Organisation, suara, note 75, 
for discussion of the increasingly important role of technological expertise in building production. 
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package of input which includes project-specific design as 
well as materials components and labour resources. The input 
of contemporary nsc. s may be an integral part of the basic 
building carcass, and their work on-site may commence at an 
early stage in a gc's programme, or even before a gc is 
appointed. Selection of the specialist is often made by the 
architect or another technical consultant to the client and 
the overriding consideration when making the choice is likely 
to be cost and technical competence rather than aesthetics105. 
The use of the traditional machinery of nomination to 
integrate this new breed of engineering specialists into 
building production has generated governance problems. In 
particular, the extensive involvement of nsc. s in structural 
aspects of building production has exposed weaknesses in the 
contractual regime for maintaining accountability of nsc. s for 
the quality of inputs and the timing of their operations on 
the site. The theory which underpinned the JCT's traditional 
structure of governance assumed that the client's interests 
in the performance of a nsc would be protected by the use of 
the gc as a conduit or cost-pass-through mechanism. By 1980, 
however, a series of judicial decisions had destroyed the 
conceptual foundations of this approach 106 
105 Ibid. 
106 See, for example, Gloucestershire County Council v. Richardson, (1969] 1 AC 480 (discussed 
in chapter IX, infra); TA Bickerton v. North West Metropolitan Hospital Board (1970] 1 WLR 607 
(discussed in chapter VIII, infra). For a contemporary example of the same tendency in judicial 
decision-makers, see John Jarvis Ltd. v. Rockdale Housing Association Ltd. (1987) 3 Construction Law 
Journal 24. 
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The judges' hostility to the cost-pass-through mechanism 
in the context of specialist input suppliers was based on a 
perception that the machinery of nomination gave the gc'very 
little freedom to negotiate the terms on which it engaged the 
nsc107. It was thought that gc. s might be "trapped" into sub- 
contracts in which a specialist defined its liability in a 
much more restrictive fashion than the gc's liability to the 
client under the terms of the main contract108. Courts refused 
to hold gc. s presumptively accountable to clients for the 
failures of nsc. s because they believed that gc. s would be 
unable to pass the costs onto the party at fault. The 
consequence of these decisions was to establish a zone of 
freedom from liability for specialist input suppliers. Nsc. s 
107 Judicial empathy with the "plight" of the gc appears to be based on an assumption that the 
machinery of nominated sub-contracting is intended to benefit the client exclusively. In TA Bickerton 
v. North West Metropolitan Hospital Board, for example, Lord Reid described nominated sub-contracting 
as: 
an attempt to achieve two objects which at first sight might seem Incompatible. The 
employer wants to choose who is to do the prime cost work and to settle the terms on 
which it is to be done, and at the same time to avoid the hazards and difficulties 
which might arise if he entered into a contract with the person whom he has chosen to 
do the work. 
(19701 1 WLR 607 at 611f-g. Similarly, Parker U., in Fairclough Building Ltd. v. Rhuddlan Borough 
Council, after concluding that part of the loss due to the withdrawal of a nsc ought to be borne by 
the client states: 
In thS result the employer will suffer a toss but ... there is no reason why he should 
[not] do so if the contract contains no protective provision. It is he who has chosen 
the sub-contractor who first did the defective work and then quit the site leaving the 
contractor no remedy for any delay resulting from the need to find a replacement so 
tong as the delay is not unreasonable. 
(1985) 3 Construction Law Reports 38 at 49. 
[* this rather crucial word is omitted from the text in the Construction Law Reports version of the 
judgment. ) 
Against this position, it might be argued that nominated sub-contracting is of substantial benefit to 
gc. s. Gc. s are not only relieved of responsibility for production of those aspects of the building 
which have been assigned to nominated sub-contracting, but are also paid a profit component for the 
work of nsc. s, see Ian Duncan Wallace, Construction Contracts: Principles and Policies (London: Sweet 
& Maxwell, 1986) paras. 21-31 to 21-33, for discussion of this aspect of project financing. 
108 See, for example, Gloucestershire County Council v. Richardson [1969] 1 AC 480. (Nb. the 
specialist in this case had been designated a "nominated supplier" although Its rote in the project 
- supply, assembly and fixture of concrete columns on the site - was better suited to the framework 
of governance intended for nominated sub-contractors). 
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would not be directly accountable to clients because of the 
lack of a contractual relationship 109, and their liabilities 
under the contract with a gc would never be activated because, 
in the absence of the gc's liability to the client, the gc did 
not suffer any damage from breach. 
The argument that a gc should not be answerable to a 
client for breaches by a nsc is apparently based on the 
premise that contracts between client and gc, and between gc 
and nsc, are to be treated as discrete transactions. Viewed 
from this perspective, the rights of the gc against the nsc 
and the obligations of the gc to the client are components of 
independent relationships. It is important to recognise, 
however, that the rationale for treating the transactions as 
distinct is grounded on their shared context. That is to say, 
the contemporary practice of the courts has been justified on 
the basis that the relationship between client and gc inhibits 
the gc's ability to secure adequate protection in its contract 
with the nsc. This interpretation of the relationship between 
client and gc as a limitation on the contractual freedom of 
the gc in its negotiations with the nsc is by no means 
inevitable. In Mitchell v. Guildford Union110, for example, 
Phillimore J. recognised that the transaction between a gc and 
109 For a very brief period of time, the House of Lords' decision in Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi 
Company Ltd. 11983] 1 AC 520, appeared to offer a solution to this dilemma. However, the precipitous 
retreat from tortious liability for economic loss suggests that there remains little scope for the 
client to bring a direct action in negligence against a nominated sub-contractor: but see, note 116, 
infra. 
110 (1904) 68 JP 84. 
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a nsc was connected to the contract between client and gc. 
However, he situated the gc's obligation to contract with a 
nsc in the context of a common law norm of reasonableness111. 
According to his view of the machinery of nomination: 
the plaintiff (general contractor] and the plaintiff 
alone was to make the sub-contracts with these 
specialists, and it was his business and his 
business alone to protect himself by making proper 
contracts with them. If the specialists had made 
unreasonable terms of payment, or other unreasonable 
terms, the plaintiff would not have been bound to 
contract with them. His contract with the building 
owners was that he should make ordinary and 
reasonable contracts with the specialist sub- 
contractors112. 
A second problem which has arisen from the extension of 
the nomination machinery to engineers and other specialists 
in building technology is that these actors supply a form of 
input - design services - which is not part of the gc. 's 
responsibilities to the client. In this context the mechanism 
of using the gc to channel liability for the input of a 
nominated sub-contractor breaks down because the gc is not 
111 See chapter VII, infra, for analysis of the contractual veto powers afforded the gc under 
JCT80. 
112 Supra, at p. 85 (emphasis added). Reliance on a working rule that the terms of a nominated sub- 
contract should be "reasonable" may appear to be less feasible in transactions where specialists are 
appointed, and may begin work, before the contract between client and gc is finalised. In this context 
it seems much more difficult to argue that a gc would be able to exercise its "freedom" not to 
contract. It is important to recognise, however, that "contract" is not the only basis on which common 
law forms links between economic actors. One might argue, for example, that gc. s should retain their 
power not to contract on unreasonable terms, and in the event that it does not reach agreement with 
a specialist the relations between client and specialist should be regulated according to the "working 
rules" of reliance and restitutionary obligations: see, for example, the arguments that were accepted 
in Junior Books v. Veitchi, supra, note 109 and British Steel Corporation v. Cleveland Bridge and 
Engineering Co Ltd 119841 1 All ER 504. Naturally, there would be costs associated with using either 
of these approaches to govern faulty execution of complex transactions. The point, however, is that 
there is no solution to the problem which is costless. if a reliance or restitutionary approach would 
increase the accountability of a specialist supplier, and this goat is believed to be important, then 
it might be preferable to the "gaps" and zones of freedom generated by contractual theory. 
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accountable to the client for a critical component of the 
nsc's package of inputs. As the main contract has no provision 
for design liability, the client cannot bring a contractual 
action against the gc for design failure in the work of a nsc. 
The gc who could potentially use legal sanctions as a remedy 
for designs which do not meet the contractual standard again 
has no incentive to do so as it is not harmed by the breach. 
In an attempt to restore the integrity of the governance 
structure, the JCT has modified its commitment to the use of 
"cost-pass-through" as the exclusive mechanism for integrating 
nsc. s into building transactions. The 1980 version of the main 
form of contract includes standard forms of nominated sub- 
contract to govern the relationship between gc and nominated 
sub-contractor, and a standard form of collateral contract 
between client and nsc113. 
g. Hybrid Sub-contractors 
In 1980 the JCT incorporated a third type of sub- 
contractor into the governance structure of the main form of 
contract. These "hybrid" sub-contractors are described as 
domestic sub-contractors, but are to be chosen from a list of 
at least three names "in or annexed to" the Bill of 
Quantities114. The work to be carried out by the sub-contractor 
113 This change pre-empted the decision in Junior Books v. Veitchi, supra, note 109: see, 
generally, chapter IX, infra. 
114 The appointment of these sub-contractors is governed by clause 19.3. 
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is priced in the usual way by the gc who has sole discretion 
to select from the list. Both client (architect) and gc are 
entitled to add names to the list at any time before the 
execution of a binding sub-contract115. If the list falls below 
three names before a sub-contract is agreed, the parties have 
two contractual options. Either client and gc may agree to add 
more names, or the work may be done by the gc who is free to 
sub-contract in the ordinary way. 
h. Nominated Suppliers 
Nominated Suppliers are specialist manufacturers who 
supply materials to a construction project. As in the case of 
specialist sub-contractors, the decision to use a nominated 
supplier is taken by the client or architect and the machinery 
of appointment is operated by the architect. JCT80 has chosen 
not to institutionalise a collateral arrangement between 
clients and nominated suppliers. Thus, these participants are 
integrated into the transaction through a contract with the 
gc alone. 
The operative premise of this contractual governance 
regime - that the gc will function as a liability channel - 
again raises the 116 issue of ensuring consistent contracts. 
115 ALL additions proposed by one party are subject to the other's power to veto on reasonable 
grounds: clause 19.3.2.1, see chapter VII, infra, for discussion of the veto powers in general. 
116 In Simaan v. Pilkington [19881 1 All ER 791, Bingham Li Left open the possibility that clients 
might use the tort of negligence to enforce quality terms directly against a nominated supplier 
(Conclusion 4 at p. 803b). Despite the unremitting hostility of Appellate courts to the Junior Books 
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The working rules of JCT80 empower gc. s to veto nominations 
unless the nominee is willing to include in its contract of 
sale a set of stipulated conditions governing the suppliers 
liability for the quality of its products and the timing of 
delivery117. 
i. Local Authorities and Statutory Undertakers 
These participants have identical relationships with the 
primary contracting parties. Their participation in a building 
transaction is driven by primarily by statutory obligations 
and powers rather than by contract with client or gc118. 
Utility Suppliers connect the site to network services such 
as water, sewerage, electricity and gas mains while Local 
Authorities function primarily as regulatory agencies with 
powers over planning and qualitative dimensions of 
buildings119. 
decision, some of the comments made in Murphy v. Brentwood District Council (1990] 3 WLR 414 indicate 
that Junior Books may potentially be used by clients against nominated suppliers. Lord Keith, for 
example, suggested that Junior Books might be seen as an application of the reliance principle 
developed by the House of Lords in Hedtey Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd ((1964) AC 465), the 
sole surviving basis of liability for "pure" economic toss (at 427H). Similarly, Lord Bridge was 
prepared to acknowledge that under some circumstances it may be possible for clients to show that 
there is sufficient reliance on a building producer that the producer may owe a duty to avoid causing 
economic loss to the client (at 441E). 
117 Clause 36.4, see chapter VII, infra, for discussion of the contractual veto powers. 
118 Clause 6.3 establishes that neither agency is to be regarded as a sub-contractor to the gc 
while engaged solely in pursuance of statutory duties. If, however, their presence on a site is only 
partially governed by the statutory power or duty, the agency may be Integrated into production, at 
least in part, by means a sub-contract of some type. 
119 
The Building Act 1984 c. 55, enables "privatisation" of the building inspection process which 
monitors compliance with the building regulations. The Local Authority retains a "default" 
jurisdiction over such inspections, and is also responsible for approval of plans. it is interesting 
to note that although the House of Lords has recently eliminated the common law route to a sanction 
against Local Authorities for negligence in the execution of their monitoring functions (Mur v. 
Brentwood District Council, supra, note 116), s. 38 of the Building Act, provides that breach of a duty 
imposed by building regulations is actionable, in so far as it causes "damage", except where the 
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The participation of utility suppliers in process of 
building production raises the issue of the integration of 
their activities into the programme of the Works. Smooth co- 
ordination of on-site operations may be difficult to maintain 
in the absence of a contractual nexus between the statutory 
body and the parties to the standard form contract. As gc. s 
do not have the contractual authority to direct this class of 
suppliers, they are compelled, in effect, to accommodate the 
activities of the statutory body. 
JCT80 responds to the problem of managing the interaction 
of statutory bodies with other participants by providing for 
adjustment of the contractual time constraint if the gc. 's 
progress is disrupted by the actions of a statutory 
supplier120. That the contract does not allocate the entire 
cost of disruption to the client, however, is indicated by the 
working rules which do not afford the gc a contractual claim 
against the client for the consequential costs of 
adaptation121. 
The standard form contract also recognises the regulatory 
functions of local authorities and other statutory bodies. 
Gc. s have specific contractual duties to ensure that input 
conforms to regulatory standards and comply with relevant 
regulations provide otherwise. 
120 Clause 25.4.11. For analysis of the extension of time machinery, see, chapter VIII, infra. 
121 le. disruption caused by statutory suppliers is omitted from the clause 26 provisions: for 
discussion of the manner in which clauses 25 and 26 work in tandem to effect allocations of risk, see, 
chapter VII, infra. 
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statutory procedures122. In the event of "divergence" between 
regulatory requirements and the standards which were specified 
in the contractual documents on which the gc had based its 
bid, the gc is entitled to full compensation for any 
additional costs entailed by compliance with the statutory 
requirements 123. 
j. Direct Employees of the Client 
Clients sometimes use direct engagement as a means of 
procuring the type of "finishing" input which was 
traditionally integrated into building production by way of 
the nomination machinery. Directly engaged suppliers may, for 
example, provide landscaping services, exterior decoration, 
or distinctive interior fittings. 
The integration of this class of input suppliers into a 
transaction governed by JCT80 is based on the premise that 
direct engagement by the client is equivalent to domestic sub- 
contracting by the general contractor. Clients, therefore, are 
wholly accountable to gc. s for all co-ordination and 
organisational costs which flow from the participation of 
these suppliers. This structure of responsibility is 
maintained by granting gc. s an extension of time and a 
financial claim against clients for any disruption to the 
122 Clause 6.1. 
123 Clauses 25,26, and 13. 
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programme which is caused by suppliers who are directly 
engaged by clients124. Moreover, the gc is afforded contractual 
power to withhold consent to direct engagement unless the 
client's decision to use such suppliers for a defined portion 
of the Works had been clearly signalled in the Bill of 
Quantities125. 
3. Summary, of the Allocation of Tasks within Transactions 
Governed by JCT80 
With respect to the issue of transactional governance, 
the critical relationships of JCT80 concern the consultants 
to the project, the general contractor and nominated sub- 
contractors. Construction projects governed by JCT80 are based 
on the premise that site selection and decisions about design 
will have been made before the primary producer - the general 
contractor - is appointed. Design planning decisions are made 
by clients on the basis of information produced by 
professional and technical advisers. Upon completion of design 
planning, the class of advisers to the client splits into two 
categories. Suppliers of engineering expertise may have 
further contractual responsibilities for assembling materials 
124 Clauses 25.4.8.1 & 26.2.4. 
125 Clause 29 of the conditions, the basic enabling clause, gives two alternative procedures for 
direct hiring. The gc is "required to permit the execution of the work" so tong as the client had 
signalled her intention to make separate arrangements in the BILL and given sufficient Information 
about the proposed duties of the direct labour to enable the gc to continue with its own contractual 
performance. If, on the other hand the client does not make up her mind until production is underway 
she must obtain the gc's express consent to the hiring of direct employees. 
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and supplying labour to execute defined portions of the 
project. They engage in building production as nominated sub- 
contractors and their participation is governed primarily by 
the terms of a sub-contract with the gc, and to a lesser 
extent, by a collateral contract with the client. The second 
group of design consultants is comprised of two actors - the 
architect and the quantity surveyor. Both consultants have 
responsibilities for administrative and supervisory tasks 
during building production and each participates in the 
project by virtue of a contract with the client alone. 
The process of production on-site involves procurement 
of labour resources and materials, and organisation of the 
deployment of labour in the assembly of material inputs. 
General contractors are wholly accountable to clients for 
obtaining materials and the services of workers for those 
parts of the project which they have undertaken to produce and 
partially answerable for the work of nominated sub- 
contractors. In addition, the gc is responsible for the co- 
ordination of supplies and assembly of inputs, subject to the 
direction and supervision of the client's consultants, in the 
building operations which are not executed by nsc. s or 
contractors directly engaged by the client. 
Nsc. s, in their role as building producers, have a 
parallel responsibility to that of the gc for obtaining and 
organising the resources required to produce "prime cost" 
components of the finished building. As in the case of the gc, 
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their work is subject to direction and supervision by the 
consultants. Accountability to clients for the quality of the 
nsc's performance is partly direct and partly channelled 
through the client's contract with the gc. 
In effect, JCT80 institutionalises a complex combination 
of overlapping and discrete areas of responsibility for the 
tasks involved in building production. As is shown in figure 
3, general contractors, specialists and advisers supply 
similar types of input to the finished product, albeit in 
different packages. Conflicts between different classes of 
resource suppliers are managed by contractual instruments 
which promote horizontal separation between production 
operations and hierarchical patterns of decision-making 
authority. 
lination 
Special 
transactional responsibility 
at Contractors 
Figure 3 Division of Responsibilities by Task under JCT80. 
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Chapter VII Planning 
This chapter explores the transaction cost implications 
of the process of contractual planning embodied in the Joint 
Contracts Tribunal Standard Form of Building Contract (1960 
edition) (JCT80)1. Consistently with our interest in the use 
of contractual forms to govern economic activity, the analysis 
focuses on the organisation of decisions about engaging in 
building production. Our discussion develops two main points. 
First, it is argued that distinctive features of the planning 
process under JCT80 are means of managing uncertainties that 
arise from the interactive nature of building production, its 
time-scale and locational specificity. The procedures that are 
used in planning to build may in this sense be viewed as 
responses to the transaction costs of organising construction. 
In the development of this argument, it will be seen that the 
working rules of contractual planning institutionalise 
particular patterns of decision-making authority which have 
their own organisational consequences. The manner in which 
transactions governed by JCT80 are planned, therefore, may 
also be seen as a source of transaction costs. 
The discussion is divided into four sections. Part A is 
an overview of the model of contract planning which is 
contained in JCT80. This section describes the four main 
I The contract itself says little about some important aspects of contractual planning. However, 
its terms are based on a set of premises about the process by which the parties have arrived at the 
stage of contract execution. It is these premises which are under scrutiny in this chapter. 
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components of transactional planning: product specification, 
selection of building producers, transaction-specific planning 
of the relationship between client and general contractor (gc) 
and the standard Conditions of Contract. Parts B and C focus 
on the management of uncertainties in contract planning. In 
part B, I-use the tools of transactional economics to analyse 
three specific aspects of planning for building production: 
the Bill of Quantities, the participant selection processes 
and the contractual techniques for managing risks. Part C 
explores the implications of the structural separation between 
design and production embedded in the Contracting System and 
institutionalised within JCT80. The concluding section locates 
the formal system of contract planning on the contracting 
continuum. 
A. The Institutional Structure of Contract Planning 
1. Product Planning and the Selection of Building Producers 
a. Design Planning 
Definition of the subject matter of a building contract 
entails decisions about the size, cost, quality and location 
of the finished product. At a general level such decisions are 
constrained by public regulation of land-use and building 
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quality2. More specifically, product planning is shaped by the 
intended use of the building(s), availability of materials 
and labour input, building technology, and clients' access to 
financing. 
Within the framework of the possible and permissible - 
as defined by financial and institutional constraints - the 
transformation of a site into a useable building entails a 
number of conceptual decisions which are to be made before 
production begins3. JCT80 is based on an assumption that 
issues such as the quantity and quality of material inputs, 
size and spatial dimensions of the buildings, and design 
implications of the relationship of individual parts of the 
building to the whole, are resolved before the builder is 
selected. This phase of planning is largely orchestrated by 
consultants to the client who make use of expertise in 
building design and technology, project appraisal and 
financial control in the production of transaction-specific 
plans. Decision-making is driven by clients' needs and 
preferences, and constrained by potential production costs. 
Product planning culminates in the formulation of 
detailed technical drawings of the clients' choice of building 
design and an itemised description of labour and materials 
resources. This latter document - the Bill of Quantities - is 
2 See, for example, the Building Regulations 1985 and the Defective Premises Act 1972. 
3 
Helpful models of the ideal planning process can be found in Ministry of Public Building & 
Works, Preparing to Build: R&D Building Management Handbook, (London: HMSO, 1965); EDCs for Building 
and Civil Engineering, Before You Build, NEDO (London: HMSO, 1974); EDC for Building, Faster Building 
for Industry, (NEDO) (London: HMSO, 1983). 
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produced by a Quantity surveyor who "measures" the product as 
defined by the architect's drawings in accordance with a 
standardised formula4. In theory, at least, the information 
contained in the Bill of Quantities is a complete statement 
of the inputs required to translate the conceptual 
representation of a project into the reality of a working 
building. 
b. Selection of Building Producers 
Appointment of the gc follows after completion of the 
design phase and clearance from regulatory bodies. Gc. s in 
projects governed by JCT80 are normally selected on the basis 
of a tendering process, the foundations of which were laid 
s during the early years of the Contracting System. 
Traditionally, the tendering process was open to any gc 
who chose to make a bid. Clients would issue a general call 
for offers and make their decision primarily on the basis of 
price. By the middle of the twentieth century it had become 
clear that the system of full competitive tendering was 
unsatisfactory. It was attacked on the grounds that the 
4 Clause 2.2.2.1 of JCT80 incorporates the premise that the designs were measured in accordance 
with the Standard Method of Measurement of Building Works 6. Standardisation in the basis on which 
building work is measured was first agreed between builders and quantity surveyors in 1922. This 
schedule of work categories an unit measurements is periodically revised an up-dated by the Standard 
Method of Measurement Development Group: see, Dennis F. Dolan, The British Construction Industry - An 
Introduction (London: Macmillan, 1979) and Patricia M. Hillebrandt, Analysis of the British 
Construction Industry (London: Macmillan, 1984). For critical commentary on the concepts underlying 
this type of measurement, see Ian N. Duncan Wallace, "How Much Measurement? " (1987) 3 Construction Law 
journal 3. 
5 Supra, chapter VI. 
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duplication of effort by several contractors preparing bids 
that had no chance of success inflated building costs. More 
seriously, it was apparent that competition alone could not 
ensure acceptable standards of building production. The Simon 
Report of 1944, for example, concluded that while 
indiscriminate tendering may generate low prices it was also 
associated with bad building and lower standards of honesty 
and craftsmanship within the construction industryb. 
The Simon Report was the first of a series of critical 
public reports on contract procurement and management within 
the construction industry which recommended reform to the 
practice of open competitive tendering7. The primary 
modification which has been adopted relies on pre-screening 
to create a short list of potential gc. s thought capable of 
meeting a client's requirements of competence, local knowledge 
of the market for input suppliers, availability and financial 
security8. All building firms in this relatively small group 
are invited to compete for the project. 
6 
Ministry of Works, The Management and Placing of Building Contracts: Report of the Central 
Council for Works and Buildings to the Minister of Works (the Simon Report), (London: HMSO, 1944). 
7 
See, for example, Ministry of Public Building and Works, Report of the Committee on the Placing 
and Management of Contracts for Building and Civil Engineering Works (The Banwell Report) (London: 
HMSO, 1964); Ministry of Works, Survey of Problems Before the Construction Industries (The Emerson 
Report) (London: HMSO, 1962); EDC for Building, Action on the Banwell Report, NEDO (London: HMSO, 
1967); EDCs for Building and Civil Engineering, The Public Client and the Construction Industries (The 
Wood Report) NEDO (London: HMSO, 1975). 
8 These screening variables are all contained in the code of practice for selective tendering 
developed by the JCT: JCT Code of Procedure for Selective Tendering. 
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Those invited to tender submit a lump-sum bid for the 
entire project as defined by the drawings and the Bill of 
Quantities. In general, clients are not under any legal 
obligation to accept the lowest bid9 and as offer prices vary 
for a number of reasons, there may be circumstances where the 
job does not go to the lowest bidder10. However, to the extent 
that selective tendering is based on the premise that quality 
concerns are addressed through screening, bids are likely to 
be evaluated primarily on the basis of price. 
Before final acceptance of an offer from the client's 
first choice, the successful bidder is required to supply a 
priced copy of the Bill of Quantities (the Bill) in which unit 
rates are given for every item listed11. Clients, together with 
their consultants, review the completed Bill for errors and 
omissions and to ascertain individual prices for each input12. 
Under the institutional structure of JCT80, acceptance of a 
tender denotes that client and gc concur on two aspects of 
price. First, that the gc will supply individual inputs in 
9 Spencer v. Harding (1870) LR CP 561. Note that clients may be under a duty to accept the "best" 
offer, defined by price, if the tender documents contained such a promise: William Lacey (Hounslow) 
Ltd. v. Davis (1957] 1 WLR 932, see discussion at 939; Harveta Investments v. Royal Trust Co. of Canada 
(Cl) Ltd (1985] 1 All ER. 261. 
10 Stone suggests a number of reasons for significant variations between tender prices: 
a) differences in the efficiency and therefore in the costs of the building firms; 
b) differences between firms in terms of the importance of the project to their programme of work: a 
new entrant, for example, may under-price in order to establish itself in the industry or location; 
c) different perceptions of the technical demands of the project; 
d) ineffective screening; 
e) opportunism - as where a firm puts in a low bid with the intention of inflating the contract price 
during production. 
Peter A. Stone Building Economy: Design. Production and Organisation -A Synoptic View (Oxford: 
Pergamon, 1983) (3rd ed. ) at 121; see also, Michael Ball, Rebuilding Construction: Economic Change in 
the British Construction Industry ((London: Routledge, 1988) at 86-9. 
11 JCT Code of Procedure for Selective Tendering, supra, note 8. 
12 Ibid. 
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the quantities and qualities stated in the Bill for the unit 
prices submitted. Secondly, the parties agree that the "lump- 
sum" bid is the total contract price for the project as 
defined by the documents upon which the offer was made13. 
Formal responsibility for selection of input suppliers 
is split between the successful bidder who becomes the gc and 
the client. In practice, many of the client's decisions are 
based on recommendations made by the architect or other design 
consultants. 
Gc. s choose skilled and unskilled suppliers of labour for 
assembly work on and off-site, off-site suppliers of non- 
specialised material components, and organise supplies of 
transportation and plant. Preliminary decisions on many of 
these matters will have been made before the tender bid was 
submitted in that gc. s' offers are typically based on 
information obtained through canvassing the market for 
resource inputs14. In view of the gc. 's contractual obligations 
to the client, the reliability of this information is entirely 
a matter for the gc15. 
Under JCT80 the sole restriction on the gc's authority 
to select input suppliers lies in the architect's power to 
13 By virtue of article 2 the offer price becomes a specific term of the contract - the Contract 
Sum. The BILL of Quantities, containing the unit prices is annexed to the standard terms and becomes 
a "Contract Document": clause 2.2.1. 
14 See Richard Lewis "Contracts between Businessmen: Reform of the Law of Firm Offers and an 
Empirical Study of Tendering Practices in the Building Industry" (1982) 9 Journal of Law and Society 
153 for an insightful study of the manner in which gc. s organise their "pre-contractual" relations with 
potential sub-contractors so as to obtain vital information without incurring legal obligations. 
15 Ibid. 
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withhold consent to the use of any domestic sub-contractor for 
a defined portion of the project. The power of veto cannot be 
exercised on the basis of the identity of a sub-contractor, 
and its use to prevent sub-letting of a particular section of 
16 the Works is subject to a contractual norm of reasonableness. 
Specialist suppliers of inputs are selected by the client 
or architect. The gc does not participate in the decision to 
use specialists and it has no contractual authority to oppose 
this decision. The gc may, however, legitimately refuse to 
enter into a contractual relationship with a nominated 
supplier who does not agree to terms that are consistent with 
the gc. 's liabilities to the client17, and, on reasonable 
grounds, - veto the appointment of particular nominated sub- 
contractors18. 
2. Transaction-Specific Planning of the Relationship between 
Client and General Contractor 
Despite the comprehensive character of the standard form 
contract, the adoption of JCT80 to govern a particular 
transaction entails some project-specific planning between 
client and gc. The Articles of Agreement require the parties 
to set out basic definitional arrangements, such as the 
16 Clause 19.2. 
17 Clause 36.4. 
18 Clause 35.4.1. 
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contract price; identify the documents which were used during 
tendering and are to be incorporated into the transaction as 
"Contract Documents"; and select the project architect and 
project quantity surveyor. 
In addition, client and gc are expected to make a number 
of transaction-specific decisions which connect the particular 
project to the procedures contained in the Conditions of 
Contract. For example, the "Date for Completion", as specified 
in the Appendix, designates the initial time constraint for 
the gc's work on the site. In the absence of a transaction- 
specific provision, contractual procedures such as the 
extension of time machinery or the client's right to 
compensation for delay, would be inoperable19. Parties' 
failures to make other administrative decisions may have less 
severe consequences. JCT8O provides for default positions in 
the event that client and gc do not make explicit plans for 
matters such as escalations in input costs, the timing of 
instalment payments, and insurance of the project during 
production. 
As JCT80 is based on the premise that binding decisions 
about qualities and quantities of inputs, together with price, 
are made when the bid is accepted, the only outstanding matter 
19 For example, in Temloc Ltd v. Errill (1988) 4 Construction Law journal 63, the Court of Appeal 
held that where client and gc had specified that the agreed damages sum was to be NIL, the client could 
not bring any contractual sanction against delay, not even an action for untiquidated damages. See 
chapter VIII for discussion of the extension of time machinery and chapter IX for analysis of the 
liquidated damages sanction. 
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to be finalised after acceptance is timing20. Within the 
constraints established by the Date of Possession and the Date 
for Completion, the gc has considerable autonomy over the pace 
of production. In contrast to the planning of quantities and 
price, where the total figure is broken down into its 
constituent parts and the parties' agreement governs aggregate 
and component terms, the time constraint of JCT80 is based on 
a "lump" specification only. Gc. s undertake to complete the 
project works by the stated date but do not commit themselves 
to meeting interim targets. 
However, this unilateral authority to determine timing 
and programming is subject to the condition that gc. s 
communicate their plans for the timing of production. JCT80 
requires gc. s to provide the architect with copies of a 
"master programme" of the Works, a document which details 
inputs of time for each stage of the project21. The master 
programme is to be given to the architect at the earliest 
possible date after the execution of the contract22, and any 
changes made in the light of the architect's decision to 
revise the Completion date are to be communicated within 14 
days of the decision23. 
20 Industry models of good building practice all assert that even if clients are unable to 
incorporate start and completion dates into the documents on which prospective gc. s bid, expected 
duration should be addressed as part of the tendering process: JCT Code of Procedure for Selective 
Tendering, supra, note 8; Faster Building for industry, supra, note 3. 
21 The master programme is expressly stated not to impose any obligation beyond those imposed by 
contract documents (clause 5.3.2. ) and thus it would appear to be significant mainly for information 
and contract administration. 
22 Clause 5.3.1.2 
23 Ibid. 
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3. Standard Conditions of Contract 
The standard Conditions of contracts drafted by the JCT 
enable participants in building production to avoid the costs 
of creating transaction-specific private rules to regulate 
their economic relationships. These "working rules" of 
building projects incorporate procedures for directing, 
adjusting and supervising production and managing conflicts 
together with substantive norms which allocate responsibility 
for activities and risks. Taken as a whole, the Conditions of 
Contracts, Articles of Agreement, Appendix, Contract Drawings 
and the Bill purport to be a complete formal system for 
governing the production phase of a building project. 
With respect to the planning decisions defining "who- 
does-what-where-when-and-how", JCT80 holds gc. s accountable 
to clients for completion of the Works in conformity with the 
Contract Documents, on or before the date specified in the 
Appendix and for the price stated to be the Contract Sum24. 
Gc. s are also required to comply with Instructions issued by 
the architect that are expressly empowered by the Contract 
Documents25 and afford the architect reasonable access to the 
project and to off-site locations where preparatory work is 
24 Clause 2, clause 14, and clause 24. 
25 
clause 4.1 
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carried out26. Finally, gc. s must contract with sub-contractors 
and suppliers nominated by the architect or client unless they 
have reasonable grounds to object to the identity of a 
nominee27. 
Clients' primary contractual responsibilities are to 
ensure that the gc has adequate access to the site28, and 
promptly to pay in accordance with the contractual 
arrangements for instalments29. Clients are also answerable 
to gc. s for the manner in which the project consultants 
exercise their management powers, any changes to the original 
project specification, and disruptions to the operations of 
gc. s that are due to performances, or performance failures of 
. the clients' appointees30 
Responsibility for project management is divided, in'a 
hierarchical fashion, between the gc and consultants to a 
project. A gc's undertaking to complete the Works entails 
procuring supplies of the inputs specified in the Contract 
Documents and co-ordinating the activities of those engaged 
in on-site assembly. However, execution of these tasks is, to 
some extent, subject to the direction and supervision of the 
26 Clause. ll. 
27 Supra, notes 17 & 18. 
28 As from the Date of Possession stated in the Appendix. 
29 See generally clause 30, see, in particular, clause 30.1.1.1. 
30 Within the framework of JC180, clients' accountability is maintained by the simple device of 
permitting gc. s' to claim adjustments to the existing terms governing price and time and as a last 
resort to terminate the contract. For the adjustment provisions see clauses 13,25,26, discussed in 
chapter VIII, infra. For the termination provision, see clause 28. 
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architect31. The project architect is empowered, and sometimes 
required, to issue instructions in a range of circumstances32. 
Architects are also authorised to monitor the quality of 
inputs, demand changes in the event that defective or non- 
conforming inputs are discovered, and certify the progress of 
the Works33. 
The standard conditions governing risk-management reflect 
objectives derived from three normative regimes. "Exogenous" 
events, which may be anticipated in advance but are not 
controllable by any participant (such as disturbances in the 
physical or economic environment of the transaction) are 
primarily handled by cost-sharing between client and gc. By 
contrast, the costs of disruptions which are (or are deemed 
to be) caused by the decisions or activities of a participant 
are presumptively allocated entirely to the client or gc, on 
the basis that, where necessary, the costs will be passed on 
to the relevant actor. Finally, the risk of physical injury 
to persons, or damage to property arising out of the execution 
of the project is managed by the loss-spreading instrument of 
insurance34. 
31 As noted in chapter VI, supra, and discussed more fully in chapters VIII & IX, infra, the 
boundaries between architects and gc. s' duties of co-ordination and supervision are hard to define in 
contractual language. 
32 See Chapter VIII, infra. 
33 See chapter VIII, infra. 
34 JCT80 requires the gc to maintain adequate insurance for its obligation to indemnify the client 
against liability for personal injury, death, or damage to any property apart from the Contract Works 
or materials that are on the site (Clauses 20.2 & 20.3.1. ). Physical damage to the building structure 
during construction or to Site Materials is to be insured against by client or gc, according to the 
planning decision that was made during formation and stated in the Appendix). 
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Implementation of the contractual regimes of 
precautionary and cost-sharing management of disruptive events 
is complicated by the lengthy and interactive nature of 
building transactions. Neither ex ante pricing, nor ex post 
adjustment is ideally suited to such transactions. ' Whereas the 
time-scale of building production and the range of potentially 
disruptive events raise doubts about the potential accuracy 
of the former strategy, the polycentricity of building 
production exacerbates the administrative and co-ordination 
costs of using adjustment35. Moreover, with respect to 
precautionary goals, accountability for disruptions caused by 
a "non-party" participant may be impeded by inconsistent 
contracts that block the "cost-pass-through" mechanism36. 
JCT80 compromises the problem of strategy by combining 
classical contractual techniques of ex ante allocations of 
risk with relational strategies of revision after the event 
has occurred. Precautionary incentives are maintained by 
holding gc. s strictly accountable for the timing of 
production, price, and exact compliance with the Contract 
Drawings and Bills, except in so far as the Condition provide 
for adjustments. The only events which are to be wholly 
excluded from the gc. s' ex ante pricing decisions, therefore, 
are those for which the contract attributes responsibility to 
clients. Where the decisions or actions of clients, or their 
35 See text, infra. 
36 Infra, chapters IX. 
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consultants or nominees increase the production costs of the 
gc - or its domestic sub-contractors or suppliers - the gc 
may claim an extension of the contract period37 and where 
appropriate a modification of the contract price38. GC. s may 
also recover direct losses and expenses from the client39, and 
. in some circumstances terminate the contract40 
With respect to exogenous events for which the risk is 
shared, JCT80 makes use of both the classical strategy of 
limiting gc. s' liability for the costs of a contingency, and 
discretionary adjustment. Contractual "capping" is illustrated 
in two out of the three alternative provisions for managing 
increases in input costs41. Both clause 38 and clause 39 limit 
the gc. s' liability for inflation during production by 
reference to the source of the price rise42. Where the increase 
in input costs stems from one of the named sources, the loss 
is to be borne by the client. All other costs due to inflation 
are assumed by the gc. 
In contrast to the regime governing events which are 
"caused" by a participant for whom the client is answerable, 
the only contractual term which may be adjusted in response 
to exogenous events of which the costs are shared is the 
37 Clause 25, see chapter VIII, infra. 
38 Clause 13, see, chapter VIII, Infra. 
39 Clause 26. 
40 Clause 28. 
41 The third alternative, clause 40 requires the client to pay for changes in the contract value 
of the Works rather than using changes in net costs of input items as Its baseline. 
42 Clause 38 & clause 39, clause 40 uses a different formula, see chapter VIII, infra. 
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Completion Date. JCT80 mandates the architect to extend the 
production period if the builder notifies her that its 
progress is being delayed by one of the specified 
contingencies, and the architect believes, on the basis of 
evidence submitted by the gc, that the claim is true43. 
Although the architect is required to give an extension, the 
amount of additional time to be granted is within her 
44 discretion. 
B. Transactional Analysis of Planning as a Response to the 
Uncertainties of Building Production 
1. The Uncertainties of Building Production 
The nature of the construction industry and its output, 
together with characteristics of the environment in which it 
operates, render planning for a building project an exercise 
that is fraught with uncertainty45. Fragmentation within the 
industry causes building production to draw on a large number 
of resource-controllers who take from separate profit streams. 
Members of the group do not have at their disposal complete 
information on which to base decisions about their own 
activity, and relevant information, where available, tends to 
43 Clause 25.4. This category of risks includes contingencies such as exceptionally adverse 
weather, abnormal site conditions or characteristics, and government regulation of the supply of 
construction input, taxes and price. 
44 See chapter VIII, infra. 
45 Supra, chapter VI. 
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be dispersed46. Moreover, the operations of group members are 
interactive and the resulting interdependence between 
participants is a site of friction and co-ordination costs47. 
As has been noted in studies of the organisation of building 
projects, relations between those involved in production are 
highly susceptible to suspicion and distrust48. Collaboration 
between clients' consultants may be impeded by professional 
jealousies, and the separation of design and production is a 
breeding ground for antagonism and tension between designers 
and producers49. 
"Participant" uncertainties, arising from information 
asymmetry and the risk of opportunism in interdependent 
transactions, may be a particularly significant source of 
costs for clients. First, clients take the transactional 
surplus after all input suppliers have been paid, the surplus 
depends in part on the quality of performances delivered by 
input suppliers, and its value is realised in the use of the 
finished buildings over a considerable period of time. In 
addition, clients' investments in building production are to 
a large extent specific to a particular site, and production 
expenditures, once made, cannot readily be transferred to 
46 Ibid., For a useful discussion of the organisational implications of the type of functional 
fragmentation found in construction, see, Tavistock Institute of Human Relations, Interdependence and 
Uncertainty: A Study of the Building Industry (London: Tavistock Publications, 1966). 
47 
Tavistock, Interdependence and Uncertainty: A Study of the Building industry, supra, note 46. 
48 
Ibid., see also, Survey of Problems Before the Construction Industries (The Emmerson Report), 
supra, note 7; EDCs for Building and Civil Engineering, How Flexible is Construction?, NEDO (London: 
HMSO, 1978); Dennis A. Turin "Introduction" in Turin (ed. ) Aspects of the Economics of Construction 
(London: George Godwin, 1975). 
49 Ibid. 
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other uses. Much of the information that a client purchases 
during product planning, for example, though essential to the 
execution of a particular building is of little value to the 
building sponsor if the project does not materialise. 
Finally, it is not unusual for clients to be infrequent 
purchasers of construction services. Lack of familiarity with 
the process of building production may hamper attempts to 
engage in routine planning procedures, such as search and 
screening. One recent report on the experience of private 
sponsors of commercial buildings noted, for example, that: 
Customers were surprised and dismayed at the 
complexity of the task and the uncertainties that 
procuring a building involved for them. Even 
sophisticated industrial customers were caught out 
by the unpredictability of construction, 
particularly when they compared it with the 
relatively controlled conditions of their own 
manufacturing environment. Several first-time 
customers, who had made efforts to assemble 
information by talking to other customers with 
recent building experience, complained about the 
difficulty and inadequate yield of their efforts 50. 
Inexperience also tends to increase clients' dependence on 
building professionals at the same time as it limits their 
abilities to make qualitative evaluations of performances by 
consultants. The Tavistock Report, suggested, for example, 
that clients are frequently unsure about how far they could 
trust members of the design team to deliver value for money, 
or interpret their needs51. 
The idiosyncratic nature of building production together 
50 EDC for Building, Faster Building for Industry NEDO (London: HMSO, 1983) at para. 9.12. 
51 Interdependence and Uncertainty: A Study of the Building Industry, supra, note 46. 
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with the complexity of the finished product impose further 
demands on contractual planning. That building projects are 
triggered by the wishes of an individual sponsor causes 
production planning to entail a large number of highly 
specific decisions. "Product" uncertainties, such as the 
correlation between conceptual representations of a building 
and clients needs, and the feasibility of a project in the 
light of economic and physical constraints, are shaped by 
bounded rationality, fragmentation and client inexperience. 
Bounded rationality limits the range of potential solutions 
to building needs and may cause failures fully to address 
technical or financial implications of a project. 
Fragmentation generates the costs of maintaining open and 
meaningful communication channels between participants. 
Decision-making and communication costs may be further 
exacerbated by clients' lack of familiarity with the processes 
by which needs, constraints and options are translated into 
workable decisions. 
The duration of a construction project, together with its 
site-based location render building production an 
"environmentally" uncertain enterprise. Prior decisions may 
be upset by site and climatic conditions or changes in markets 
for labour resources and materials inputs. Environmental 
uncertainties are associated with transactions costs of 
negotiating and enforcing allocations of risk, and the co- 
ordination and communication costs of adapting production to 
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contingencies that have occurred. These classes of costs may 
be affected by behavioural characteristics of participants in 
building production. Whereas bounded rationality precludes 
reliance on ex ante decisions to govern responses to every 
possible contingency, on-going revision of plans may be a site 
for opportunism52. 
Planning for the purposes of JCT80 features two types 
of responses to participant, product and environmental 
uncertainties. First, the contract draws on specific planning 
practices and institutions which facilitate the production 
and communication of reliable information. Secondly, the 
structural separation between design and production which 
underlies the standard form contract creates a basis for 
mutual monitoring between architect and general contractor53. 
2. Transactional Analysis of the Planning Mechanisms 
a. Bill of Quantities 
The Bill of Quantities (The Bill) is intended "to put 
into words every obligation or service which will be required 
in carrying out the building project"S4. It is said to: 
52 Supra, chapter IV. 
53 Infra, part C. 
54 The Placement and Management of Building Contracts (The Simon Report), supra, note 6 at para. 
56. 
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facilitate accurate competitive tendering... [and] 
simplify preparation of valuations, contract 
planning and financial accounting, so that economic 
and administrative responsibilities are easier for 
the builder to control 5. 
As the most detailed document available to those bidding for 
a project, the Bill may be viewed primarily as a response to 
product and environmental uncertainties. Subsequent 
incorporation of the Bill into the contract between client and 
gc, may, in addition, enhance a client's ability to monitor 
the performance of the architect, and so limit the costs of 
participant uncertainty56. 
With respect to product uncertainties, the Bill, in the 
form in which it is presented to bidders, supplements the 
information about the building concept that is contained in 
architect's drawings and other design documents57. 
Communication of this information means that individual 
bidders do not incur (and pass on to clients) the preparation 
and error costs of formulating their own specifications of 
quantities. Initial offer prices are therefore thought to be 
lower than they would be if the tendering process did not 
55 Dolan, The British Construction Industry - An Introduction, supra, note 4 at 32. 
56 infra, part C. 
57 The arguments given in support of the Bill of Quantities were all made to the Restrictive 
Practices Court in Re Birmingham Association of Building Trades Employers' Agreement 119631 1 WLR 484. 
The Court ultimately declared the rule forbidding members of the association to bid for contracts over 
L8000 unless there was a bill of quantities to be anti-competitive. The court accepted that bidding 
without a Bill of Quantities would tend to increase builders' costs. However, the evidence was not 
thought to establish that the increase would outweigh clients' expenditures on preparation of the 
single Bill or that additional costs to bidders would necessarily be passed on in full. 
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incorporate a Bill prepared by a consultant to the client 
58 
, 
Avoidance of duplication costs is by no means the only 
consequence of using a single Bill. Comparison of tender 
offers and selection of the gc, it may be argued, imposes less 
strain on scarce rationality resources where all offers are 
derived from a uniform information base. Finally, the 
completed Bill of Quantities is perhaps the most important 
source of clients' information about the financial 
implications of a project. A priced Bill may lead to 
modifications to ensure that the finished product will fit 
within a client's cost constraints and it provides a basis 
for evaluating the consequences of any changes to the initial 
specif ication59. 
The role of the Bill of Quantities as a response to 
environmental uncertainties illustrates the interaction 
between risk-management by price and by adjustment. In theory, 
at least, the Bill functions to assign to gc. s the risk that 
economic or physical conditions will cause production costs 
to exceed the agreed price60. Gc. s' exposure to this risk, 
however, is also limited by the specification of quantities, 
in the sense that clients bear the costs of differences 
between as-built quantities and initial predictions. That is 
to say, gc. s who demonstrate that completion of the project 
58 Ibid. 
59 Dotan, The British Construction Industry - An Introduction, supra, note 4. 
60 Ian Duncan Wallace, "Price Under Common Law Systems" in Peter Gauch and Justin Sweet (eds. ) 
Selected Problems of Construction Law: international Approach (London: Sweet and Maxwe(l, 1983). 
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requires more labour or materials than had been stated in the 
Bill are contractually entitled to a modification of the 
contract price in line with the unit rates, compensation for 
their private costs of the change, and an extension of time61. 
Critics of the Bill of Quantities system contend that 
this limitation on gc. s' liability causes clients realised 
building costs to exceed planned costs62. In addition, it is 
alleged that actual building costs are higher than they would 
be if gc. s bore the entire risk of variation between predicted 
and actual prices63. The essence of this argument is that the 
structure of contractual claims enables gc. s opportunistically 
to seek out discrepancies or omissions in the Bill in order 
to assert that the project requires additional inputs of 
labour and materials. Many such claims, it is said, are 
spurious 64 . Alleged additions may have been part of the 
background understandings on which the gc made its offer, or 
the gc may be attempting to compensate for its own mistakes 
in initial offer 65. 
Similarly, it is argued that allocation to clients of the 
costs of variations in quantities encourages strategic ex ante 
pricing of tenders. Industry commentators have noted, for 
example, that gc. s may gamble that certain items in the Bills 
61 Chapter VIII, infra. 
62 Duncan Wallace, "Price Under Common Law Systems", supra, note 60. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., see also, Stone, Building Economy: Design. Production and Organisation -A Synoptic 
View, supra, note 10. 
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are likely to be varied once production is underway 
66 
. Such 
items are given a high unit price, which may be well above the 
cost of supplying the resource inputs, in the initial offer. 
As revisions to the contract price are based on the original 
unit rates, variations in these items will produce a final 
price which is disproportionately high in comparison with the 
cost of the additional resources67. 
Clients are not in a strong position to resist such 
opportunistic manipulations. First, they may lack the 
experience necessary to identify strategic pricing in the Bill 
of Quantities. Consultants who have the relevant expertise, 
but did not perceive the problem before recommending 
acceptance of the offer, are unlikely to alert a client once 
production is underway for fear that they will be blamed for 
poor advice. 
Secondly, even if a client recognises that a gc's claim 
for a variation is opportunistic, she is not well-placed to 
make an effective response. Opposition to the claim may 
generate costly conflict over the precise meaning and content 
of the Bill. Moreover, gc. s' control over a building site 
generates power to disrupt or delay projects as a means of 
putting pressure on clients to settle claims. As a last 
resort, a gc may threaten to abandon a project secure in the 
66 Ibid. Items relating to foundations and other aspects of the project that are highly contingent 
on the physical conditions of the site are thought to be particularly vulnerable to strategic pricing. 
Bidders would typically compensate by tendering low unit prices for items which are likely to be 
reduced in quantity or quality. 
67 Ibid., see in particular, Stone, Building Economy, at 122 -123. 
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knowledge that the costs to the client of contractual failure 
would substantially outweigh the costs of resolving a spurious 
variation claim. 
That the Bill of Quantities does not entirely protect 
clients from changes in the contract price during production 
is indisputable. However, the Bill may yet play an important 
role in managing the uncertainties of the construction 
process. First, with respect to the specific issue of 
environmental uncertainties and opportunism, the Bill, 
together with the contract terms, generates reliable 
information about the bases on which price will be adjusted 
in the light of contingencies. It is also important to 
recognise that opportunistic behaviour is not caused by the 
Bill and variations regime but simply afforded a particular 
site for its expression. Contracts in which gc. s bear the risk 
of differences between predicted and realised quantities may 
also be vulnerable to opportunism. Gc. s might, for example, 
try to compensate for a bad bargain by cheating on quality, 
adopting production economies that increase clients' costs of 
using new buildings or taking advantage of technical breaches 
to escape from the transaction. 
Secondly, the transaction costs of environmental 
uncertainties under the Bill of Quantities system should be 
evaluated in the light of its function as a response to other 
types of uncertainty. Thus, the opportunism and adjustment 
costs that may attend reliance on the Bill should be compared 
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with reductions in the error, duplication, communication and 
decision-making costs of managing product uncertainties. 
Finally, it is arguable that the Bill, precisely because 
it shifts to clients the risk that as-built quantities will 
differ from predicted quantities, functions as a standard 
against which to measure the performance of clients' 
consultants during product planning. Under the decision- 
making structure of JCT80, discrepancies between predicted and 
as-built quantities are attributable to one or more of three 
reasons. Boundedly rational and inexperienced clients may not 
have fully grasped all of the implications of the building at 
the time of tendering. Upon obtaining access to information 
in the form of a partially completed building clients may 
change their minds about some aspect of the project and seek 
to alter the specification without realising the extent to 
which such changes are costly and disruptive. 
Alternatively, predicted quantities may be inadequate 
because the architect did not fully investigate the site or 
the implications of the building concept during the design 
planning stage. This omission may reflect a calculated 
decision that the delay and information processing costs of 
acquiring sufficient information before work commenced on site 
would be so high that the client would be better off paying 
for a variation or it may evidence lack of effort, 
incompetence, or cheating. 
Finally, failures in communications between architect, 
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other members of the design team and client may result in a 
specification that does not meet the clients needs or 
constraints, and requires revision during production. 
Clients who have little experience of construction 
practices seldom have the resources adequately to evaluate the 
performances of their consultants. Furthermore, the 
construction process is structured to facilitate the 
development of clients' reliance on architects. Given this 
context, clients are relatively defenceless against 
opportunistic decisions by the consultants to deliver a lower 
quality planning service than that for which they are paid. 
The Bill of Quantities, together with the standard 
Conditions of JCT80, responds to this problem by linking the 
gc. s' responsibilities under the contract to the quality of 
information that was available at tendering. By enabling gc. s' 
to activate the variation machinery if the quantities stated 
in the Bill are insufficient for the project, JCT80 creates 
a mechanism that affords clients access to information about 
the quality of the planning service that they have received68 . 
68 See text, infra. 
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b. Selection Procedures 
(1) Selective Tendering 
Selective tendering may be viewed as a response to 
clients' uncertainties about the quality of performance which 
would be rendered by gc. s appointed solely on the basis of 
price. The failure of markets accurately to compound pertinent 
information about quality into prices may be attributed to 
what are by now familiar characteristics of the industry, its 
products and process of production. The transformative and 
interactive nature of the construction process impedes the 
operation of market mechanisms of accountability which rely 
on evaluation of individual outputs. Buildings are highly 
durable and information about quality is largely derived from 
user-experience. These characteristics delay the process by 
which information about the performance of building producers 
reaches the market. Finally, transaction-specific production, 
and the relationships which it entails, enables gc. s to 
distinguish between projects where opportunism is unlikely to 
be spotted, or if identified, sanctioned, and those where the 
structure of supervision and reporting indicates that such 
behaviour is likely to be detected and information relayed to 
the market for construction services. 
The distinctive combination of screening and price 
competition constituted by the selective tendering process, 
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situates the implicit information contained in offer prices 
in the context of prior evaluation of the reputation and 
experience of potential gc. s. Selective tendering may, 
therefore, enable clients to contain the risk of contracting 
with a gc who is an egregious opportunist, grossly incompetent 
or on the verge of insolvency. It would be a mistake to 
believe, however, that selective tendering eliminates clients' 
uncertainties with respect to the reliability of gc. s, nor 
should one overlook the cost implications of the process for 
other aspects of planning to build. 
Pre-tender screening may be of limited value as an 
instrument for managing uncertainties about gc. s because 
relevant information is unavailable, or because of weaknesses 
inherent in the use of ex ante information as a means of 
controlling performances during execution of a transaction. 
Clients may have relatively good access to information about 
matters such as the financial health of building firms or 
their connections with local markets for input suppliers. 
Knowledge of opportunistic tendencies, however, is costly to 
acquire and may be of questionable reliability. Opportunistic 
behaviour in the performance of building contracts is 
difficult to observe, and, in many instances, there is no 
agreed standard against which behaviour can be evaluated. 
Informal channels of reporting, such as "gossip" and "local 
knowledge", use industry norms and information, both of which 
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may be implicated in the problem of quality control69. 
Furthermore, as gc. s do not necessarily perform in the same 
way on every contract, the record of any firm, even if 
available, may be difficult to interpret. 
These problems of observation, evaluation and 
interpretation may be illustrated by reference to an item of 
information that may be. available to clients and their 
advisers during the screening process: the record of building 
firms with respect to contractual claims. Most standard form 
building contracts afford gc. s contractual entitlements to 
adjustments in time and price constraints in a wide range of 
circumstances. Claims procedures are clearly open to abuse. 
Gc. s may, for example, assert that a relevant event has caused 
greater disruption than has in fact occurred, or fail to 
conform to expectations about mitigating the impact of an 
event in the knowledge that they are completely protected 
against its costs. 
On the other hand, claims procedures may also provide a 
mechanism by which gc. s implicitly report to clients on the 
performance of consultants and other participants for whom the 
70 client is contractually accountable. A firm's claims 
69 The problem described here has a similar logic to Akerlof's "market for lemons" thesis: George 
A. AkerLof, "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism" (1970) 84 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 488. That is to say, if opportunistic tendencies are not properly reflected in 
the prices which gc. s may command, the industry norms which in part constitute the market standards 
for gc. s may reflect a "normal" degree of opportunism. Similarly, local knowledge (information) about 
gc. s may tend to evaluate / rank gc. s against "normal" opportunism. Goldberg's analysis of standard 
form contracts also addresses the process by which sub-optimal norms may be institutionalised into 
economic relationships: Victor P. Goldberg, "Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand" (1974) 
17 Journal of Law and Economics 461. 
70 Infra. 
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history, therefore, may be an ambiguous indication of its 
tendencies to behave strategically. Extensive claims on 
previous contracts may evidence opportunism or signify that 
the gc was an effective monitor of other participants. A 
record of failing to make claims may reflect the honesty of 
a gc, suggest that the transaction was adequately defined 
during planning and well-managed by the supervising architect, 
indicate that the gc was unaware of performance failures by 
the consultants or suggest that gc and architect colluded in 
more subtle forms of opportunism 71 
The efficacy of pre-tender screening as a mechanism of 
quality control is also limited by the fact that ex ante 
information cannot provide absolute protection against 
opportunism in the course of building production. Information 
is a basis for prediction, but not, in itself, a means of 
constraining behaviour during execution of complex 
transactions. Moreover, gc. s who appreciate the costs to 
clients of relaying information to the market for gc. s' 
services are unlikely to be deterred from opportunism by 
concern for their subsequent reputation. Knowledge derived 
from screening, therefore, may reduce the probability of 
contracting with a "lemon" gc, but it does not eliminate the 
risk. Indeed, in the absence of further transactional 
71 For example, gc and architect may easily collude in concealing defective inputs. This may 
entail express opportunism, as where the architect makes a conscious decision not to respond to 
evidence of poor quality materials or workmanship. Alternatively, there may be implicit "collusion", 
as where the gc knows that the architect is providing inadequate supervision and so will not notice 
if the gc supplies poor quality inputs. 
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safeguards such knowledge may be dysfunctional in that it 
could generate a false sense of security in clients and their 
consultants with the result that strategic behaviour is even 
less likely to be identified. 
Finally, it is important to recognise the potential 
effects of selective tendering on offer prices. Pre-tender 
screening creates a "small numbers" context for the 
appointment of gc. s. This context may facilitate strategic 
pricing and collusive arrangements between building firms. 
Industry commentators have noted, for example, that firms 
which have been invited to tender but whose current workload 
does not permit an additional contract, may submit a bid which 
is realistic but has no chance of success, rather than refuse 
the invitation outright72. Such "cover" prices are formulated 
by contacting "competitors" to obtain a sense of the genuine 
offers that are likely to be submitted. On the basis of this 
information, a phantom bidder can ensure that its spurious bid 
is high enough to avoid the risk that it will be accepted, but 
not so high that it attracts suspicion of bad faith. This type 
of phantom bidding reduces the already fragile competitive 
element of selective tendering and where the practice is 
formalised by local building firms acting as a "price ring", 
the notion of competition becomes a charade73 . 
72 Stone, Building Economy: Design. Production and Organisation, supra, note 10; Hittebrandt, 
Anatysis of the British Construction Industry, supra, note 4. 
73 Ibid. 
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(2) The Contractual Vetoes 
The provisions of JCT80 which enable architects, acting 
on behalf of clients, to withhold consent from a gc's decision 
to sub-contract a portion of the Works and permit gc. s to 
object to nominees create a decision-making framework for 
managing participant uncertainties. Client and gc are each 
compelled to take account of the other's concerns about the 
identity of those who are to execute the Works. In the case 
of the gc's power to veto the appointment of nsc, the ground 
for objection is expressly stated to be the identity of a 
nominee74. Similarly, under the new provisions for "hybrid" 
domestic sub-contractors, chosen from a list of names agreed 
between client and gc, authority to withhold consent is 
related to identity of a proposed sub-contractor75. By 
contrast, an architect's opposition to conventional domestic 
sub-contracting is to be expressed in terms of the practice, 
rather than the identity of a particular choice of the gc. 
Despite the generality of its language, this latter provision 
may also be viewed as a response to participant 
76 uncertainties. 
74 Clause 35.4.1. Note, however, that objection to the identity of a nominee includes the power 
to oppose the nomination of a sub-contractor whose programme for the Sub-contract Works is incompatible 
with the gc. s programme for the entire project: Rhuddlan Borough Council v. Fairctough Building Ltd 
(1985) 3 Construction Law Reports 38. With respect to nominated suppliers, gc. s may veto nominees who 
are unwilling to undertake the range of risks and liabilities specified in clause 36.4. 
ß Clause 19.3. 
76 In this instance, the clause may be seen to protect clients' interests in the gc "personally" 
producing a specific part of the works. 
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The requirement of "reasonableness" which constrains the 
exercise of the veto power may be viewed as a means of 
limiting the potential for opportunistic abuse of contractual 
authority. Under JCT80, client and gc are locked into a 
relationship which is "reciprocally monopolistic" in the sense 
that premature termination of the contract may cause 
substantial losses that cannot ordinarily be recouped in a 
substituted transactions. Clients would lose time and the 
benefits of the specific expertise acquired by a gc through 
its participation in the project. In addition, clients face 
the costs of extending their financing arrangements to 
accommodate the time that it would take to find another gc. 
Gc. s may incur costs of terminating or re-arranging 
contracts with suppliers and sub-contractors as well as the 
costs of moving its operations. Premature termination may also 
mean that gc. s' preparatory costs of tendering are wasted and 
loss of opportunities to add a particular enterprise to the 
project portfolio upon which gc. s' market their services. 
That the two parties need one another to achieve their 
economic goals engenders contractual power to impose harm. 
Refusals to co-operate in the implementation of decisions to 
use sub-contractors (or nominated suppliers) may result in 
significant costs for the party whose plans are thwarted. 
Building firms, whose in-house resources are fully committed 
to a number of projects, may be unable to comply with their 
77 Supra, chapter IV. 
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contractual undertakings if permission to use domestic sub- 
contractors is withheld. Whereas, clients, who have invested 
in searching for specialist input suppliers and are 
accountable to gc. s for timely appointment, may incur heavy 
costs if gc. s continually object to their nominees78. 
The importance of these costs lies in their implications 
for strategic bargaining over the distribution of the 
transactional surplus. Economic actors who know that the value 
of a transaction to a contracting partner is partly contingent 
on their co-operation, may opportunistically threaten to 
withhold agreement to the other's plans unless the terms of 
the contract are adjusted in their favour. JCT80 limits the 
scope for such redistributive bargaining between client and 
gc over the use of sub-contractors by its incorporation of the 
"reasonableness" constraint on the right to object. This 
provision structures the contractual distribution of power so 
that co-operation may not be withheld arbitrarily. 
Institutionalisation of this norm within the governance of 
building production by no means guarantees security against 
strategic behaviour. However, to the extent that it is 
internalised within industry practices, and potentially 
enforceable by legal or industry sanctions79, the requirement 
78 infra, chapter VIII. 
79 See chapter IV, supra, for general discussion of duties to co-operate. With respect to building 
contracts, courts have, on occasion, been prepared to recognise that a duty to co-operate, enforceable 
by legal sanctions, is embedded in particular contractual terms: see, for example, Neodox Limited v. 
Borough of Swinton and Pendlebury (1958) 5 Building Law Reports 38 (implied term that the client would 
details and instructions necessary to execute the works would be given within a reasonable time as 
assessed by reference to the needs of the contractors programme); Holland Hannen & Cubitts v. Welsh 
Health Technical Service Organisation (1981) 18 Building Law Reports 80 (client under a duty to "do 
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of reasonableness provides a stronger defence against 
strategic bargaining than would exist in its absence. 
c. Standard Conditions 
The standard conditions of JCT80 may be viewed as a 
response to environmental and participant uncertainties and 
a means for parties to avoid the costs of negotiating a 
transaction-specific framework for governing the complex 
activity of building production. With respect to participant 
uncertainties, the contract terms provide a formal basis for 
clients to demand minimum standards of honesty, competence and 
good faith from gc. s and a corresponding foundation for gc. s' 
expectations of clients. In addition, terms specifying the 
responsibilities of clients and gc. s within the privately 
agreed contractual constraints create a foundation for the 
"cost-pass-through" mechanism80. 
By way of response to environmental 'uncertainties, the 
Conditions specify allocations of the costs of "exogenous 
events" which impact on prior decisions about inputs of time, 
labour and materials. The primary consequence of such events 
is that individuals' expectations of profit, if defined 
all things necessary to enable the contractor to carry out the work"); London Borough of Merton v. Hugh 
Stanley Leach Ltd 32 Building Law Reports 51 (client under a duty to ensure that the architect co- 
operates with the gc in enabling the gc to carry out the Works). However, the notion of a wide-ranging 
duty to co-operate imposed on clients was rejected in Mention Construction Ltd. v. The Guiness Trust 
(1988) 4 Construction Law Journal 39. 
80 Supra, chapter VI, infra, chapter IX. 
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without reference to the contingencies, will not be realised. 
Disappointment may have further implications for the execution 
of building transactions. For example, gc. s may attempt to 
shift some of the costs of disappointment onto others by 
refusing to continue unless the allocation of risks is 
renegotiated. In the interactive and "reciprocally 
monopolistic" context of building contracts, threats to 
withdraw, or withhold co-operation are potentially highly 
disruptive. Not only may such threats be a powerful means of 
escaping responsibility for losses, but they also entail 
transaction costs of conflict and negotiation. While the 
building contract can do little to affect the likelihood of 
cost-generating changes in the physical or economic 
environment of a transaction, its terms may facilitate smooth 
accommodation of such contingencies, thereby reducing the 
scope for conflict. 
Risk-management under JCT80 operates in two stages. 
First, clients are expected to indicate at the time of 
tendering that the contract will be let on the terms of 
JCT8081. This information functions as a signal to building 
firms that bids should be based on the allocations of risks 
set out in the standard Conditions. Moreover, because the 
Conditions address the issue of exogenous events, clients and 
bidding firms are alerted to risks and encouraged to take 
account of contingencies when formulating initial expectations 
81 JCT Code of Procedure for Selective Tendering, supra, note 8. 
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and developing transaction-specific constraints of time and 
price. 
Second, the standard Conditions contain procedures for 
adjusting the original cost and time constraints in the light 
of events that occur during execution of the Works. With 
respect to exogenous risks, these adjustment provisions are 
used primarily to enforce an allocation to clients of a share 
in the costs of a contingency82. The adjustment procedures may 
in addition serve the function of providing a contractual 
framework within which client and gc may bargain over the 
distribution of the costs of a contingency where realised 
costs are substantially greater than the parties' had 
anticipated83. 
Underlying the strategy of ex ante discounting there is 
a premise that once expectations have been defined in the 
light of environmental contingencies, the occurrence of such 
events should not disrupt the project or impose unanticipated 
costs on a contractor. Within complex transactions, such as 
those governed by JCT80, reliance on this premise may itself 
generate transaction costs of risk-management. 
One important issue is whether the model of rationality 
upon which discounting depends accurately captures the manner 
in which expectations are formed. That is to say, if economic 
82 Supra 
83 This function is particularly evident in the fluctuation clauses which specifically provide 
for quantity surveyor and gc to negotiate settlements in the light of actual changes in input costs: 
clause 38.4.3, clause 39.5.3 and clause 40.5. 
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actors do not behave as if contractual obligations were 
defined by the risks that they have assumed, but instead 
experience contingencies as if such events were a cause of 
unanticipated harms, the theoretical advantages of discounting 
may not be realised. Furthermore, to promote ex ante risk 
allocation in a context where individuals' decision-making 
practices, though rational in the view of their experience, 
do not conform to the model, may engender transaction costs. 
Take, for example, the issue of time constraints in 
building production. Clients, typically, are anxious to have 
a functioning product in use as quickly as possible, and may 
indicate their hopes for timely completion in the tendering 
documents. Building firms may realise that clients' 
expectations are unreasonable and they know that the pace of 
production will be affected by uncontrollable events. Yet gc. s 
may agree to unrealistic time constraints and assume 
contractual commitments which they realise are unlikely to be 
met. 
At the bidding stage, it is perfectly rational for a gc 
to seek to please a client. Indeed, if the selection process 
is in any degree competitive, it may be foolish for a building 
firm to point out that a client's expectations, developed on 
the basis of need and professional advice, are infeasible. 
That a gc accepts a term for the purposes of obtaining the 
contract, however, by no means signifies that the provision 
84 JCT Code of Procedure for Selective Tendering, supra, note 8. 
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is internalised as a legitimate demand. Thus, in the event of 
a disruptive contingency during production, a gc may 
rationally seek to evade the obligation to complete on time, 
creating transaction costs of conflict and strategic 
bargaining. Clients' specific investments in building 
production generate vulnerability to threats that gc. s may 
make in support of such demands, with the result that clients 
may incur costs of "betrayal" or "demoralisation , 85 in 
addition to losses of part of the transactional surplus. 
Even if a contract is structured to encourage gc. s to 
internalise the costs of contingencies which they have agreed 
to bear, the time-scale and complexity of building production 
suggests a further limitation on the efficacy of discounting. 
Ex ante risk-management is based on the assumption that 
parties have sufficient information at the time of planning 
to estimate the probable cost implications of contingencies 86 . 
In the absence of this information, the actual costs may 
diverge significantly from the expected costs reflected in the 
private rules of the contract. This divergence constitutes a 
windfall gain for one party and an uncompensated loss to the 
other. The distribution of these gains and losses may create 
yet another site for conflict and (potentially strategic) 
85 The concept of "demoralisation costs" was first developed in Frank MicheLman's analysis of 
justifications for compensating holders of property rights for invasions of those rights: Michelman 
"Property Utility and Fairness: "Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation' Law" (1967) 
80 Harvard Law Review 1165. The concept has been used by Anthony Ogus in a comprehensive analysis of 
compensation principles in English Law: Ogus "Do We have A General Theory of Compensation" (1984) 37 
Current Leaal Problems 29. 
86 See chapter III, supra. 
368 
negotiation. 
Suppose, for example, that client and gc agree that gc 
will assume the risk of market changes in input costs, and 
that an economic downturn during the 36 month construction 
period causes the market prices of labour and materials to 
escalate at twice the rate which the parties had anticipated 
on the basis of the information available during planning. The 
market conditions cause the contract to be more beneficial to 
the client than had been anticipated, but at the same time 
they may turn what had once been a profitable transaction to 
the gc into an economic disaster. In such a context, the 
contractual distribution of costs and benefits is likely to 
be unstable. Continued participation in the contract with the 
client on the original terms is at a minimum likely to result 
in the gc foregoing opportunities to engage in another 
contract in which it would be paid at current market rates. 
More seriously, continued participation may threaten the 
financial health of the gc. To the extent that the change 
results in the gc believing that it has less to lose from 
withdrawal than continuation, it creates conditions under 
which strategic bargaining may emerge. 
The combination of discretionary adjustment and ex ante 
pricing institutionalised in JCT80 may be viewed as a means 
of alleviating some of the potential costs of discounting 
alone. First, because the parties, in effect, share the costs 
of many exogenous contingencies, the cost consequences of such 
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events, are more evenly distributed. One might, therefore, 
anticipate fewer, and less antagonistic, conflicts over 
contingencies that do materialise than in an institutional 
context where risks are wholly allocated to gc. s. 
Second, the adjustment procedures create a transactional 
setting within which conflicts may be managed. The working 
rules of the building contract establish a framework for 
negotiations and institutionalise a distribution of bargaining 
power. As such the contract terms may be seen as a recognition 
of an inevitable dimension of building transactions, and an 
attempt to order the unavoidable. 
It should not be forgotten, however, that the contractual 
structure of risk-management is itself a source of transaction 
costs. In particular, operation of the adjustment procedures 
creates administration costs, and risk-sharing and adjustment 
may attenuate incentives that would otherwise exist in a 
conventional system of ex ante discounting. For example, it 
is sometimes argued that the provisions of JCT80 reduce gc. s' 
incentives to mitigate the consequences of disruptive events. 
Critics of risk-sharing maintain that gc. s who have no control 
over the incidence of exogenous events may yet profoundly 
affect the impact of such events on building production87. 
By limiting gc. s' exposure to environmental uncertainties, 
87 For example, gc. s may be able to speed up production in response to events which generate 
delay. The production schedules of different sub-contractors may be synchronised more tightly or the 
order in which different aspects of the project are assembled may be revised so as to streamline the 
process. Similarly, the impact of changes in input costs will to a large extent depend on the 
arrangements which a gc has made for obtaining supplies. 
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therefore, the JCT may have eliminated an important source of 
discipline over gc. s' performance of their management 
responsibilities 88 
An additional site of transaction costs is the adjustment 
machinery itself. While the creation of a mechanism for 
adaptation may have the positive effect of providing a 
structured framework within which change is managed, its 
existence may encourage contractors to make marginal or 
spurious claims. Whether or not sharp practice is spotted, and 
bogus claims are rejected, the mere fact that they are made 
and must be processed adds to the transaction costs of risk- 
management. 
C. Transactional Analysis of the Separation of Design and 
Production 
Perhaps the most striking feature of planning for 
building projects is the minimal involvement in product 
definition of the actor who is to play the central role in 
production. Indeed JCT80 assumes that the gc will not even 
have been selected at the stage when crucial decisions about 
shape, size, quality and location of the buildings are 
finalised and preliminary cost constraints are established. 
This separation of design and construction into autonomous 
phases of production dominates every aspect of planning to 
88 Chapter VIII, infra. 
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build and is one of the most contentious features of the 
Contracting System. Separation has been attacked on the 
grounds that it distances architect and gc and makes it more 
difficult for these actors to achieve a co-operative working 
relationship. The Emmerson Report, for example, noted that 
"[i]n no other important industry is the responsibility for 
design so far removed from the responsibility for production" 
and commented that: 
.. there is all too often a lack of confidence between the Architect and the builder amounting at 
its worst to distrust and mutual recrimination. Even 
at their best, relations are often affected by an 
aloofness which cannot make for efficiency, and the 
building owner suffers89. 
Institutionalisation of separation between design and 
production has also been criticised for excluding gc. s' 
expertise from the process of project planning90. The essence 
of this argument is that experienced building contractors have 
a background in practical and technical aspects of 
construction which is quite distinct from that of an architect 
or other specialist consultant. Builders' knowledge could be 
used to expose assembly problems inherent in design proposals 
and identify potential building economies if it were included 
at sufficiently early stage in planning. Under the current 
89 Survey of Problems facing the construction Industry, supra, note 7 at para. 27. 
90 Ministry of Public Building and Works, Report of the Committee on the Placing and Management 
of Contracts for Building and Civil Engineering Works (The Banwett Report), supra, note 7; EDC for 
Building, Action on the Banwett Report, supra, note 7; Building Employers Confederation, A Fresh Look 
at the UK and US Building Industries (London: BEC, 1986); Chartered Institute of Building, Project 
Management in Building, (London: CIOB, 1982). 
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structure of building production, however, much of gc. s' 
expertise is wasted because it cannot be incorporated into 
the project except through costly revision to completed 
plans91. 
Finally, it is suggested that separation rests on a false 
dichotomy between design and assembly and hence compounds the 
problem of maintaining accountability for the timing of a 
project and the quality of the finished work92. Functional 
divisions of responsibilities for building production are said 
to be incoherent and entail designers and producers 
undertaking ill-defined and often overlapping tasks. 
Separation is thought to provide fertile ground for attempted 
evasions of responsibility and costly disputes between the 
main protagonists both during production and after completion 
93 
. of the project 
That the structural separation of design from 
construction in building production is a potentially 
significant source of transaction costs is undeniable94. What 
91 Ibid. 
92 Donald Keating, Building contracts: including a commentary on the JCT Standard Form of Building 
Contract (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1978). Keating points out that design obligations of the gc are 
implicitly recognised in the standard Conditions of Contract and the governing norms derived from the 
public legal regime. This issue is touched on in chapter IX, infra. 
93 Chapter IX, infra. 
94 The Banwell Report illustrates the modern interest in strengthening the relationship between 
builder and architect. It was argued that earlier appointment of a general contractor to work with the 
design team during the planning process would provide: 
undeniable advantages for the client in solving some of the failures in communication 
and understanding between designers and contractors and contractors and sub- 
contractors which have hampered the industry... The contractor appointed at an early 
stage will be able to develop a close relationship with all the other partners in the 
design and construction team before work begins on site, to plan the work property and 
so ensure speedy and economical working while it is in progress. 
Ministry of Public Building and Works, Report of the Committee on the Placing and Management of 
Contracts for Building and Civil Engineering Works (The Banwell Report), supra, note 7 at para 3.15. 
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is much less clear, however, is whether integration of 
builders into the design phase would result in lower 
organisational costs. Integrated decision-making, together 
with closer relationships between designers and producers, 
will entail its own configuration of transaction costs95. 
Although our analysis cannot determine whether separation or 
integration is the more "efficient" organisational form for 
building production, the tools of transactional economics 
provide a basis for analysing the governance implications of 
the two institutional settings96. 
Viewed from the perspective of transactional economics, 
the functional separation between design and production, and 
the relational distance between architect and gc with which 
it is associated, constitute an institutional context that has 
two key features. First, clients' specific investments in 
building production are not as closely tied to any particular 
gc as they would be were the gc a full participant in product 
planning. Second, relations between architect and gc working 
on a project are, to some extent, antagonistic 97. The former 
95 Some of the problems that may arise with greater integration are developed in the essays which 
comprise the Law and Contemporary Problems symposium on "Construction Management and Design-Build / 
Fast Track Construction" (1983) 46 Law and Contemporary Problems 1-180: see, in particular, 
contributions by John B. Tieder & Robert K. Cox "Construction Management and the Speciality Trade 
(Prime) Contractors" 39; C. A. Foster "Construction Management and Design-Build/ Fast Track 
Construction: A Solution which Uncovers a Problem for the Surety" 95; Note "Allocation of Risk in the 
Construction Industry: The Nonprofessional Owner and His Construction Manager" 145; and Walter F. Pratt 
Jr. "Afterword: Contracts and Uncertainty" 169. 
96 Indeed, to the extent that integration and separation constitute distinct institutional 
settings, It may not be possible even empirically to compare the two forms of decision-making using 
a single efficiency calculus: supra, chapter 11. 
97 Tensions between architects and gc. s arise because architects are authorised to monitor the 
performance of gc. s, and in exercising many of their contractual powers, are to act primarily in the 
interests of clients. 
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characteristic is associated with limiting a client's 
dependence on any particular gc and may, thus, indirectly 
contain clients' vulnerability to opportunism on the part of 
gc. s. Relational distance between gc and architect facilitates 
practices in which gc. s report to clients on the performance 
of the architect. 
a. Separation as a Means of Limiting Clients' Dependence on 
General Contractors 
The process of planning to build is lengthy and costly. 
Although clients initial investments take the form of general 
inputs of time and money, the purpose for which these 
resources are used - the production of a building concept - 
is specific to the needs and constraints of clients and their 
sites. Moreover, the returns on clients' investments in 
planning do not begin to materialise until the building 
concept has undergone a process of transformation - production 
- that requires the dedication of further resources to the 
particular project. 
As we have seen, transactions in which specific 
investment creates a link between economically autonomous 
actors are vulnerable to opportunistic skirmishing over the 
distribution of the transactional surplus. In the context of 
building production, the risk to clients arises because they 
are unable to realise the value of their cumulative investment 
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until the building is in use, and the resources invested 
cannot readily be deployed for other purposes. Furthermore, 
building production entails gc. s acquiring skills and 
knowledge from their participation on a particular project. 
Such resources are partly specific to the transaction with the 
client, and partly redeployable through the market for 
construction services. However, from the clients perspective, 
a gc's acquisition transaction-specific knowledge serves to 
enhance the value of the surplus that is obtainable from the 
contract with that individual. The evolving gap between a 
participant gc's specific expertise and the general expertise 
of the next best alternative is a measure of the portion of 
the transactional surplus - the quasi-rent - that accrues from 
specificity98. 
These characteristics of clients' investments in building 
production shape their relations with gc. s. Clients are highly 
dependent on the "good-faith" and competence of those with 
whom they contract and the value of clients' shares of the 
transactional surplus is partly contingent on the honesty of 
the building producers. Furthermore, the greater the 
participation of any individual producer, the larger will be 
the transactional surplus generated by the contract. 
One consequence of the exclusion of gc. s from product 
planning under JCT80 is that clients' specific investments in 
the development of the building concept do not create a link 
98 See generally, chapters II and IV. 
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with any particular building producer. As a result, the quasi- 
rents attached to the eventual relationship with a gc are 
lower than they would have been had the gc participated in 
planning. By driving a wedge between design and construction, 
separation generates a smaller "appropriable" surplus than 
integration, and may effectively limit clients' exposure to 
opportunism on the part of a gc. The question of whether the 
benefits of this aspect of separation, if viewed in isolation, 
outweigh the costs, entails comparison of the reduced scope 
for opportunism against the loss of gc. s' expertise during 
planning together with foregone opportunities for gc. s to 
develop transaction-specific knowledge and skills from the 
earliest possible moment. 
b. Separation as a means of maintaining the Accountability of 
Architects 
Production of the building concept represents a large 
proportion of the services which a client buys from an 
architect 99 . The architect's role during this process involves 
interpretation of the client's needs, liaison between 
different members of the design team, communication of 
potential solutions, and translation of the client's decisions 
99 Under the RIBA scales approximately 75% of the architect's total fee is to cover work which 
should have been completed by the time the project is at tender stage: clause 2.11, RIBA Conditions 
of Engagement (London: RIBA, 1982). 
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into the language of building production10°. The centrality of 
the architect to this phase of a construction project is 
underlined by the extent to which every other piece of 
planning information is based on architects' representations 
of clients' choices. In particular, the Bill of Quantities is 
taken directly from the drawings, and parties' expectations 
about the duration of the project are informed by the quality 
and completeness of the architect's documentation. 
Information asymmetry between client and architect may 
mean that many clients are unable accurately to monitor 
whether they are receiving the level of skill and effort for 
which they have contracted. Nor is eventual outcome 
necessarily a good proxy for the quality of the planning 
service delivered by an architect. Not only does the 
architect's performance interact with activities of other 
participants, but building transactions are situated in an 
uncertain environment. 
Agency theory suggests that this combination of factors 
may impede the operation of mechanisms of accountability and 
render clients vulnerable to cheating by opportunistic 
architects. 
Ironically, the very reason which leads clients to resort 
to the market for architects' services inhibits the operation 
of the market as an institutional limitation on agency costs. 
Clients hire architects because they lack the resources of 
100 Supra, chapter Vi. 
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information and expertise which are necessary in order to 
formulate proposals for a building concept101. In the absence 
of a reasonably detailed specification, however, architects 
appear to be unwilling to compete for the job of building 
design102. 
Recent reports have shown, for example, that clients 
usually appoint architects shortly after making the decision 
to build and that the appointment is normally based on 
negotiation with one particular firm, rather than direct 
competition 103. Moreover, many clients, when making decisions 
about appointment, do not respond to market signals of 
reliability, competence and quality, as they are 
conventionally conceived. A report of the Building EDC found, 
for example, that: 
[O]ne-time customers often routed their approach 
through familiar channels like estate agents, local 
surveyors .... Advice from professional bodies was found to be unhelpful in that they provided lists 
of local practices without any indication of 
relevant experience. New appointments were often 
made for personal rather than professional 
101 According to one study the main problem with attempting to inject greater competition into 
the process of engaging professional services is that the client often cannot generate sufficient 
information about the project to set a framework for open competition. It was suggested that 
professional architects would not be prepared to bid for a contract without a detailed specification 
of the job; and that it is usually not possible and may be undesirable to procure such a specification, 
without the services of an architect. It was further argued that it was unlikely to be cheaper for a 
client to do work which is normally performed by a professional: Director-General of Fair Trading, 
Report on Fee Competition in Professional Services in the Construction Industry, Office of Fair Trading 
(London: OFT, 1986). 
102 Ibid. 
103 The OFT Report, ibid., found that 79% of all architects commissions were made by appointment, 
a process where at the time of discussion with the client the practice was the sole contender for the 
job and in only 12% was there some degree of competition. The statistical breakdown by type of client 
showed little variation between public and private sectors. Within the central public sector 71% of 
contracts were based on appointment and 20% entailed some degree of competition; within the rest of 
the public sector the appointment - competition ratio was 73% : 17%; within the private sector, the 
distribution between the two modes of engagement was 81% : 10%. 
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reasons,.... Only very exceptionally did customers 
seek references or inspect other work done by the 
practice and there were few instances of any 
searching encu ry into the practice's expertise, 
workload etc. . 
The degree of information asymmetry between clients and 
architects also raises doubts about the argument that markets 
may control agency costs through ex post revisions to the 
value of the agents human capital105. Architects' perceptions 
of the risk that information about tendencies to cheat will 
be compounded into the prices which they command may be shaped 
by awareness that clients' appointment practices typically do 
not take account of the market concept of reputation106. In 
addition, the threat of economic sanctions may be considerably 
diluted by architects' knowledge that many clients are unable 
to detect poor quality planning. 
It is sometimes argued that the disciplinary power of 
market mechanisms may be strengthened by contractual 
governance of the relationship between principal and agent107. 
Principals may, for example, enhance their ability to evaluate 
agents by adopting, as contract terms, measurable proxies for 
unobservable dimensions of the agents performance108. 
104 Faster Building For Industry, supra, note 3 at para. 9.13. 
105 Supra, chapter V. 
106 It is important to recognise that there may exist different conceptions of reputation. 
Informal reputational standards can be very important, but may not feed into price as accurately as 
the traditional measures. 
107 Supra, chapter V. 
108 Supra chapters IV & V. 
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Alternatively, the contract may incorporate "aspirational" 
norms or standards derived from agencies which regulate the 
profession of which the agent is a member 109 
Formal governance of the relationship between client and 
architect is, of course, derived from contract. Moreover the 
transaction between client and architect is situated in an 
institutional context that includes general rules of law, 
legal norms that are specific to professional relationships 
or construction projects, a licensing regime, and Codes of 
Conduct developed by the professional institutes. However, the 
transactional characteristics of building production, together 
with the information asymmetry between clients and architects 
suggest that the direct protection against opportunism in the 
delivery of planning services furnished by contract, may be 
quite limited. 
First, clients face the problem of formulating 
transaction-specific standards which are observable, and 
reasonably approximate the dimensions of quality and effort 
that are of concern. Moreover, in developing contractual 
standards, the parties will need to avoid constraining the 
discretion of the architect to such an extent that the client 
foregoes much of the benefit of architect's expertise110. 
Second, the efficacy of legal constraints hinges upon 
there being in place a mechanism for reporting failures to 
109 Supra chapter IV. 
110 Supra, chapter IV. 
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conform to contractual standards. Even if standards are 
formulated, therefore, the combination of clients' lack of 
expertise and the ease with which planning failures may be 
camouflaged suggests that architects who cheat may be able to 
block the emergence of the information upon which legal 
enforcement depends111. 
The relational distance between architect and gc 
associated with the separation of design and production, 
constitutes a framework within which some of these monitoring 
problems may be alleviated. Whatever the confusions in 
production responsibilities that might attend separation, its 
primary consequence during project planning is to render 
architects wholly accountable to clients for production of the 
building concept112. In addition, the institutional structure 
of planning to build clarifies precisely what is required of 
the architect at this stage, that is, timely production of 
useable and reliable information which reflects an effective 
compromise between clients' needs and constraints. Inadequacy 
at any of these margins has an impact on the ability of 
building firms to prepare reliable offers and may also affect 
the costs to the gc of procuring supplies and co-ordinating 
the production process. That the planning service delivered 
by the architect shapes the conditions under which gc. s work, 
111 infra, chapters V111 & IX. 
112 Supra, see also Moresk Cleaners v. Hicks (1966) 4 Building Law Reports 50; Holland. Hannen 
& Cubitt v. Welsh Health Technical Services Organisation, supra, note 79; Richard Roberts Holdings Ltd. 
v. Douglas Smith Stimson Partnership (1989) 5 Construction Law Journal 223. 
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furnishes gc. s with a direct interest in the quality of that 
service, as measured by criteria of the timeliness, 
completeness and reliability of information. 
Separation, therefore, creates an institutional context 
for planning which generates measurable standards and promotes 
convergence of the interests of clients and gc. s in the 
quality of planning services supplied by architects. This 
context also provides a basis for the development of 
incentives which encourage gc. s to use their expertise to 
monitor. architects and notify clients of evidence of cheating 
or incompetence 113. Within transactions governed by JCT80, such 
incentives are to be found in two classes of working rules. 
First, the Conditions hold clients answerable to gc. s 
for the organisational and production costs of working with 
poor quality design information. Underlying the contract there 
is premise that the documentation available to gc. s during 
tendering contained sufficient information that a gc may 
procure the entire complement of resources necessary to 
produce the building. Incomplete planning of the building 
concept is a ground for the gc to claim an adjustment in the 
113 it may be argued that this system of monitoring has a more generally beneficial effect. 
Monitoring by a gc clearly does not directly solve the problem of client inexperience and information 
asymmetry between client and architect. However, it does provide a mechanism by which some evaluation 
of the architect's performance may reach the market for architects' services. Builders who have the 
expertise to assess the adequacy of planning are encouraged to do so by the contractual entitlements 
to compensation for their private costs of inadequate planning. Clients who receive information from 
builders are better able to determine whether there is a divergence between the contracted for and 
actual performance from the architect. Architects who know that information asymmetry may be short- 
circuited in this way so that the market may in fact receive signals about their propensity to act 
opportunistically, and who are concerned to protect the capital value of reputation will thus be more 
inclined to comply with contractual standards. 
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contract price114; an extension of time, if necessary115; and 
compensation for the costs of adapting to the new 
information 116. Clients who must compensate the gc for the 
costs of working with inadequate information clearly have a 
greater incentive to take action against a cheating architect 
than if the costs associated with producing on the basis of 
poor quality information were borne by gc. s. 
Gc. s' incentives to use the contractual machinery and 
report directly to clients are reinforced by the structure of 
legal norms governing relations between architect and gc. The 
principle that architects do not owe any duties to gc. s with 
respect to the preparation of designs, curtails gc. s' access 
to direct compensation from the architect117. Gc. s, therefore, 
who incur costs from using defective information have no 
choice but to invoke the contractual cost-pass-through 
mechanism by bringing claims against the client. 
Secondly, gc. s are subject to specific contractual duties 
to warn the client of particular inadequacies in the building 
concept, and may, in addition, have an implied contractual 
duty to warn of design defects in general. Under the express 
terms of JCT80, gc. s are required "immediately" to notify the 
114 Additional or Substituted work is treated as a Variation and processed under clause 13: see, 
chapter VIII, infra. 
115 Clause 25.4.5, see chapter VIII, infra. 
116 Clause 26. 
117 On the point of negligence duties between participants in construction projects who do not 
have a formal contractual relationship with one another, but are linked by virtue of separate contracts 
with a third party, see, Simaan General Contracting Company v. Pitkington Glass Limited (No. 2) [19881 
1 ALL ER 791; on the specific issue of the absence of a duty owed by architect to gc, see, Michael 
Sat Liss & Co. Ltd. v. E. C. A. Catit & Others (1988) 4 Construction Law Journal 125. 
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Architect of inconsistencies between the Contract Documents118, 
and discrepancies or divergences between the Contract 
Documents and statutory requirements119. This information, 
though channelled through the architect who may be responsible 
for the problem, will eventually reach the client, who is, 
once again, contractually accountable to the gc for production 
and organisational costs attendant upon resolving the 
problem120. 
Gc. s' implied "duty to warn" of defects in the building 
concept was formulated by Judge John Newey QC in two decisions 
of the Official Referee's Court during 1984. In each case the 
conflict between client and building producers centred on 
inadequate performance of a building feature during use of the 
completed building and both cases involved earlier versions 
of the JCT's standard form of building contract. 
In Equitable Debenture Assets Corporation Ltd. v. William 
Moss Group Ltd. and Others121 (EDAC), the architect had 
persuaded a somewhat sceptical client that the feature in 
question - curtain walling - was not only aesthetically 
desirable but would also withstand the rigours of the climatic 
conditions to which the development would be exposed. The 
architect had hired a consultant during preparation of the 
building concept to advise on design, installation and use of 
118 
clause 2.3. 
119 Clause 6.1.2. 
120 Clauses 25.4.5.1,26.2.3 & 26.2.7. 
121 (1984) 2 Construction Law Reports 1. 
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curtain walling. Once the client had accepted the idea, the 
architect nominated a sub-contractor to design, supply and 
install a project-specific system of curtain walling. That the 
system as installed was an unmitigated disaster was found to 
be due, in part, to defects in design for which the architect 
and the nsc were accountable under the express terms of 
contracts with the client122. 
In Victoria University of Manchester v. Hugh Wilson & 
Lewis Womersley and Pochin (Contractors) Ltd123, the decision 
about the design feature - ceramic tile cladding - was again 
based on the architect's enthusiastic recommendation in the 
face of some hesitation by the client. The architect had 
formulated the plans for the cladding, nominating a sub- 
contractor for the purposes of supply and installation only. 
The University experienced persistent problems with the 
appearance and maintenance of the external cladding and 
eventually replaced the tiles. 
As is apparent from this brief review of the facts of 
these cases, the transaction in each instance was set in the 
context of the traditional Contracting System. The gc. s had 
not played any part in the production of the building concept 
as a whole or in the design of the specific feature. Nor, 
122 The architect's obligation, as interpreted by the Official Referee, was to design a watertight 
building and to revise plans and redesign during production, if necessary. Though the Official Referee 
did not believe the initial decision to use curtain walling to be negligent, he thought that there was 
negligence in the selection of the nsc, approval of the nsc's design, and in the haphazard use of the 
expertise of the consultant during planning. 
123 (1984) 2 Construction Law Reports 43. 
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under the terms of the JCT contracts, were the gc. s explicitly 
accountable for the quality of performance of building that 
conformed to plans and instructions issued by the architect124. 
Nevertheless, the judge accepted the plaintiffs' contentions 
that gc. s were subject to a duty to warn clients of defects 
in the designs with which they were working. The primary 
conceptual basis of the analysis was the implied contractual 
term125. The duty to warn was thought to meet the threshold 
test of "necessary for business efficacy" on the grounds that 
int he light of gc. s experience and expertise: 
it would have been absurd for [the gc] to have 
carried on implementing [a design] ... if on 
examining the drawings or as a result of experience 
on site [the gc had] formed the opinion that in some 
respect the design would not work or would not work 
satisfactorily 126. 
As formulated in EDAC, the gc's duty appeared to relate to 
design defects which the gc had observed or encountered (or 
ought to have observed or encountered) during the process of 
transforming a building concept into a physical structure. In 
the University of Manchester decision 127, Judge Newey 
emphasised that gc. s should not wait for evidence of design 
124 Clause 2.1. See chapter IX, infra, for discussion of the extent to which sanctions may be 
available against gc. s who supply and install inputs that meet the contractual specifications but are 
inadequate. 
125 Note that the Official Referee would also have been witting to hold that there was a tortious 
duty of care. More recently, however, the courts have taken a strong stand against the "finding" of 
concurrent tortious duties, particularly with respect to "economic losses", between parties who have 
a contractual relationship: see for example, Greater Nottingham Cooperative Society Ltd v. Cementation 
Piling and Foundations Ltd., [1988] 3 WLR 396; see also, the comments of Lord Scarman in Tai Hing 
Cotton Mill Ltd. V. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd. (1986] 1 AC 80. This issue of concurrent liabilities is 
discussed in more depth in chapter IX, infra. 
126 Supra, note 121 at 31. 
127 Supra, note 123. 
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defects to materialise, but would be expected to alert 
architects, as agents of the client, to the possibility of 
problems. He stated that: 
.. a term was to be implied ... requiring the 
contractors to warn the architects as the 
University's agents of defects in design, which they 
believed to exist. Belief that there were defects 
required more than mere doubt as to the correctness 
of the design, but less than actual knowledge of 
errors128. 
Doubts have been expressed about the desirability of 
implying terms into detailed contracts such as those of the 
JCT129. Others have criticised the concept of a gc. s' duty to 
warn on the grounds that it blurs distinctions between design 
and production. Hilary Nicholls, for example, asserts that it 
is: 
odd for professionals - who hold themselves out as 
experts in the design of buildings - to expect 
contractors, employed simply to carry out the works 
130 to point out shortcomings in their own design. 
Of particular significance to some commentators and 
judges is the concern that architects would not only rely on 
the gc's contractual duty to shelter themselves from full 
responsibility to clients, but might also develop negligence 
claims to the effect that gc. s were answerable to architects 
128 ibid., at 77. 
129 See generally, Lynch v. Thorne [1956) 1 WLR 303; Tai Hing Cotton Mill v. Liu Chong Hing Bank, 
supra, note 125; see, in particular, Greater Nottingham Cooperative Society v. Cementation Piling and 
Foundations Ltd, supra, note 125; The University Court of the University of Glasgow v. William 
Whitfield (1989) 5 Construction Law Journal 73. 
130 Hilary Nicholls, "Contractors' `Duty to Warn' following D &F Estates and University of Glasgow 
v. Whitfield" (1989) 5 Construction Law Journal 175 at 175. 
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for design inadequacies 131. Recent restrictions on liability 
for economic loss in tort have ensured, for the moment at 
least, that any such suggestions from architects are unlikely 
to be received sympathetically132. However, there remains the 
argument that an implied contractual term requiring gc. s to 
warn clients of design defects, may, in the event that the 
terms is breached, enable architects to avoid being held fully 
to account for the quality of planning services133. 
Implementation of the gc's duty to warn clients of design 
defects by way of legal sanctions undoubtedly entails costs, 
including, conceivably, the cost of attenuating the incentives 
faced by architects134. However, it is important to clarify the 
basis on which these costs are to be evaluated. Given the 
unequal relations of dependence in transactions between 
clients and architects, clients are unlikely to detect many, 
or even most, qualitative failures in the planning service 
delivered by architects. Analysis of the incentives of 
architects in an institutional context that includes gc. s' 
duty to warn, therefore, cannot assume that in the absence of 
such a duty, architects believe that detection of cheating or 
incompetence is certain, and act accordingly. Rather than 
compare the costs of the duty to warn with a contractual 
131 See Glasgow university v. Whitfield, supra, note 129, where such a claim was made, and 
rejected. 
132 Infra, chapter IX. 
133 Infra, chapter IX. 
134 infra, chapter IX. 
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context that would produce perfect deterrence, evaluation 
should engage with the actual operation of markets for 
architects' services, information asymmetry and client 
inexperience. In view of this context, the relevant comparison 
is between transaction and incentive costs of the duty to warn 
and any increase in the probability that cheating and 
incompetence in design will be detected if gc. s have a 
stronger inducement to use their expertise in the monitoring 
of service delivery by the architect. 
D. Contractual Planning and the Contracting Continuum 
Many of the issues raised by planning for the purposes 
of JCT80 involve dimensions of contract management and 
enforcement that are considered in more depth in the following 
chapters. However, some general points emerge from the 
discussion. One important feature of the standard form 
contract is its dual planning modes. Decisions about inputs 
to the project and organisation of production are detailed and 
highly transaction-specific, whereas risk-planning is 
unfocused and largely expressed in the standard conditions of 
contract. Because these issues are interdependent, their 
resolution in this manner creates a tension between two 
economic models of contractual relations. 
The idiosyncratic phase of planning to build is robustly 
classical. Strict functional divisions between different 
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participants in construction; the use of ex ante price 
competition as an important selection criterion; and the 
attempt to define the gc's input precisely are all indicative 
of the classical discrete transaction. Turin nicely captures 
the image of the building process that underpins this phase 
of the planning process when he speaks of a world of "as if": 
It is "as if" the client knew what he wanted when 
he commissioned the building from a designer; it is 
"as if" the designer was in a position to advise the 
client on the best value-for-money he could obtain 
in the market; ... it is "as if" the contractor knew how his resources were used, was in a position to 
control them, and was able to use this experience 
on his next job 135 . 
By contrast, contingency planning is quite literally pro forma 
and is dominated by the relational technique of arranging for 
ex post adjustment to events that have occurred. In this 
context the contractual provisions function as a decision- 
making structure which opens up the prospect of revising most 
of the transaction-specific decisions. 
A further twist'is provided by the role of the architect, 
the most prominent of the "non-party" participants in a 
transaction regulated by JCT80. The relationship between 
client and architect is a standard example of the principal- 
agent transaction, calling for its own system of checks and 
balances to mediate between maximising agent expertise and 
minimising agency costs. JCT80's emphatic separation of design 
and production functions, most visible in contract planning, 
135 reintroduction's Aspects of the Economics of Construction, supra, note 48, at xi. 
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underpins a complex control system which supplements 
regulation by the market and the law. In addition to limiting 
the scope for builder opportunism resulting from specific 
investment by ensuring that investment in product planning is 
not dedicated to a relationship with a particular builder; 
separation maintains gc. s' incentives to monitor the 
architect. The detailed basis of the contract with the gc 
becomes a measure of the architect's performance. 
Inevitably, there are costs to the form of contractual 
planning reflected in JCT80. Building projects forego some of 
the benefits of gc. s' inputs during planning, the possibility 
of co-operation between architect and gc may be reduced, and 
the probability of friction increased. There is, in addition, 
a more subtle source of costs. The tension between classical 
norms of "distance" and the relational practice of 
interconnection encourages architects and gc. s to define their 
transactional commitments in a discrete fashion. An important 
governance implication of this mode of planning is that it 
increases the risk of what may be perceived as "gaps" in the 
transactional network of formal duties and responsibilities 
owed to clients136. 
136 Infra, chapter IX. 
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Chapter VIII Administration and Management-' 
The administration and management of building 
transactions entail decision-making processes which regulate 
the physical process of production. The decisions which are 
required to transform labour resources, materials inputs and 
the information contained in design documents into a 
functioning building fall into two main categories. Co- 
ordination decisions guide participants' activities, and are 
used to manage adjustments to contingencies and other relevant 
information which emerges during production. Evaluation 
decisions involve monitoring resource inputs for conformity 
with the contractual terms governing price, quality, 
quantities and time. 
The working rules of administration and management 
contained in JCT80 create a difficulty for the presentation 
of our analysis. In a manner which is comparable with many 
"firm-like" transactions, JCT80 blends decision-making with 
respect to co-ordination and evaluation into a unified set of 
procedures. While an institutional perspective may suggest 
that these processes can be understood only if we respect the 
integrity of the contractual form taken as a whole, it is also 
important to clarify the distinct forms of transaction costs 
to which co-ordination and monitoring decisions respond. 
Failure to distinguish between the two classes of decisions 
may lead us to neglect tensions between their objectives, or 
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overlook the extent to which the working rules of a contract 
have different implications for the costs of co-ordination and 
evaluation. 
The approach that I have chosen attempts to show the 
connections between evaluation and co-ordination goals in the 
working rules of JCT80, and the distinct implications of these 
rules for the transaction costs attendant on the two 
processes. To these ends, the analysis of contractual 
management is divided between this chapter and chapter IX. 
This chapter describes the principal management procedures 
instituted in the working rules of JCT80, and, where necessary 
to the, explanation, comments on their role in evaluation; 
however, the primary focus is co-ordination. The analysis 
emphasises the management of disruptions and interactions 
between contractual provisions for responding to change and 
the execution of transactional tasks. Chapter IX draws on the 
discussion of the working rules of evaluation provided here, 
but focuses on their implications for the enforcement of 
transactional commitments. 
The discussion in this chapter is divided into four 
sections. Part A describes the instruments of administration 
and management under JCT80. The contractual procedures 
governing Architect's Instructions, Certification and 
Inspection are outlined and the architect's management role 
is illustrated in discussions of Directive Instructions and 
Interim Certification. Part B focuses_on the machinery of 
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adjustment. This section describes the primary contractual 
procedures for adapting to changes and analyses the 
implications of the extension of time machinery and the 
variation provisions for the costs of co-ordinating building 
production. Part C deals with the intersection of risk- 
allocation ideas and transactional governance in the context 
of the departure of building resource suppliers during 
execution. This section traces the development of contractual 
norms to govern two insolvency risks and analyses the 
implications of these norms for the management of building 
production. The concluding section compares the governance 
implications of contractual management, as structured by 
JCT80, with the economic models of governance that constitute 
the contracting continuum. 
A. The Institutional Structure of Administration and 
Management Under JCT8O. 
Responsibility for decisions about the administration and 
management of a building project governed by JCT80 is 
organised in a manner which combines autonomy with hierarchy. 
The general contractor (gc) and nominated sub-contractors 
(nsc. s) are to procure and co-ordinate the resources required 
to complete their distinct portions of the project, although 
nsc. s' management powers are, to some extent, subordinated to 
the authority of the gc. Within the parameters of the 
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contractual constraints specified in the Bill of Quantities 
and agreed between client and gc, gc. s have considerable 
management autonomy. They select input suppliers, determine 
the pace of production and make decisions about the 
organisation and sequencing of building operations. Where the 
activities of building producers confront any of the 
contractual constraints, however, the gc's management function 
is subordinated to that of the architect. Revisions to the 
parties' original decisions about price or the Date for 
Completion, or changes to the building specification, for 
example are managed by the architect, as is evaluation of the 
performance of building producers against the contractual 
standards of timing and quality. 
The architect's mandate to administer and manage building 
projects is to be found in a range of contractual powers and 
duties. This authority is exercised by means of three 
instruments: inspection, certification, and instruction. 
Project architects must certify the gc's progress at certain 
stages of the project and at specified intervals, and are 
sometimes, required to issue directive or adjustment 
instructions. In addition, architects are empowered to inspect 
the Works and order rectification or removal of defects and 
non-conforming inputs. 
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1. Architect's Instructions 
JCT80 empowers or requires the architect to issue 
1 Instructions in a wide range of circumstances. The authority 
. 
to instruct is a unilateral power to direct production in the 
sense that gc and nsc. s are required to comply with properly 
issued Instructions which fall within the architect's 
authority2. Only in the case of one type of "variation 
Instruction" are building producers afforded a_ contractual 
right of "reasonable objection"3. 
The procedure for issuing Instructions purports to ensure 
that directions are documented, and reach the gc (or nsc) in 
good time for the activity which it describes to : be 
organised4. It is the responsibility of the gc to ensure that 
the information contained in Instructions reaches other 
building producers in time for supplies to be organised. To 
this end, the gc is required "constantly (to] keep upon the 
Works a competent person-in-charge" who is empowered to 
1 The contract distinguishes between imposing a duty to instruct and conferring powers to instruct 
according to the subject-matter of the direction (see Fig. 1). As the architect is not technically 
party to the contract, enforcement of the duty to instruct is channelled through the client. 
2 Clause 4.1.1 of the main form states: 
The Contractor shall forthwith comply with all instructions issued to him by the 
Architect / Supervising Officer in regard to any matter in respect of which the 
Architect /. Supervising Officer is expressly empowered by the Conditions to Issue 
instructions... 
See clause 4.2 of NSC/4 for the equivalent obligation of a nsc to comply with Architect's Instructions. 
Note that Architect's Instructions will normally be channelled through the gc to a nsc. 
3 Gc. s and nsc. s may object to Instructions which change terms governing access to the site, and 
limit working space or working hours: Clause 4.1.1, see clause 4.3 NSC/4 for the equivalent provision 
in the standard form of sub-contract. 
4 Clause 4. The procedure also affords gc. s the power to request clarification of the architect's 
authority to issue a particular instruction, and provides clients with a remedy if the gc does not 
comply with an Instruction that is authorised by the Conditions. 
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receive Instructions from the-architect and liaise with the 
Clerk of Works5. 
-Architect's 
Instructions are the primary contractual 
instruments by which the project architect communicates 
information to the gc6. With respect to co-ordination 
decisions, Instructions are used to give direction and specify 
adjustments to information which emerges during production. 
In addition, Architect's Instructions play a role in the 
contractual system of monitoring and evaluation. JCT80 
requires Instructions to. - 
be issued before the architect 
exercises her contractual power to inspect completed portions 
of the- Works7, and envisages that producers' failures to 
comply with contractual terms will be recorded in Architect's 
Instructions8. Figure 1, documents the principal contract 
terms under which the architect is empowered to issue 
Instructions and the management function of the Instruction 
in each case. 
5 Clause 10. The precise range of functions to be fulfilled by this person is a matter for the 
gc alone. 
6 Note that the communication envisaged by Architect's Instructions is unidirectional. 
7 Clause 8.3. 
8 See, for example, clauses 8.4 and 17. 
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fig. 1 The conditions expressly enoower or require the architect to give instructions in the following 
instances: 
Tern Substance Function 
2.3 Resolving discrepancies between contract documents Supervision 
6.1 Resolving discrepancies between private Supervision 
(contractual) provisions and statutory requirements 
7 Setting out works at ground level Direction 
8.3 Opening up works for inspection Supervision 
8.4 Removal of non conforming goods Supervision 
8.5 Excluding employed persons from the site / Works Supervision 
13.1 Changes to the project defined by original contract Adjustment 
documents, or to the conditions under which project 
is to be executed 
13.3 Expenditure of provisional sum items in bills Direction 
17 Rectification of defects that appear within 6 Supervision 
months of practical or apparent completion of the 
works 
22C - Removal and disposal of debris where clause 22C Direction 
insurance provision used 
23.2 Postponement of any part of the Works - Adjustment 
25.3 Extension of the contract period -Adjustment 
26 Gc's claim for direct loss and or expense Adjustment 
27.4.2 Assignment of the benefits of sub-contracts where Adjustment 
the gc's contract is determined by the client 
30 Documents to the OS for ascertaining final contract Direction 
sum 
32.2 Protective work on the outbreak of hostilities Adjustment 
Direction 
33.1.2 Removing debris and damaged work and execution of Adjustment/ 
33.1.3 protective work in the event of war damage Direction 
34 Discovery of antiquities Adjustment 
35.5.2 Changes in the nomination procedures Direction 
35.10.2 Contract with nsc - "basic" procedure Direction 
35.8 Where gc and nsc fail to agree terms Direction 
35.11.2 Using the "alternative" nomination procedure Direction 
35.18.1.1 Re-Nomination Adjustment 
35.24.4.1 Default by nsc Adjustment 
36.2 Nomination of suppliers Direction 
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Directive. Instructions 
Directive instructions describe actions which gc: s or 
nsc. s must take in order to meet their contractual obligations 
to "carry out and complete" the Works and are required 
whenever the information available to a gc or nsc is 
incomplete, contradictory, or in other respects an inadequate 
basis upon which to act9. Such Instructions operate to shield 
building producers from contractual liability for defects in 
the completed building which result from compliance with a 
valid instruction10. JCT80 also protects producers from 
dilatory performance by the architect of her responsibilities 
to co-ordinate production. Directive Instructions which are 
late or non-forthcoming are grounds for a gc or nsc to claim 
an extension of time and recover its "private" costs- of 
disruption, provided that the gc or nsc had made a specific 
and timely written request for the instruction". 
Directive Instructions are also used to facilitate co- 
ordination of the operations - of independent resource 
suppliers. Take, for example, the nomination procedures 
9A 
good example of this function is the clause 7 Instruction by which the architect is to direct 
the gc as to the precise layout of the buildings on the site. In this type of situation, the duty to 
instruct avoids the costs of the gc duplicating the architect's investigations. 
10 Architect's Instructions would appear not to shield gc. s from accountability for breaches of 
statutory duties or tortious obligations. The issue may not arise, however, as the courts have severely 
restricted clients' and subsequent building owners' access to sanctions under these theories, see 
chapter IX, infra. 
11 26.2.1 and 25.4.6. In both cases the request is to be made: 
on a date which having regard to the Completion Date is neither unreasonably distant 
from nor unreasonably close to the date on which it is necessary to receive the same. 
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contained in clause 3512. Clause 35 opens with a clarification 
of the circumstances in which the architect is permitted to 
appoint a sub-contractor13. Once the architect has selected a 
firm to supply specialist input, she is required to send "a 
preliminary notice of nomination" to the gc, which notice is 
to include details of the tender offer made by the 
specialist14. The notice is an Instruction to the gc to 
"proceed to settle outstanding matters of schedule 2 of the 
tender forthwith" unless it has reasonable grounds to object 
to the identity of a nominee15. The gc's obligation to 
negotiate with the nsc is mirrored by the nominee's 
undertaking (contained in the collateral arrangement between 
client and nominee), to seek to settle matters with the gc16. 
These provisions establish a framework within which gc 
and nominee are to bargain over arrangements for their on- 
site activities. If they fail to come to agreement the gc is 
12 The contract provides two primary nomination procedures, both of which are supported by 
standard forms of sub-contract (NSC/4 & NSC/4a) and collateral warranty (NSC/2 & NSC/2a). The "basic" 
method of nomination presumes that the nsc is selected on the basis of a tendering process that is 
governed by yet another standard document NSC/1 (clause 35.6 - 35.10). Under this procedure the 
transactional relationship between gc and nsc is governed by the tender and the standardised conditions 
of NSC/4 and the relationship between client and nsc is governed by NSC/2. The alternative procedure 
assumes that the appointment of the nsc Is not managed on the terms of NSC/1 (clause 35.11). In this 
case the relationship between gc and nsc is on the basis of NSC/4a and the client-nsc relationship is 
governed by NSC/2a. (Note that JCT80 also recognises the possibility that client and nsc may agree, 
during tendering, that their relationship will not be governed by either of the standard forms of 
collateral warranty: clause 35.11.1). 
13 An intention to use a specialist input suppliers for some part of the Works will usually be- 
signalled during initial planning by the device of inserting a "prime cost" sum into the BILL of 
Quantities, supra, chapter VI. JCT80 also permits the decision to be taken after work has commenced 
on site. Implementation of a decision which is made during production is governed by the Variation 
procedure: clause 13. 
14 This specific direction to the architect is part of the basic procedure: clause 35.7.1. 
15 Clause 35.4.1, see chapter VII, supra, for discussion of the contractual veto powers. 
16 Clause 1.1 NSC/2: the matters referred to deal with organisation of. 
-the 
nsc's activities on 
the site, and integration of these operations with those of the gc. 
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required to notify the architect, explain the reason for 
failure, and continue with negotiations until instructed 
otherwise17. Upon receipt of notification that gc and nominee 
are unable to agree, the architect is required to issue "such 
instructions as may be necessary"18 to resolve the deadlock. 
Once the organisational arrangements have been concluded both 
gc and nominee are to inform the architect of their agreement, 
whereupon the architect is to issue the formal nomination 
Instruction directing the two actors to enter into the 
standard form of sub-contract19. 
2. Supervision 
a. Inspection 
The inspection provisions of JCT80 are primarily directed 
at the transaction-specific constraints set- out in the 
documents which define the building concept and its component 
inputs. Clause 8 empowers architects to request evidence that 
materials and goods conform to the standards described in the 
Bill of Quantities and direct gc. s to open up executed work 
for testing. More limited provision is made for inspection of 
preparatory work off-site. The gc is required to ensure that 
17 Clause 35.8. 
18 ibid. 
19 Clause 35.10.2. 
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the architect has "reasonable access" to its own workshops and 
those of domestic sub-contractors, and, "so far as possible", 
to secure similar rights of - access to the workshops of a 
nominated sub-conträctor20. 
Although the architect has extensive powers to monitor 
the quality of input, practical execution of the regime of 
quality control may be hampered by the terms of the contract 
between architect and client. This arrangement normally 
envisages periodic rather than constant attendance at the 
site21. JCT80 compensates for the potentially significant gaps 
in supervision which may arise by providing for the 
appointment of a Clerk of Works (CW). 
Clause 12 gives clients a right "to appoint a clerk of 
works whose duty shall be to act solely as inspector on behalf 
of the Employer under the directions of the Architect". The 
CW's place in the contractual structure of quality control 
entails checking. that materials and workmanship accord with 
the contractual specification, Architect's Instructions and 
"good practice" in the industry22. Subject to the significant 
qualification that the instructions of CW. s are not. binding 
on the gc unless ratified by the architect, CW. s may assume 
20 Clause 11. 
21 Contract management and supervision is usually a relatively small component of the architect's 
fee. Under the RIBA Conditions of Engagement, for example, only 25% of the fee is payable for the 
services supplied between the end of the tender stage at which the gc is hired and Completion of the 
project. 
22 Allan Ashworth Contractual Procedures in the Construction Industry (Harlow: Longman Scientific 
and Technical 1986); Dennis F. Dolan The British Construction Industry An Introduction (Basingstoke: 
MacMillan, 1979). 
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any of the architect's monitoring powers23. Gc. s are 
specifically required to facilitate the activities of the CW24. 
This assistance might include affording the CW reasonable 
opportunities to inspect products before incorporation-into 
the Works and test completed portions of the building for 
conformity with the contractual specification. 
b. Certification 
Certification is primarily used to trigger payments under 
the terms of the contract. The majority of the certificates 
for which JCT80 makes provision are concerned with the 
progress of building producers and precipitate release by the 
client of part of the contract sum. Others function, in 
effect, as contractually authoritative statements that the gc 
or a nsc has failed to meet the constraints of time, quality 
and quantities.. With respect to this latter class of 
certificates, the architect's evaluation activates the 
obligation of the building producer, under JCT80, to 
compensate the client for breach. Figure 2 documents the range 
of clauses under which the architect is to certify 
performances at various points during the transaction and 
indicates the direction of -the contractual payment obligation. 
23 Clause 12, see chapter IX, infra, for discussion of the relationship between architects' and 
clerks of works' supervisory duties. 
24 Clause 12. 
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Fig 2. Architect's Certificates 
Clause Subject Matter of Certificate 
17.1 Practical Completion of the Works. 
17.4 Completion of Making Good Defects at the end of the 
Defects Liability Period. 
18.1.1 Estimated value of the Works where the client takes 
partial possession before the end of the project. 
18.1.3 Defects made good after partial possession. 
22A. 4.2 Payment of insurance monies after reinstatement of 
damage. 
24.1 Failure to complete the Works by the Date for 
Completion. 
27.4.4 Expense, loss or damage incurred by the client 
arising out of determination of the contract by the 
client. 
30.1.1 Interim certificates for periodic payment during 
production. - 
30.7 Interim Certificate for final payment of nominated 
sub-contractors. 
30.8 Final Certificate 
35.13.5.2 Contractors failure to provide reasonable proof of 
payment to nominated sub-contractor. 
35.15.1 Failure of nominated sub to complete the sub- 
contract by the due date. 
35.16 Practical Completion of the sub-contract Works 
35.17 Interim Certificate to complete payments to 
nominated sub-contractors. 
Party Spieet to 
obligation 
Client 
Client 
Client / no payment 
Client 
General Contractor 
General Contractor 
Client 
Client 
Client 
Nominated Sub- 
Contractor 
Client 
Client 
Interim Certification and Quality Control During Production 
Many certificates are expressly made part of the quality- 
control system in that the architect may not issue the 
document unless satisfied that output conforms with the 
specification in every material respect. The contractual role 
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of others is more ambiguous. Of particular interest are those 
certificates which entail assessment of the progress of the 
Works. The question which has arisen is to what extent should 
the architect, when evaluating quantities and timing, take 
account of the quality of input supplied before certifying 
that an operation has been completed? Certification for 
interim payments during production raises this issue in a 
particularly acute form. 
JCT80 requires the contract price to be paid in 
instalments throughout the production process25. Interim 
payments are governed by a system that falls somewhere between 
periodic payment of equal sums at regular intervals and stage 
payments as and when production phases are completed. Payments 
are to be calculated at the intervals agreed between the 
'parties during the transaction-specific planning phase26. At 
the conclusion of each interval the architect measures the 
quantity of the Works which has been completed during the 
valuation period and communicates this information to the 
Quantity Surveyor of the project (QS)27. 
The QS assesses the value of the work in accordance with 
the rules given in clause 3028. These rules stipulate, in 
25 Instalment payments are governed by clause 30. 
26 The payment intervals are recorded in the Appendix. JCT8O provides for a "default norm" of 
monthly intervals. 
27 Clause 30.1.2 mandates the OS to make an interim valuation of the Works whenever it is deemed 
necessary by the architect. 
28 The "working rules" of valuation itemise the work for which the gc is to be paid. There are 
four basic categories: 30.2.1 lists the matters for which the gc is to receive a payment from which 
a percentage is automatically deducted and retained until final accounting (the Retention). Clause 
30.2.2 lists items for which the gc is to receive payment without any deduction. Clause 30.2.3 
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effect, that, the interim payment due on each certificate is 
the difference between the value of the Work which has been 
completed at the time of assessment and the total that has 
already been paid. Issue of the priced certificate by the 
architect triggers the client's obligation to pay the gc who 
is then responsible for distributing the sum to other input 
suppliers29. 
This procedure clearly provides a direct pecuniary 
incentive for the gc and its input suppliers to operate within 
the time constraint in that cash-flows are made contingent on 
the rate of progress. Whether the interim certification system 
also reinforces the quality constraint is a more complex 
issue. Some argue that the interim payments machinery ought 
to be interpreted to mean that architects would not certify 
work for payment unless satisfied that it conforms to the 
contractual standards in all material respects. Architects who 
fail to evaluate quality, it is thought, should-be answerable 
to clients for any costs which result from over-certification. 
Normatively, this structure of accountability is seen as 
desirable because it connects building producers' incentives 
with respect to time to the quality of materials and 
workmanship, and by a simple extension of liability gives 
specifies two Items for which the entire value is to be deducted from the amount due. Clause 30.3 
affords the architect limited discretion to include materials or goods for the supply of which the 9c. 
has made contractual arrangements, but which have yet to be delivered to the site. 
29 The clients obligation is to pay within 14 days from the date of issue of each interns 
certificate: clause 30.1.1.1. Failure to pay on time is one of the grounds on_which the gc may invoke 
the termination procedures of clause 28. 
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architects an incentive to perform their supervisory duties 
conscientiously. 
Support for the idea that interim certificates should 
reflect qualitative monitoring can be found in the valuation 
rules of JCT80. Clause 30.2.1.1, for example, asserts that 
certificates are to include the value of the work "properly 
executed by the Contractor". Moreover, the requirement that 
instalment payments correlate with the value of the Works to 
date rather than production costs appears to link interim 
payments to quality. The practical realities of building 
production would appear to reinforce this argument. 
Construction operations are cumulative and defective work is 
quickly covered up in succeeding stages of the project. Poor 
quality input which is not discovered during interim 
certification, therefore, may remain hidden until the building 
is in use, at which point, the costs of correction are likely 
to be much higher than they would have. been during 
construction. 
Professional support for the view that in certifying 
payment the architect ought to evaluate quality is also 
apparent in the testimony of some of the independent witnesses 
before the official Referee in Sutcliffe v Chippendale and 
Edmondson 30. Judge Stabb QC noted in particular the evidence 
of one architect who: 
30 (1971) 18 Building for Reports 149 (Luis). 
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took the view that the certificate should conform 
as strictly as possible to the terms of the contract 
and that, if he was not satisfied with any 
particular item of work, it was implicit that the 
value of the work was not to be included in a 
certificate covering work properly executed31. 
However, specific provisions of JCT80 are also consistent 
with the competing view that interim certification is a 
procedure which enables monitoring of building producers' rate 
of progress but should not play a significant role in quality 
control. Clause 30.10, for example, states that interim 
certificates are not to be regarded as conclusive evidence 
that work, materials, or goods conform to the specification32. 
In addition, the contractual provision for a percentage of the 
sum due on each certificate to be withheld until the gc has 
, 
rectified defects suggests that architects are not expected 
to identify every divergence from the specification during 
the process of interim valuation. Finally, the formulation of 
interim payments as the difference between the value of the 
work completed and the sum which has already been paid, means 
that over or undervaluation is readily corrected so long as 
the transaction remains alive. 
This interpretation of interim certificates as a rough 
appraisal of the progress of the Works rather than a means of 
verifying the quality of inputs was also backed by expert 
31 "., evidence of Nr Clarke, Lexis page 18. 
32 The contract envisages that the architect wilt have an opportunity to revise a previously held 
opinion until the Final Certificate Is issued: see generally, clause 30.7, clause 30.8 & clause 30.9. 
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witnesses in the Sutcliffe case. Judge Stabb QC noted that 
some professional architects had suggested that the 
certificate should be viewed as: 
an approximation of the value of the work as it 
progressed, assessed by the quantity surveyor 
without any detailed inspection of the work, the 
object being simply to provide a reasonable progress 
payment for the contractor based upoq a 
comparatively cursory examination of the site 3. 
The implications of these conflicting views for the 
transaction costs of building production may be clarified by 
distinguishing between the issues of excessive payments and 
quality control. Provided that the relationship between the 
client and gc survives until satisfactory completion of the 
project, overpayment on any individual certificate has little 
significance in that subsequent payments can always be revised 
, 
if non-conforming inputs are discovered during routine 
inspection and testing. In terms of the basic issue of 
matching payments to the quality of building producers' 
performances, therefore, an architect's failure rigorously to 
inspect work prior to the issue of each certificate should not 
matter so long as the architect at some point conducts a 
thorough review of quality. w 
There may be differences, however, between the governance 
costs of linking quality control to interim payments as 
33 Sutcliffe V ChIrgendete and Edmondson, suwre, note 30, evidence of Mr Ashcroft & Mr James, 
Lexis page 19. 
34 Clause 17.2 mandates the architect to conduct a review of the Works for evidence of qualitative 
defects during the period between Practical Completion of the Yorks, as certified under clause 17.1 
and Issue of the final Certificate under clause 30. See chapter IX, ufre, for discussion of the 
Defects Liability Period. 
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opposed to maintaining distinct processes for evaluation of 
progress and quality. It might be argued, for example, that 
a unified monitoring procedure will entail fewer interventions 
by the architect and so is likely to be less disruptive than 
evaluation processes which involve separate assessments of 
performance against time and quality constraints. Moreover, 
the predictability of monitoring which is linked to the 
interim payments machinery may facilitate accommodation of 
inspection and testing into the gc's programme for the Works. 
In other respects, the transaction costs of a single 
procedure may be higher than the costs associated with 
separate assessment of quality and progress. The ease with 
which defective work may be concealed, for example, might 
suggest that effective supervision of qualitative dimensions 
of building production requires frequent but unpredictable 
monitoring. In addition, architects who conduct separate 
reviews of progress and quality may have a greater number of 
opportunities to unearth defective inputs. 
B. Adjustment Machinery 
In most commercial contracts the fundamental 
contract terms concern the obligation to be 
performed, the period for performance and the price. 
Usually these are stipulated with some 
particularity. But it is not unusual to find some 
element of fluidity.... I do not think that there 
is any class of contract in which the content of 
these fundamental terms is potentially as fluid as 
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in the familiar forms of building and civil 
engineering contract35. 
The adjustment machinery of JCT80 takes the form of 
decision-making procedures which become operational when the 
project is affected by specified contingencies. These 
procedures enable the parties to modify their initial 
decisions with respect to timing, quantities and qualities of 
labour resources and materials inputs, and revise the contract 
price to take account of such modifications. In addition, 
JCT80 provides for changes in the contract sum in response to 
inflation of input prices. 
1. Fluctuations in Input costs 
The fluctuations clauses enable adjustments to the price 
term in response to inflationary changes in input costs, an 
event which is beyond the control of either party to the 
contract. JCT80 provides three alternative regimes which vary 
in their apportionment of increased costs between client and 
GC36. Under clause 38, the default norm, the gc bears the risk 
of all changes in input rates except for the net cost of 
changes in statutory rates and charges on-labour, materials 
fuels. Clause 39 allocates a higher proportion of the costs 
35 Bingham U, Ashville Investments Ltd. v. Elmer Contractors Ltd. 119881 2 All ER 577 at S91e-9. 
36 The parties are expected to select between the provisions during the planning process. If they 
fail to make an election, clause 33, which allocates to the gc most of the risk of a rise in Input 
costs, operates as the default norm: Appendix. 
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of changes in input prices to clients. Clients are to pay for 
changes in national wages for labour; increases in 
transportation costs for workers and the net cost of changes 
in market prices for materials and fuels. Both terms exclude 
allowance for the gc's profit on higher input costs and both 
freeze fluctuations on the existing completion date so that 
the price term will not be adjusted for changes in input rates 
beyond the date at which the project should have been 
completed 37 , 
With respect to both of these clauses the adjustment 
machinery is activated by the gc who must notify the architect 
of any changes in the relevant rates within a reasonable time 
of the change occurring33 and the change is effected by way of 
an addition to the contract sum. The precise amount of the 
additional payment is to be determined by the QS and the gc 
who are empowered to agree upon "what shall be deemed for all 
purposes of this contract to be the net amount payable to or 
allowable by the Contractor"39. 
The third option, clause 40, adopts a completely 
different approach to price changes. This term provides for 
adjustments on the basis of the value of the Works rather than 
37 This provision reverses the decision in Peek Construction (Liverpool) Ltd v. McKinney 
Foundetfone ltd (1970) 1 Building Law Reports M. In this case the Court of Appeal held that the gc's 
right to compensation for inflationary increases in input costs remains alive until the production 
process is finally completed however late. Although the transaction in the Peak case was not governed 
by a JCT contract, the decision was assumed to apply to the JCT forms. 
38 This notice is expressly swede a condition precedent to 9c. s' contractual rights to an 
adJustment in the contract price: clauses 38.4.1 & 38.4.2; 39.5.1 & 39.5.2. 
39 Clauses 38.4.3 t 39.5.3. 
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changes in input prices. The contract sum is to be re- 
evaluated throughout the lifetime of the project by reference 
to price trends for similar work in the UK. Operation of the 
clause 40 mechanism requires that input is well defined at the 
outset so as to correspond with the monthly price indices. As 
the basis for adjustment is underlying price trends in the UK 
the clause excludes imported items which are incorporated 
without processing. Price changes in these commodities are to 
be dealt with according to the net price adjustment 
machinery 40. 
2. Extensions of Time 
The organisation of building production and the 
environment in which it is situated render parties' initial 
decisions about the duration of a project particularly prone 
to error41. The time-scale, complexity, and interactive nature 
of the assembly process, together with participants' inability 
to control the environments in which they operate create a 
context in which the fact of delay-is predictable although its 
potential scope is unforeseeable. JCT80 mediates between 
participants' interests in timely completion and limitations 
on their power to control the conditions under which 
160 Claus" 40.3. 
41 ;; gars, chapters VI and V11. 
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transactions are executed by means of a combination of 
contractual sanctions and discretionary adjustment provisions. 
Under JCT80, the costs of delay are allocated, initially 
between client, gc and nsc, according to the cause of the 
event which disrupts progress. The contract requires gc. s to 
complete the Works on or before the Date for Completion. If 
the architect certifies that the gc has failed to meet the 
time constraint, the client may deduct (or recover) liquidated 
damages42, at the rate agreed during planning, unless the 
delay is attributable to a contingency for which the client 
is wholly or partially responsible under the contract -a 
"Relevant Event" (RE)'3. Where a contingency which induces 
delay is a RE, the time constraint is to be adjusted. 
The RE. s include contingencies of which the costs are 
shared as well as those for which the client is wholly 
accountable to the gc or nsc44. With respect to the latter 
class of events. the gc or nsc is also entitled to claim 
against the client for the "direct losses and/or expenses" 
occasioned by the disruption's. For the purposes of 
clarification, fig. 3, which lists the Relevant Events, 
indicates the grounds on which the gc or nsc may, in addition, 
recover compensation for direct costs. 
42 Clause 24, see chapter IX, ni . 43 Clause 25. 
44 See chapter VII, tuare. 
45 Clause 26. 
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fl9.3 Relevant Events 
Ctaise no: Event 
25.4.1 / 11.2.5.1 force Aaleure 
25.4.2 / 11.2.5.2 Exceptionally adverse weather conditions 
25.4.3 / 11.2.5.3 Loss or damage to the Works caused by any of 
the events covered by the projects "all-risks" 
losurance policy 
25.4.4 / 11.2.5.4 civil unrest or local Industrial action 
affecting the trades engaged in on-site 
production, off-site preparation or 
manufacture, or transportation of labour or 
materials. 
25.4.7 / 11.2.5.7 Delay an the part of nsc., or nominated supps., 
which the gc has taken all practicable steps to 
reduce 
25.4.9 Governmental restrictions on labour and / or 
/ 11.2.5.9 materials; where the measures were announced 
after the Data of Tender 
25 .4.10 / Unforeseen and uncontrollable difficulties in 11.2.5.10 securing essential supplies of labour and 
materials 
25 .4 Actions or Inaction of statutory authorities 11.2.5.11 
25.4.5.1 / Architect's Instructions to vary the original 
11.2.5.5.1 contract plans 
25.4.5.1 / Architect's Instruction to postpone part of the 
11.2.5.5.1 works (23.1) 
25.4.5.1 / Anbipulty or discrepancy In the contract 
11.2.5.5.1 documents 
25.4.5.1 / Discovering antiquities 
11.2.5.5.1 
25.4.5.1 "/ Nomination of sub-contractor or of supplier 11.2.5.5.1 
2S. i. S. 2/ Inspection under clause 8 unless the inspection 11.2.5.5.2 reveals non-conforming Input 
25.4.6 / Delayed receipt of necessary Instructions for 
11.2.5.6 which the Contractor specifically applied in 
writing 
25.4.8.1 / Execution of work for the project by the client 
11.2.5.8.1 or any Input suppliers directly engaged by the 
client. 
25.4.8.2 / late delivery or non-receipt of materials input 
11.2.5.8.2 which the client had undertaken to supply 
25 .4.12 / Inadequate arrangements for access to and fron 11.2.5.12 the site. 
11.2.5.13 Exercise by nsc of its contractual authority 
to suspend operations if it has not been paid 
by'the ge in accordance with the terns of nsc/4 
Loss/ Expense ctai  
No 
No 
No 
No 
No* 
Mo 
No 
No 
26.2.7 / 13.1.2.7 
26.2.5 / 13.1.2.5 
26.2.3 / 13.1.2.3 
34.3.2 
If a Variation 
instruction is 
required: 26.2.7 / 
13.1.2.7 
26.2.2 / 13.1.2.2 
26.2.1 / 13.1.2.1 
26.2.4.1 / 13.1.2.4 
26.2.4.1 
26.2.6 / 13.1.2.6 
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During production, the machinery for modifying the time 
constraint is to be activated by the gc. Gc. s are required to 
notify the architect of any actual or anticipated circumstan- 
ces which may cause progress to be delayed 46. In this written 
notice, the gc who wishes to claim an extension of time, must 
specifically identify those circumstances which are believed 
to constitute RE. s, state the probable effects of such Events, 
and estimate the period of delay which is likely to result. 
On the basis of this information, the architect must 
decide whether the material circumstances of the delay reveal 
any RE. s, and j completion is likely to be delayed by any 
such contingencies. Where both conditions are met the 
architect must revise the time constraint. On a first 
application by a go the architect has no choice but to extend 
the Date for Completion and in granting an extension the 
architect is required to state which of the RE. s she has taken 
into account. The exercise of the architect's-discretion is 
governed by a standard of "fairness and reasonableness"47 and 
her decision must be made within 12 weeks of receiving 
sufficient information from the gc, or by the existing 
completion date, whichever is sooner48. 
Once extended, the time constraint may be drawn in again 
at a later point, if the architect instructs the go to omit 
46 Clause 25.2.1.1. 
47 Clause 25.3.1. 
48 
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parts of the Works. However, the gc cannot be required to meet 
an earlier deadline than the original Date for Completion, no 
matter how much work is omitted49. This power to "reduce" the 
contractual time period enables clients to choose expeditious 
completion by omitting non-essential items but protects the 
gc against a more onerous contractual obligation than it had 
originally assumed. 
Clause 25 also contains a procedure which enables the 
architect to grant "retrospective" extensions of time. The 
Architect is required to conduct a review of the progress of 
the project "not later than the expiry of 12 weeks from the 
date of practical Completion"50. The purpose of the review is 
to determine whether the progress of the gc or a nsc was 
disrupted by any RE. s, for which the gc (or nsc) has yet to 
present a successful claim. Upon concluding her evaluation the 
Architect is to notify the gc of her final decision about the 
Date for Completion. The notice may confirm a previously fixed 
Date, bring the Date forward (if work has been omitted and an 
extension previously granted) or extend time to take account 
of a RE, whether or not the gc had notified the architect of 
such a contingency. 
Retrospective extensions preserve the initial-allocation 
of risks between client and building producers. Their most 
obvious consequence is to protect the gc (or nsc) from 
49 Clause 25.3.2. 
50 Clause 25.3.3. 
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failures to present successful claims for extensions while the 
Works are in progress. It should also be recognised, however, 
that the procedure may serve to maintain the client's 
contractual power to sanction building producers for failing 
to meet a specific completion Date. Many of the RE. s are 
contingencies for which the client is wholly accountable under 
the terms of JCT80. In the absence of a revision to the 
contractual time constraint, such contingencies would be 
viewed as breaches which cause time to be "at large". While 
clients may still be entitled to completion within a 
"reasonable time", they would lose the right to insist on a 
specific Date for Completion, and could enforce the 
"reasonable time" constraint only by way of the ordinary 
action for damages51. The procedure for retrospective 
extensions empowers the architect to make ex post adjustments 
for RE. s, including breaches by the client, which may have 
been overlooked or underestimated. It therefore enables the 
client, through the architect, to define what would be meant 
by a "fair and reasonable" Date for Completion and preserves 
the contractual sanction of liquidated damages52. 
No guidance is given as to the basis on which the 
architect is to decide upon a "fair and reasonable". extension 
of the Date for Completion, either during production or. as 
51 Holme v. Guppy 1838 3 M&W 387; Netts v. Army & Navy Co-operative Society Ltd. (1902) 86 law 
Times 764; Amalgamated Building Contractors v. Waltham Urban District Council (1952] 2 All ER 452; Peak 
Construction (Liverpool) Ltd v. McKinney Foundations Ltd, supra, note 37. 
52 See chapter IX, infra, for discussion of the contractual sanctions against delay. 
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part of the retrospective procedure. Some commentators argue 
quite categorically that it "must mean fair and reasonable'in 
relation to the cause"53. For-example, a gc who devoted three 
days to "opening up and testing" of the Works would be 
entitled to a three day extension of the Date for Completion. 
Others maintain that the decision-making criteria should 
relate to the effect of a RE on the progress of the Works 54 
If, for example, a gc were already 2 weeks ahead of its 
schedule when it was required to devote three days to "opening 
up and testing", this analysis would mean that the time 
constraint should not be changed. 
The primary argument. for an "effects-orientation" is that 
gc. s are able to influence the impact of disruptive events. 
A well-planned programme, it may be argued, ought to 
'anticipate and accommodate predictable events. Gc. s might, for 
example, plan *"float" days into the master-programme, organise 
building operations in a manner which contains the effects of 
RE. s, and take steps to recover lost productive time. To the 
extent that gc. s are able to engage in such pre-emptive and 
mitigatory actions, the duration of a RE (the cause), would 
53 Dennis F. Turner Building Contracts: A Practical Guide (Harlow: George Godwin, 1983) at 53. 
54 See, for example, the judgment of Megarry J. in Hounslow London Borough Council v. Twickenham 
Garden Developments Ltd. (1970) 7 Building Law Reports 89. He illustrates the point by reference to 
a strike during production, and comments that: 
If a strike occurs when two-thirds of the work has been completed in half the contract 
time, I do not think that on resuming work a few weeks later the contractor is then 
entitled to slow down the work so as to Last out the time until the date for 
completion ... if thereby he is failing to proceed with the work "regularly and 
diligently. 
at 113. (Note that Megarry J, 's example is based on the assumption that the risk of delay due to a 
strike is allocated to the client. Under JCT80 this position could be argued on the basis of clause 
25.4.10.1. ). See also Vincent Powell-Smith and John Sims, Building Contract Claims (London: Granada, 
1983). 
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seem to be a misleading measure of disruption (the effect). 
In such a context, a cause-based analysis may enable the 
adjustment machinery to be used to weaken the accountability 
of gc. s and other building producers for the pace of 
production. 
Some support for the idea that architects' revisions to 
the time constraint are to be based on a "fair and reasonable" 
estimate of the unavoidable consequences of a disruptive event 
is to be found in provisions of clause 25. First, -an 
architect's decision to grant an extension is made conditional 
upon a finding that: "the completion of the Works is likely 
to be delayed [by a RE] beyond the Completion Date"55 and the 
decision as to the amount of additional time is to be 
implemented "by fixing such later date as the Completion Date 
as [the Architect] then estimates to be fair and 
reasonable" 56. " Gc. s, therefore, do not even qualify for an 
extension unless they can persuade project architects of the 
probable effect of a RE on their ability to meet the time 
constraint. Moreover, the focus of the adjustment decision is 
not the duration of the cause, but the gc's potential 
progress, given that the event has occurred. 
Second, the information, supplied by the gc, on which the 
architect is to decide whether to grant an extension, and if 
so, for how long, is not only required to establish the fact 
55 Clause 25.3.1.2. 
56 Clause 25.3.1. 
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of an RE, but must also explicitly address its effects and 
impact 57. Finally, in addition to specific norms concerning 
mitigation of disruptive effects which are built into the 
definitions of some' RE. s58, the entire set of grounds for 
adjustment are governed by a working rule which requires the 
gc (or nsc) to use its "best endeavours" to limit the impact 
of these contingencies 59 . 
Even if it is true that an effects-orientation better 
maintains the accountability of gc. s for timely completion of 
production the interactive nature of transactions governed by 
JCT80 suggests that we should be wary of solutions which focus 
exclusively on one class of participants. Of particular 
significance to understanding the transaction costs which 
might be engendered by an effects-orientation, is the fact 
that some of the RE. s are attributable to actions or decisions 
of the architect. Moreover, some of these actions by the 
architect constitute failures to deliver the quality of 
60 services envisaged. by her contract with the client. 
As we have suggested, the working rules of JCT80 by which 
clients are held accountable to gc. s for the actions of the 
architect may be viewed as a means for the expertise of gc. s 
57 Supra. 
58 For example, clause-25.4.7 defines as a Relevant Event "delay on the part of Nominated Sub- 
Contractors or Nominated Suppliers which the Contractor has taken all practicable steps to reduce". 
59 Clause 25.3.4.1 states that the gc: 
shall use constantly his best endeavours to prevent delay in the progress of the 
Works, howsoever caused, and to prevent the completion of the Works being delayed or 
further delayed beyond the Completion Date. 
60 See, for example, clause 25.4.5: Compliance with Architect's Instructions ..... ; and clause 25.4.6: Architect's failure to provide necessary production information in good time.. 
422 
and other building. producers tobe deployed in the monitoring 
of architects61. However, analysis of claims provisions as a 
mechanism which aids evaluation of the architect's performance 
must 'be situated, in the context of the actual procedures 
instituted by JCT80. That the architect is responsible for 
operating the adjustment procedures, such as the extension of 
time machinery, is not, in itself, inconsistent with the idea 
that these procedures are a reporting mechanism. After all, 
an architect can scarcely prevent a: client from learning that 
liquidated damages are not due from the gc despite the fact 
that the building is not ready at the time originally 
envisaged. When called upon the adjudicate a gc's claim that 
its progress has been delayed by her own actions or decisions, 
however, the project architect is caught in a conflict between 
interest and responsibility. The architect's role in managing 
revisions under JCT80 requires her to decide "fairly" - in 
adjudicating the. claims of the gc62, but in doing so she may 
implicate herself in a breach of the performance norms of her 
contract with the client. 
This context adds another dimension to the choice between 
"cause" and "effects" interpretations of the decision-making 
criteria for an extension of time. An effects-orientation 
affords the architect greater discretion than a cause-based 
judgment. When using a cause analysis the architect's 
61 See chapter VII, supra. 
62 Sutcliffe V. Thackrah [19741 AC 727. 
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decision-making authority is primarily directed at the issues 
of whether a Relevant Event has occurred and its duration63. 
An effects-orientation substitutes for the relatively 
observable measure'of "duration" a more amorphous idea of 
"impact on the gc's ability to complete by the Completion Date 
given all of the circumstances". Although the architect's 
discretion, in either case, is to be governed by the fairness 
norm, it would appear that the less definite the reference 
point for her decision, the harder it would be to challenge 
a parsimonious and self-protective extension. 
The power of the architect strategically to manipulate 
revisions so-as to limit her accountability for inadequate 
performances might be controlled, to some extent, by switching 
between "cause" and "effects" analyses according to the nature 
of the Relevant Event. That is to say, the working rules of 
adjustment could be structured so that extensions for RE. s 
which are attributable to defaults by architects would be 
assessed by reference to the duration of the "cause", and the 
remainder would be processed on the basis of their effects on 
progress. While such a contractual practice would by no-means 
ensure absolute accountability of gc and architect in all 
circumstances, it would seem to afford the project-architect 
relatively less decision-making power over the transactional 
consequences of her own defaults. 
63 Note that the architect ought also to have in mind actual or potential mitigatory actions on 
the part of building producers: clause 25.3.4. 
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3. Variations 
The variation machinery of JCT80 contains procedures for 
modifying earlier transaction-specific decisions about 
building components. Incorporation of unilateral authority to 
make such changes into the structure for governing building 
production has been described as "both a strength and a 
weakness of the traditional British contracting system"64. 
Variation procedures facilitate on-going revisions to the 
building concept with the result that the client / architect 
does not need to finalise every detail during- the ex ante 
planning process. 
Given the complexity of building production, this 
capacity to postpone some decisions until the consequences of 
other choices have appeared may be a means of avoiding costly 
errors65. However,, the ease with which a variation decision 
can be made may be a misleading indication of the transaction 
costs of such changes. Modifications may force the gc to 
revise or terminate existing arrangements for procuring inputs 
and leave insufficient time for the gc to negotiate favourable 
terms to obtain the supplies required to implement the 
changes. Variations may also compel the gc - to revise its" 
64 EDC for Building, Faster Building for Industry, NEDO (London: HMSO, 1983) at para. 3.3. 
65 See chapter IV. 
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programme for the Works, and cause interruptions in the 
production process. 
The modifications envisaged by clause 13, the Variations 
clause, fall into three categories. First clients / architects 
may alter the specification of the building concept which is 
contained in the Documents created during planning. This 
provision envisages changes to prior decisions about 
quantities or qualities of labour resources, materials and 
goods, and alterations in the design of the building. 
Second, a Variation Instruction may modify certain 
provisions that were included in the Bill of Quantities and 
which shape the conditions under which building producers are 
to work. Clause 13.1.2 enables changes to "obligations or 
restrictions" which affect access to the site67, limit working 
*space or working hours 68 and specify the sequence in which 
building operations are to be executed or completed69. 
Finally, the architect must issue a Variation Instruction 
to communicate her decisions with respect to any parts of the 
project which had not been specified in detail in the Bill of 
Quantities, but had simply been described as "provisional sum 
items"70. This type of variation does not so much express a 
change to a previous choice, but is, rather, an instrument 
66 Clause 13.1.1. 
67 Clause 13.1.2.1. 
68 Clauses 13.1.2.2 and 13.1.2.3. 
69 Clause 13.1.2.4. 
70 Clause 13.3. 
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for making decisions which have been postponed. ýf rom the 
initial planning period. 
The variation power grants authority to make unilateral 
decisions in sense that gc. s who do not participate in 
decision-making are obliged to comply with variation 
instruction71. Gc. s are protected from the cost consequences 
of their lack, of control over variations by the contractual 
provisions for adjustments to other terms. The value of any 
additional work is to be added to the Contract Sum72, and the 
gc is entitled to claim an extension of time and its "private" 
costs of adjusting to the change 7. 
The primary governance function of the variations 
machinery is to enable boundedly 'rational and imperfectly 
informed clients to avoid the potential error costs of 
complete ex ante specification. As we have seen, however, 
decisions "not to decide just yet" may also generate 
transaction costs. of particular significance to complex 
transactions situated in an uncertain environment and 
involving specific investments are the costs of securing co- 
operation to changes. Absent a procedure for making unilateral 
71 This obligation is strict with regard to changes in design, quality or quantity of the works 
(13.1.1 variation) and Instructions respecting expenditure of provisional sums (13.3 variation), but 
qualified with respect to changes in restrictions concerning working conditions (13.1.2 variation). 
With respect to this last category of variations, the gc does not have to comply if it has 'reasonable' 
objections: Clause 4.1.1. 
72 JCT80 anticipates that work executed pursuant to a variation instruction will be valued by the 
quantity surveyor on an ex Post "measure and value" basis wherever possible, using the same principles 
and unit rates as were used to develop the tender offer: clause 13.5.3. If the nature of the work is 
such that it cannot be properly measured in accordance with the principles used to prepare the BG, the 
valuation norm is "prime cost" plus a percentage addition for profit: clause 13.5.4. 
73 Clause 25 and clause 26. 
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decisions, clients, who wished to modify earlier choices about 
a project in the light of information which emerges during 
production would have no alternative but to negotiate changes 
with the building producers. Negotiation is in itself a 
transaction costly exercise, particularly when located in an 
institutional setting such as that which shapes building 
production. The interactive nature of construction, and the 
number of separate resource suppliers who are involved in the 
process may cause modification to entail revisions to many 
distinct contracts. In addition, changes to the specification 
of a complex product are multidimensional. One consequence of 
the connections between the definition of inputs and other 
contract terms under JCT80 is that negotiations would need to 
address a range of issues. Timing, disruption, the prices of 
additional or substituted inputs, and the implications of 
product'and programming changes on one project for building 
producers' commitments to other transactions, are all relevant 
factors in settling the terms of producers' co-operation in 
altering plans upon which they have relied. 
In addition to the direct process costs of bargaining for 
changes, negotiations during production may open up the 
possibility of strategic behaviour. Differences between 
clients and building producers' specific investments in a 
transaction create unequal relations of dependence74. Whereas 
provisions for interim payments enable gc. s and other 
74 Supra, chapter IV. 
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producers at least to cover preparatory"costs - and perhaps 
realise returns on their early. investments during the 
production process, the benefits of clients' investments in 
the transaction do not materialise until the completed 
building is available for use. 
Moreover, the construction process generates transaction- 
specific knowledge about the site and idiosyncratic 
relationships between producers and clients' consultants. 
These resources may serve to increase the gap between the 
value to the client of the relationships entailed by a 
transaction with a particular gc and the value of a 
substituted transaction. Within such a setting, a process of 
negotiating changes during production may expose clients-to 
redistributive bargaining by opportunistic gc. s.. Gc. s, for 
example, might refuse to co-operate in revisions to the 
specification of a building unless the client makes 
compensatory concessions which far exceed the costs to the gc 
of implementing the changes. 
Building producers' -power , 
to "hold-out" against 
modifications as-a means of appropriating part of the client's 
share of the transactional surplus may be of relatively little 
significance if the change in question is trivial. However, 
by no means all revisions during production would fall into 
this category. Clients may find, for example, that as a result 
of changes in input costs or delays, they are compelled - to 
omit work in order to remain within financial and time 
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constraints. Alternatively, information about the site which 
emerges during production may reveal that substantial changes 
to structural plans are needed if the building is to be safe 
to use. With respect to this type of essential revision, a 
practice of bargaining for changes may render clients highly 
vulnerable to opportunistic manipulation by gc. s. who know 
that clients have little alternative but to agree to their 
terms. 
By enabling the client to make what are in effect 
unilateral decisions about alterations in the building 
concept, JCT80 limits the scope for redistributive bargaining. 
In addition, because the variations machinery provides for 
adjustments to other terms of the transaction, it forces 
clients to confront the full costs of changes' during 
production. 
However, these provisions, like other aspects of JCT80 
which may be analysed as potential responses to one class of 
transaction costs, generate their own organisational costs. 
One issue which arises is the accountability of the architect 
for the co-ordination costs of restructuring production to 
accommodate changes, where changes would not have been 
required had the architect conducted more extensive inquiry 
before work began on the site. In some instances, the failure 
to engage in prior investigations may constitute opportunistic 
"cheating" by the architect. While JCT80 protects gc. s' 
expectations of profit from transactions- by pricing unilateral 
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changes in accordance with the total co-ordination and 
production costs, it cannot pass these costs to the architect. 
If the claims procedures are a means by which gc. s act 
as surrogate monitors for clients with respect to the quality 
of planning- services delivered by an architect 7', it might 
also be argued that they enhance clients' knowledge of the co- 
ordination costs attributable to the architect's decisions. 
Whether clients are able to use this information to strengthen 
the accountability of the architect, however, depends on the 
institutional structure of. the transaction between architect 
and client. 
The primary issue which arises relates to the costs to 
the client of interpreting and processing information. The 
information contained in a gc's contractual claims is 
inherently ambiguous. Variations may result from a number of 
factors, by no means all of which are evidence of cheating by 
the architect. Even a deliberate choice to postpone a crucial 
decision until production is underway may be shown to be a 
justifiable exercise of the architect's professional judgment, 
under certain circumstances. To the extent that the 
information contained in a gc's claims is a relatively crude 
indication of how far an architect's decisions were a source 
of avoidable disruption costs, therefore, the efficacy. of the 
claims machinery as an instrument for maintaining architects' 
accountability may be quite limited. 
75 Supra, chapter VII. 
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Take, for, 
--example, a common source of variation claims, 
the design and specification of the.. foundations of a building. 
Architects, and structural engineers, might be expected to 
draw upon their expertise, and knowledge of comparable 
projects and similar sites to develop an educated appraisal 
of the needs of a client's particular project. Given the costs 
of introducing changes after the building contract has been 
let, it would seem to be desirable to maintain the incentives 
of building professionals to conduct adequate investigations. 
before tendering and produce a complete specification of 
inputs. This structure of accountability might be achieved 
relatively easily by holding . building professionals 
presumptively liable for the co-ordination costs occasioned 
by every technical change in the building concept.. 
However, much of the information which may be relevant 
to decisions about foundations is quite literally buried in 
the site. One consequence of this feature of building 
production is that plans cannot be developed with absolute 
certainty unless, the designers engage-in a full investigation 
of the specific conditions of the particular site. That such 
an investigation might entail costly excavation, could justify 
a judgment that it would be cheaper to delay final decisions 
on the design of foundations until after the gc has commenced 
work on the site rather than to attempt to acquire the 
necessary information in time for the tendering process. 
Clients, presumably, would prefer not to pay for prior 
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investigations where the information could be obtained more 
cheaply at a later stage. A governing norm which exposed 
architects to the risk of liability in every situation where 
it had seemed feasible to delay decision-making would seem to 
be inimical to this goal. Those ' architects who do not disclaim 
responsibility may develop defensive practices to control 
their vulnerability, but such practices may contribute little 
to production economies. The alternative strategy available 
to architects - exclusion or limitation of liability - 
reproduces the original problem. That is to say, an 
opportunistic architect may take advantage of the variations 
machinery to shift to the client some of the costs of meeting 
the contractual standards. 
C. Contractual Management of Insolvency Risks 
1. Insolvency of a General Contractor 
Insolvency of a gc during 'execution of a building 
transaction is an event which may have widespread 
repercussions for the relationships between clients and other 
building producers76. JCT80 governs this contingency by 
76 The analysis in this section focuses on just one aspect of gc. s' insolvency. For a thoughtful 
discussion of the implications of gc. s' insolvency for unpaid sub-contractors, see Deborah Tremer, 
"Sub-Contractors' Rights upon the Main Contractor's Insolvency" (1987) 3 Construction Law Journal 94; 
for economic analysis of some the risk-allocation issues which arise when the gc becomes insolvent 
after receiving payment for materials, but before passing the payment on to a supplier, see G. 
Antoinette Williams, "Reservation of Title in the Construction Industry: Who Wants It - Some Economic 
Perspectives on Risk-Allocation" (1987) 3 Construction Law Journal 252. 
433 
providing for automatic determination of contracts between the 
client and the gc and between gc and nsc77 . In addition, the 
gc is specifically prohibited from assigning to the client the 
benefits of its domestic sub-contracts with other input 
suppliers. The primary consequences of this provision are that 
the receiver of the gc is neither entitled nor required to 
continue with performance and the client is relieved from 
further payment-obligations under the specific terms of the 
Conditions of Contract. 
Quite apart from the settlement of accounts between 
client and receiver, contractual governance of this 
contingency has implications for transactions which do not 
break down before completion. That is to say, the allocation 
of insolvency costs between those who would remain involved 
in building transactions, may shape the behaviour of these 
actors-on all construction projects. The ramifications for 
"healthy" transactions of norms derived from the governance 
of "terminal" projects are particularly significant with 
respect to the role of the architect in certifying work for 
payment 78 . 
Sutcliffe v. Thackrah79 illustrates the manner in which 
the issues of over-certification and quality control may be 
shaped by the allocation of the risk that a gc will become 
77 Clause 27.2 main form and clause 31.1 NSC/4. 
78 Supra. 
79 Supra, note 62. 
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insolvent before completion of its performance. The client, 
Sutcliffe, had been unhappy with the performance of the gc. 
Thackrah, the project architect, knew that Sutcliffe was 
thinking of terminating the building contract. Thackrah 
included on two interim certificates work which he knew to be 
defective, but due to a breakdown in communication did not 
tell the QS that certain items should be omitted from the 
valuation. After the gc had been paid on the overvalued 
certificates, Sutcliffe terminated the contract and engaged 
a substitute. Shortly afterwards the original gc went into 
liquidation. As the prospects of recovering the excess 
payments from that actor were remote, Sutcliffe sued the 
architect for negligent supervision. The House of Lords 
confirmed that the role of the architect in the certification 
process was "quasi-arbitral" in character, but held, 
nevertheless, that architects were potentially liable to 
clients for negligent over-certification 80. 
This decision created the possibility of shifting, from 
clients to architects, the risk that a gc. s' insolvency would 
preclude recovery of an overpayment. The effect of the ruling 
is that the costs of this contingency are to be borne by 
client or architect according to the "care" with which the 
80 The House of Lords, thus overruled the "fallacy" developed in Goldthorpe Y. Chambers (1901] 
1 KB 624 in which it was held that because the architect performed a "quasi -arbitral" function, by 
which she would be expected to decide "fairly" as between the interests of client and gc, she could 
not also be held accountable for negligence in making evaluation decisions. 
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architect discharges her responsibilities for evaluating the 
performance of the gc at the time of certification. 
Economic analysis of this working rule as part of the 
institutional structure for governing building transactions 
involves two issues. First, there is the question of the 
potential repercussions of the norm on the price of a specific 
input in construction projects - the certification services 
of a professional architect. Secondly, the decision may have 
implications for the transaction costs of monitoring and 
evaluation during production. 
At first glance the problem of allocating the costs of 
the insolvency of a former participant in a construction 
project at a point when it has been overpaid might appear:, to 
be amenable to the "creditors' bargain" analysis. Economic 
theorists have argued that losses caused by insolvency should 
be allocated between loan and trade creditors of an insolvent 
debtor so as to replicates a multipartite transaction in which 
the costs of insolvency are minimised 81. Both the 
institutional context and the contours of the hypothetical 
"creditors' bargain", however, are quite distinct from the 
relationship between client and architect. 
First, the architect does not have a creditor-debtor 
relationship with the gc. Insolvency of a gc which has 
81 Thomas H. Jackson, "Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain" (1982) 
Yale Law Journal 859; Jackson, "Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy" (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 725; 
Douglas G. Baird, and Jackson, "Corporate Re-organisations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership 
Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy" (1984) 51 University 
of Chicago Law Review 97. 
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received excessive payments would not be a source of costs to 
the architect unless it were thought desirable to hold the 
architect accountable to the client. The building transaction, 
therefore, differs from the creditors' bargain in which every 
participant in the hypothetical transaction is contractually 
linked to the insolvent debtor, and each incurs a loss as a 
direct result of the debtor's breach of contract with the 
individual creditor. 
Second, the relationship between client and architect is 
a real contract rather than a hypothetical transaction. 
Responsibility for the losses caused by insolvency of the gc 
at a point when it has been overpaid, is an issue that the 
parties could address in negotiations over the ordinary terms 
of the transaction 82 
Third, the architect, who has the power to verify the 
quality of input supplied by a gc before certification, 
controls the contingency (over-certification)-- which causes 
insolvency of the gc to generate the costs of an unrecoverable 
payment. Liquidation of the debtor in the multiple creditor 
context of the creditors' bargain-is usually precipitated by 
the decision of an individual creditor. However, it will 
rarely be the case that one creditor might have prevented 
82 Thus the problem here is more analogous to that raised in the "default rules" literature, where 
there is an emerging scepticism over the possibility of developing simple efficiency norms to govern 
contractual silences: see, for example, Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, "Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules" (1990) 19 Yale Law Journal 87. Jules Coleman, Douglas 
D. Heckathorn & Steven Maser, "A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules 
in Contract Law" (1989) 12 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 639; seep generally, chapter IV, 
supra. 
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losses accruing to another creditor by direct precautionary 
actions at an earlier point in time. 
Finally, whereas insolvency of a gc ends the connection 
of that actor to the client and architect on a particular 
project, it does not necessarily result in termination of the 
project, nor will it affect the formal terms of the 
relationship between client and architect. The "creditors' 
bargain" model, ' however, envisages that the implicit 
transaction between those- with an- economic interest in the 
holdings of the insolvent debtor concludes with the 
distribution of assets 83 
Deterrence arguments provide an alternative lens through 
which to view the transaction between client and architect 
with respect to the risk of insolvency of a gc at a point when 
it has been overpaid. Comparative analysis of the choice 
between allocating this risk to client or architect suggests, 
first, that the accountability of architects for the 
performance of supervisory functions may be strengthened if 
they bear the risk84. However, this allocation may increase 
the market price of professional services in building prpjects 
as architects seek compensation for the increase in their 
potential liability. If, on the other hand, the risk is 
presumptively allocated to clients, . architects may 
face 
marginally lower incentives with respect to precautionary 
83 Jackson, "Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain", supra, note 
81. 
84 See chapter IX, infra. 
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supervision, but clients will avoid the risk-bearing premium 
in contracts for architects' services. 
It should not be forgotten, however, that relationships 
between clients and architects are contractual. The 
significance of a "default" legal norm, therefore, lies in its 
implications for the distribution of bargaining power in the 
process of formulating the allocation which is to govern any 
particular transaction, and the costs of making changes to an 
undesired "default" allocation. That is to say, within the 
confines of the Unfair Contract Terms Act, and subject to the 
costs of transacting, client and architect could alter courts' 
allocations of a contractual risk. The price of the parties' 
bargain, however, is likely to differ according to whether the 
default norm constituted by law assigns the risk to client or 
architect. 
Suppose, 'for example, that the parties decide to allocate 
to the client the risk that an overpayment- will not be 
recovered, together with all of the other costs of the 
insolvency of a gc. Given the working rule formulated in 
Sutcliffe v. Thackrah, implementation of such a decision in 
the terms of the contract between client and architect occurs 
in a context where the client is in a relatively strong 
position to bargain for a discount of the price for the 
85 architect's services. If the House of Lords had held that 
85 Bargaining power is obviously not a function of contract law alone. However, to the extent that 
law is implicated in the distribution of bargaining power, it would seem tobe important'to explore 
the implications of alternative default rules. See, generally, chapter It. 
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the architect was not accountable for negligent supervision, 
the parties in my example would avoid the transaction costs 
of changing the rules, but the client would be dependent on 
the market to discount the price of professional services86. 
Analysis of the governance implications of using a 
negligence norm to reinforce the accountability of the 
architect for evaluation services involves revisiting the 
issue of quality control and disruption costs87. Architects 
who are legally liable for over-certification face a greater 
risk of costs if non-conforming work is wrongly included on 
an interim certificate than those who are not liable., In 
seeking protection against these costs, architects might 
adjust their certification practices in two ways. First, they 
might routinely under-certify the quantity of work for which 
payment is due. Alternatively a- project architect may attempt 
to include within her evaluation procedures careful monitoring 
of the project for conformity with the specification. While 
each of these strategies may limit the architect's exposure 
to liability for excessive payments, neither form of 
precaution is transaction costless. 
Under-certification is a, relatively easy precautionary 
strategy for architects to implement.. It simply requires the 
development of a consistent practice by. which architects make 
a conservative estimate of the value of the work completed 
86 See chapter VII for discussion of why the market for architects' services may not accurately 
compound pertinent information into a form in which it is accessible to clients. 
87 Supra. 
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during each measurement interval. Architects-who choose this 
strategy would not incur the monitoring costs of refining 
evaluation procedures so as to reduce the risk of errors, nor 
would there be any increase in the disruption costs due to 
inspection and testing. 
At first sight, under-certification would not appear to 
harm the gc and its input suppliers. After all, under- 
certification would not preclude building producers eventually 
receiving the full contract sum to which they are entitled, 
but merely shift a larger proportion of the payments to the 
end of the project. If the building transaction is viewed "in 
its entirety", however, it appears that the implications of 
an accumulating shortfall during production may be more 
complex and transaction costly. 
As we have seen, the institutional structure of the 
construction process may be viewed as a response to producers' 
inability to control the demand for their products 88 . The 
resulting uncertainty in the economic environment of 
production is associated with distinctive adaptations in the 
transactions by which building production is organised.. Under 
the Contracting System, the main producer assembles the 
resources required for production on the basis of. contracts 
which involve minimal long-term commitments. Capital equipment 
is hired instead of owned, materials are bought not made, and 
labour is obtained through sub-contracting rather than full- 
88 See chapter VI, supra. 
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time employment. That gc. s maintain little by way of capital 
assets-. may limit their exposure to the vagaries of the 
business cycle, but it renders producers highly dependent on 
cash-flow to fund their participation in individual projects. 
Cash-flow has been described as "the very life-blood of the 
industry". It has become the primary means by which gc. s 
finance Head-Office costs, the costs of unsuccessful bidding, 
preparatory investments on tenders which are obtained, and, 
of course, the procurement of inputs during production. 
Within this institutional setting under-certification by 
an architect may have serious repercussions and potentially 
provoke the very event which it is sought to avoid - 
liquidation of the gc. Gc. s who are consistently 
undercompensated for the value of the work produced may be 
unable to cover their production costs. That the shortfall is 
temporary and will be corrected at final accounting may 
provide little comfort in view-of the length of construction 
projects, and the number of factors which may intervene during 
production and reduce profitability. Under-certification for 
the purposes of interim payments, therefore, is a practice 
which is likely to be fiercely resisted by gc. s and a site for 
conflict where it is imposed. 
Moreover, the working rules of building transactions 
would tend to support the position of the gc. JCT80 permits 
gc. s to apply for immediate arbitration of the issue of 
whether certificates which under-estimate the value of the 
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work completed are in conformity with the provisions of clause 
3089. With respect to general norms of law, losses sustained 
by the client as a result of an arbitration may be grounds 
for an action against the architect. In addition the architect 
may also be vulnerable to 'direct claims by the gc based on 
. tortious principles90 
The alternative precautionary strategy of greater 
investment by the architect in monitoring the performances of 
building producers may avoid many of these costs of under- 
certification. In addition, careful supervision by project 
architects may increase the probability that incompetence of 
a gc or its suppliers will be detected at an early stage, 
89 Clause 5.2.2. 
90 The liability of architects to gc. s for under-certification is in a state of flux. In 
overruling the fallacy of immunity against negligent certification, the House of Lords in Sutcliffe 
v. Thackrah, supra note 62, indicated that architects could potentially be liable to gc. s. See also 
Arenson v. Casson [1977) House of Lords. The Court of Appeal in Lubenham Fidelities & Investment Co. 
Ltd v. South Pembrokeshire District Council (1986) 2 Construction Law Journal 111 held that architects' 
were subject to a duty of care owed to gc. s in the. exercise of certification, although on the facts, 
breach of the duty was held not to have been a cause of the loss: see also Michael Satiss & Co. Ltd. 
v. E. C. A. Catis (1988) 4 Construction Law Journal 125. In Pacific Associates Incorporated and R. B. 
Construction Limited v. Hatcrow International Partnership (1988) 4 Construction Law Journal 131, by 
contrast, Official Referee Judge John Davies QC in adjudicating the same issue on the basis of a 
standard form civil engineering contract held that the supervising engineer (the project equivalent 
to the architect under JCT80) owed no duty of care in interim certification to the contractor. The 
contractor's action lay against the client. In a Scottish case based on a previous edition of the JCT 
contract, Farrans (Construction) Ltd v. Dunfermline General District (1988) 4 Construction Lew Journal 
314, the Inner House (Second Division) held that under-certification by an architect could not ground 
an action against a client for wrongful withholding of money. More generally, it would appear that the 
courts' recent retreat from liability in negligence for economic loss has restricted if not curtailed 
gc. s access to sanctions against an architect who carelessly under-certifies, see, generally chapter 
IX, infra. However, as was recognised in the Lubenham decision, a gc who could demonstrate a practice 
of under-certification might have a claim against the architect for intentional interference in the 
execution of the contract between client and gc. In Lubenham, the Court of Appeal, white rejecting the 
gc's claim on the facts (because the gc did not prove intent), stated that: 
We would not accept the broad contention that an architect, in effecting an interim 
valuation ... could never in any circumstances, expose himself to a claim under this head of tort. It seems to us, for example, quite possible that he could expose himself 
to an actionable claim that he had interfered with the building contractor's 
contractual rights, if, in effecting a clause 30 valuation he deliberately misapplied 
the provisions of the clause with the intention of depriving the contractor of the 
larger sums to which he would otherwise be entitled. 
at 132. 
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deter building producers from opportunistic cheating, and 
merge producers' incentives with respect to speed and. quality. 
However, inspection and testing procedures are costly. Not 
only do such procedures entail the "opening up" and subsequent 
restoration of completed portions of the Works, but they also 
consume time, that might otherwise have been devoted to 
production. 
Moreover, as noted above, the linkage of quality control 
to certification increases the predictability of evaluation 
processes. As such it may facilitate the development by 
building producers of opportunistic practices designed to 
conceal poor quality work. Quality evaluation tied interim 
certification, therefore, may result in a less effective 
regime for discovering non-conforming inputs than if 
monitoring were instituted in the form of spot checks at 
unpredictable intervals. 
Comparison of evaluation. procedures in terms of their 
potential efficacy with respect to the identification of 
defects is particularly significant in the light. of the 
adjustment machinery of JCT80. As we have seen, the Conditions 
enable gc. s and nsc. s to claim an extension of time and their 
private costs of interruptions, where progress is-disrupted 
by inspection and testing, unless non-conforming inputs are 
discovered. -This distribution of the co-ordination costs 
occasioned by monitoring applies whatever the architect's 
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practice with respect to the issue of quality control, but it 
creates a dilemma for those who would use a unified procedure. 
Careful evaluation of quality at the time of interim 
certification may be sufficient to protect an architect from 
liability under the Sutcliffe v. Thackrah principle, even if 
a gc who subsequently goes into insolvency had successfully 
concealed non-conforming materials, goods or workmanship. 
However, by institutionalising quality evaluation at the time 
of over-certification, the architect may, in effect, 
facilitate opportunistic concealment. Furthermore, to the 
extent that a unified procedure simplifies such practices, 
thereby reducing the chances that non-conforming inputs will 
be discovered, a client is likely to face more contractual 
claims for disruption from building producers. 
Separate processes of monitoring against time and quality 
constraints may, as a result of the element of surprise, 
facilitate identification of non-conforming inputs supplied 
by opportunistic gc. s. If, however, the architect does not 
evaluate quality at the point of certification, she faces the 
risk of liability for excessive. payments should it, prove 
impossible for the client to recover the payment from the gc. 
An evaluation regime which combines routine monitoring 
with spot-checks for quality would appear to provide greater 
protection against opportunistic building producers who supply 
non-conforming inputs, while safeguarding the architect from 
liability for negligent certification. The benefits of 
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stronger deterrence. against opportunism, however, may be 
offset- by. the increase in costs to clients of building 
producers' claims under the adjustment provisions. - 
2. Withdrawal of a Nominated Sub-Contractor due to Insolvency 
Insolvency of a nominated sub-contractor during its 
operations on the site is a matter which the JCT has found 
difficult to incorporate into its framework of governance. 
This event will almost certainly disrupt the progress of the 
Works, creating delay and exacerbating the costs of project 
management. In addition, - the production costs of obtaining 
replacements may be substantially higher than under the 
transaction with the original nsc. 
Allocation of the costs of nsc. s' insolvency between 
client and gc is a complex issue. In terms of incentives, 
there seems to be little to choose between equally "innocent" 
clients and gc. s. As neither party controls the events which 
precipitate insolvency of the independent nsc91, it is hard to 
imagine that one would be better placed to prevent withdrawal 
than the other. As is apparent from economic analysis of law, 
however, power over a costly event is not the only-mechanism 
for controlling risk. Risks might be, reduced by ex ante 
screening and managed by loss-spreading. 
91 Although note the possibility that because payments are made by clients and channelled through 
gc. s both parties may be implicated in a cash-flow crisis which precipitates insolvency of a nsc. 
446 
A screening analysis might suggest that the client should 
bear the risk of the insolvency of a nsc before it has 
completed its work on the site. The essence of this argument 
is that a client who selects the nominee is in a better 
position to verify its financial health than a gc who is 
simply directed to contract with a nominated specialist. 
Allocation of the risk of insolvency to the client, therefore, 
appears to be more likely to encourage precautions in the form 
of ex ante screening than if the gc were to bear the expected 
costs. 
An alternative approach to risk-management might suggest 
that the risk of insolvency of a nsc should be borne by the 
gc. Gc. s, it may be argued, usually have more knowledge and 
experience of the market for construction inputs than clients. 
'This experience should give gc. s an advantage in calculating 
the probability and the potential costs of an insolvency. 
Armed with such knowledge, gc. s ought to be well-placed to 
build the expected costs of specialist insolvency into their 
prices and, perhaps, diversify the risk across the range of 
contracts which they hold at any one time. 
While it may be difficult to make a theoretical choice 
between these competing arguments some of the ramifications 
of each position are clear. A rule which allocates the entire 
cost of specialist insolvency to gc. s is likely to entail 
higher prices for their construction services than one which 
allocates the risk to clients. The premium for risk-bearing 
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on each contract may be small, but is likely to be charged on 
all transactions, unless the allocation is varied by express 
bargain. In addition, allocation of the risk to gc. s may 
result in a situation where neither clients nor gc. s-make 
meaningful investments in specific ex ante financial screening 
of potential nsc. s. Apart from its contractual veto, the gc 
has little control over the appointment of specialists, and 
a client who is insured against the expected costs of 
insolvency, lacks the incentive to incur heavy screening 
costs. 
If, on the other hand, the risk is allocated to clients, 
one might predict that the market prices for gc. s' services 
ought to be marginally lower. Clients' savings on the prices 
of the main contract, however, may be offset by the costs of 
searching the market for specialist input suppliers in order 
to reduce the-chances of selecting a nominee who is likely to 
become insolvent-during the transaction. 
Analysis of the allocation of this risk becomes more 
complex when viewed from a governance perspective in that the 
disruptive effects of unanticipated withdrawal may provide a 
site for opportunism. The primary management consequences of 
the departure of an insolvent nsc are, first, that the part 
of the project which was to be executed by that participant 
will be delayed until alternative arrangements are in place. 
Secondly, operations which depend on completion of the work 
which had been delegated to the nsc may have to be postponed. 
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In addition, the re-programming of remaining portions of the 
project in order to reduce the loss of productive time may be 
a costly exercise. 
The transactional functions of architect and gc, as 
constituted by the Contracting System, suggest that while 
each has a role to play in managing the consequences of the 
departure of a nsc, neither has complete control over the 
entire package of adjustments. Whereas gc. s are responsible 
for procuring non-specialised inputs, and co-ordinating on- 
site resource use, they do not have the contractual authority 
to select an alternative nominated sub-contractor92, omit 
work, or make other compensating changes to the building 
concept. 
Architects, on behalf of clients, may direct alterations 
to the building concept, but cannot intervene in the 
organisation of the building programme, except to the extent 
that a gc fails to perform in accordance with its 
undertakings. Whether architects were. entitled, or required, 
to make a substituted nomination, was traditionally thought 
to depend upon the terms of the contract between client and 
gc, and prior to the 1980 edition of the contract, the JCT had 
made no explicit provision for re-nomination. 
One consequence of this division of responsibility 
between architect and gc for the management of building 
92 This would not necessarily preclude the possibility that gc. s were responsible for ensuring 
completion of the nsc's part of the project: see discussion infra. 
449 
production is that 'allocation of- the entire risk of the 
insolvency of a nsc to client or gc is likely to attenuate 
someone's incentives to mitigate disruption costs. -Such a 
limitation on the accountability of a decision-maker for 
avoidable costs may, in addition, create scope for 
opportunism. For example, where clients are insulated from the 
disruption costs, architects, ' whose responsibilities for 
contractual administration are channelled through clients, 
will not be legally answerable for failure to give appropriate 
directions as required93. Opportunistic architects may find, 
therefore, that they are in a stronger position implicitly to 
shift to gc. s some of the costs of delivering the quality of 
management services defined in the architect's contract with 
the client than if legal liability were part of the 
institutional matrix of the transaction. 
Allocation of the risk of withdrawal of a nsc by reason 
of insolvency may eliminate. some of the potential for 
architects to cheat, but does not eradicate the possibility 
of opportunism within the transactional framework of building 
production. Gc. s, who are fully protected against the costs 
of the contingency, may attempt to exaggerate its effects. 
Given the complexity and interactive character of building 
production there may be considerable. scope for inflating 
claims against clients. 
93 See chapter IX, infra, for discussion of problems of accountability. 
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In addition, the transaction-specificity of clients' 
investments in building production may create scope for more 
explicit forms of strategic behaviour. Armed with knowledge 
of clients' dependence on their continued participation, gc. s 
are in a relatively powerful position to engage in 
redistributive bargaining directed at appropriation of part 
of clients' shares in transactional surpluses. For example, 
gc. s might refuse to co-operate in interim arrangements 
designed to ensure continuity of the production process94 or 
resist integration of new arrangements into the established 
programme for the Works, unless the contract price is revised 
in their favour. Such strategic behaviour may be contractually 
ambiguous in the sense that it would be difficult to establish 
that the threat, however inconsistent with the "spirit" ofa 
building contract, is a breach of its terms95. In any event, 
clients who incur the costs of financing production before 
obtaining any material return on this investment, may be 
unlikely to perceive legal sanctions,. even if available, as 
a useful defence against this type of threat96. The costs of 
obtaining a remedy and /or replacing a gc during production, 
are likely to exceed by far the immediate costs of acceding 
to the gc's demands. 
94 Such as hiring a specialist on a temporary basis. 
95 On courts' reluctance to imply general duties of co-operation into detailed building contracts 
see Mention Construction Ltd v. The Guiness Trust (1988) 4 Construction Law Journal 39; "Rosehaugh 
Stanhope (Broadgate Phase 6) plc v. Redpath Dorman Long Ltd. (1990) 6 Construction Law Journal 309. 
96 Supra, chapter IV. 
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The working rules of JCT80 governing allocation of the 
disruption costs arising from insolvency= of a nsc may be 
viewed as an attempt to curtail the scope for opportunistic 
behaviour by architects and gc. s. In order to grasp the 
transactional implications of the contract-specific norms, 
however, it is necessary to situate their development in the 
context of the working rules formulated by the courts. 
In T. A Bickerton v. North West Metropolitan Hospital 
oard97, the House of Lords considered the issue of allocating 
the costs of insolvency of a nsc within a transaction governed 
by the 1963 edition of the JCT's standard form. Bickerton, the 
gc, had used its own specialist heating division to execute 
work that had not been completed by an insolvent nsc. The 
conflict centred on the client's payment obligations with 
respect to this work. Bickerton maintained that in its role 
as the nsc it 'should be paid as if it were a replacement hired 
after a new bids had been received and a re-nomination had 
been made by the architect. Bickerton also sought 
compensation, as the gc, for some of the disruption costs 
occasioned by the architect's failure to make an effective 
nomination. 
The client insisted that the gc's obligation to "carry 
out and complete" the Works, as defined in. the Documents 
comprising the main contract, included the responsibility to 
ensure that specialised inputs were supplied by those 
97 [1970] 1 WLR 607. 
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originally nominated by the client and at prices stated in the 
original sub-contracts. In the event of withdrawal by a nsc, 
for any reason at all, the gc, it was argued, in reasonable 
mitigation of its loss, should make alternative arrangements 
for the execution of the Work entailed in the sub-contract. 
Any difference between the price of the original sub-contract 
and the actual costs of procuring a substitute were to be 
borne, in the first instance by the gc, who would normally 
recover these costs from a solvent nsc98. 
In the absence of any explicit contractual provision for 
withdrawal of a nsc, the House of Lords used an implied term 
analysis to develop a governing norm. The Court held that the 
express terms of the contract neither required nor entitled 
the gc to carry out any part of the works that were subject 
to a "prime cost" sum in the Bills and stated to be the 
province of ä nsc. Rather than infer that the building 
contract imposed. on the gc the type of residual or default 
liability which had been suggested by., the client, the House 
of Lords focused on the responsibility of the client / 
architect for the initial nomination. It was thought that the 
architect's contractual "duty" to issue an Instruction 
governing expenditures of a prime cost items should be 
interpreted as an on-going. obligation. This obligation would 
98 The client's argument was intended to preserve the integrity of the "cost-pass-through" 
mechanism by which nsc. s are held accountable for conformity with the contractual standards. In the 
absence of liability of the gc to the client for the performance of a nsc, nsc. s could repudiate sub- 
contracts and supply defective work with impunity. This issue is discussed more fully in chapter VI, 
supra. 
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be re-activated if, at any point during the transaction, the 
gc lost its only means of complying with the instruction - its 
sub-contract with a nominee. The client, therefore, was held 
contractually accountable to the gc for the costs of 
withdrawal of a nsc, on the basis of an implied obligation to 
ensure that the architect re-nominates if an earlier 
appointment fails 99 
The House of Lords acknowledged that to protect gc. s 
against the consequences of architects' failures to re- 
nominate might enable defaulting nsc. s to escape 
accountability for breach of contract100. However, it was 
thought that a gc's responsibility to the client for the 
performance of a nsc should not materialise until there was 
a nsc in existence. The "cost-pass-through" function of the 
gc, therefore, was to function only in the context of a, "live" 
and currently'operational nomination. 
The specific conflict in Bickerton was primarily 
concerned with allocation of the risk of changes in the prices 
for inputs which were to have been supplied by a nsc. However, 
the "duty to re-nominate", as formulated by the House of, Lords 
99 There was some doubt expressed as to whether this interpretation accurately reflected the 
intentions of the contract drafting agency. (See in particular Lord Guest at p. 621c-d, and Lord Hodson, 
at p. 616c-f and 617e). The judges were particularly concerned with the implications of their ruling. 
That is to say, one consequence of the decisions was that: 
a sub-contractor who had put in too low a. tender or found himself offered more 
lucrative work might promptly disclaim and would at most have to pay the contractor 
nominal damages knowing that the main contractor was under no liability to the 
employer in the circumstances which he himself had created. 
Lord Hodson at p. 616 e-f. 
However, such misgivings were not sufficient to outweigh the intuition that it would have been unjust 
to hold the gc accountable for costs occasioned by the departure of an insolvent nsc. 
100 Ibid. 
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appeared to be capable of grounding gc. s' claims for all 
production and disruption costs attendant on withdrawal of a 
specialist. The extent of the implied duty to re-nominate has 
been clarified a little by two decisions during the 1980's. 
In Percy Bilton v. GLC101, the House of Lords considered 
the specific issue of liability for the costs of delay 
attendant on withdrawal of a nsc, in the context of the 
client's decision to deduct liquidated damages for late 
completion by the gc. Upon learning of the withdrawal of a 
nsc, the architect had immediately made emergency arrangements 
for the sub-contract works to be continued on a "day-work" 
basis. Difficulties in reaching agreement on the sub-contract 
price, slowed the process of making an effective re-nomination 
and resulted in disruption to the gc's programme. The gc 
argued that the client was not entitled to liquidated damages 
because its progress had been delayed by an event for which 
the client was wholly accountable under the contract. The 
architect's failure to effect a speedy re-nomination, it was 
alleged, had invalidated the Date for Completion, causing time 
to be "at-large". 
The client accepted that the gc. s failure to meet the 
Date for Completion was partly attributable to the time which 
had been lost before the_ Architect re-nominated102. It was 
argued, however, that the gc should not be able to rely upon 
101 [1982] 1 WLR 794. 
102 The parties had agreed that this period amounted to 14 weeks. 
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this event to escape responsibility for the period of delay 
which was attributable to its own tardiness. The court was 
urged to preserve the integrity of the contractual structure 
of governance for delay by incorporating the duty to re- 
nominate into the extension of time machinery 103 
In deciding in favour of the client, the House of Lords 
held that while clients were answerable for tardy re- 
nomination, they could protect themselves against loss of the 
liquidated damages remedy by . extending 
the Date for 
Completion. Clients' liabilities were further limited by the 
ruling that architects were to be afforded "a reasonable time" 
in which to make a re-nomination. Within that time period, the 
costs of any disruption to the-Works occasioned by withdrawal 
of the original nominee were to be borne by the gc. 
The question of what constituted a "reasonable time" 
within which to effect a re-nomination was further considered 
by the Official Referee in Fairclough v. Rhuddlan Borough 
Council104. Judge David Smout QC decided that a "reasonable 
103 The transaction in this case was governed by-an earlier edition of the standard form of 
contract. This contract did not include an explicit working rule to govern the contingency. The client 
argued, therefore, that the architect's delay in making a renomination should be viewed as a late 
instruction, for which the gc would be able to claim an extension of time. 
104 (1985) 3 Construction Law Reports, 20; (1985) 3 Construction Law Reports 38 (Court of Appeal). 
The nominated sub-contractor terminated its contract because the project was seriously delayed by a 
strike. The gc immediately applied for re-nomination, but it took almost 5 months for the architect 
to name a replacement. To make matters worse the substitute was not acceptable to the gc. The gc 
rejected the first replacement, partly because the architect refused to. grant an extension of time to 
take account of the fact that the programme of the proposed nominee was longer than the gc's remaining 
schedule. An additional factor was the refusal by-the substitute nominee to rectify the defects in the 
work of the first specialist. Both the Official Referee and the Court of Appeal held that, given these 
conditions, the gc was entitled to reject the proposed nominee. The dispute between client and gc 
centred on the gc's right to an extension of time for the delay entailed in making an effective 
renomination, and as a corollary, the client's claim to deduct liquidated damages. The decision of the 
Court of Appeal does not revisit the question of "reasonable time", but concentrates on the issue of 
the contractual authority of the gc to reject a re-nomination. 
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time" may protect what might appear to be a slow re- 
nomination, so long as the delay is not attributable 'to 
procrastination, negligence or unreasonable behaviour by the 
architect105. The Official Referee specifically stated that the 
Architect should take account of the client's financial 
interests when searching for a replacement and that this 
interest in the production costs of the substituted work must 
be balanced against the interests of both client and gc in 
106 timely completion. 
JCT80 introduced machinery for adapting the transaction 
between client and gc to accommodate withdrawal of a nominated 
sub-contractor. The Conditions set out procedures for the 
implementation of the architect's duty to re-nominate in three 
situations, including insolvency of a nsc107. In addition, the 
gc is entitled to claim an extension of time for delay to its 
progress which is attributable to compliance with Architect's 
Instructions relating to the nomination (or re-nomination) 
procedure108. Dilatory performance by. the architect of her 
105 An important consequence of the decision is that it set ground rules for securing the general 
contractor's consent to a replacement specialist. The Official Referee emphasised that the crucial date 
against which to assess disruption is the existing contractual completion date rather than any earlier 
date by which the general might have hoped to finish: it may therefore, be necessary for the general 
contractor to forego the "float" time in its programme. This aspect of the decision is significant 
in so far as it prevents subtle shifts in the distribution of gains from the project. If the client 
bears the risk of delay in re-nomination, the general contractor may have an Incentive to be 
recalcitrant over accepting substitutes in the hope of appropriating some, of the clients expected' 
benefit from the transaction. By emphasising that the general contractor will not be compensated for 
losing the "float" within its programme, the Court maintained incentives for the general to co-operate 
in the re-nomination process. 
106 He further held that the gc was justified in rejecting the first substitute on the grounds 
that its work programme was incompatible with that of the general itself, so that the rejection did 
not mean that the general contractor was the cause of the delay. 
107 Clause 35.24. 
108 Clause 25.4.5.1. 
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obligations to issue a re-nomination Instruction would be 
caught- by the ordinary provisions for changing the time 
constraint and compensating the gc in the event of late 
Instructions109. - 
Under the contemporary working rules of contractual 
governance, therefore, the disruption costs attendant on 
withdrawal. of a nominated sub-contractor are shared between 
clients and gc. Although this apportionment of costs does not 
eradicate the possibility of opportunism, it may, to some 
extent, limit the scope for architect's to cheat and gc. s to 
engage in redistributive bargaining. As clients are now 
accountable to gc. s for securing a replacement and 
"unreasonable" delay in re-nomination, it may be more 
difficult for the delivery of poor quality administration 
services by architects to escape undetected. Gc. s, one might 
anticipate, have a substantial incentive to use the claims 
machinery as a means of reporting tardy execution of the duty 
to re-nominate by the architect. Whether or not the client can 
use this information in a formal sanctioning procedure, the 
relative ease with which it maybe interpreted by clients 
enhances its "embarrassment" value, as a means of reinforcing 
the accountability of architects. 
That the gc is answerable for some of -the disruption 
costs of withdrawal of a nsc preserves its incentives to take 
steps. to limit the impact of the event on the progress of the 
109 Clause 25.4.6 and clause 26.2.1. 
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Works. Furthermore, the nature and the extent of gc. s' 
legitimate claims for disruption are controlled by the 
contractual procedures'10. 
Finally, although gc. s retain the transactional power to 
engage in redistributive bargaining over a replacement for a 
departed nsc, they may be less likely to expend resources on 
strategic threats in a context where disruption costs are 
apportioned, than if the client were wholly responsible for 
such costs. Not only do the working rules of apportionment 
reduce the ambiguity of strategic threats by a gc, but they 
may also enable clients, through the architect, to 
retaliate111. Even if the gc remains in a position where it can 
inflict greater damage on a client than it would suffer in 
reciprocal action, that the client is able to respond at all 
may reduce the bargaining power of the gc in strategic 
attempts to force redistribution of the contractual surplus. 
110 Note that this is another situation where conflicts may arise between the gc. s contractual 
rights to adjustment and architects, interests in concealing their own failures to respond to events 
in a timely fashion, supra. 
111 Thus the architect's power over extensions of time may also function as a valuable means of 
disciplining gc. s. 
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D. Contractual Management and the Contracting continuum 
Our analysis of the formal system of contract management 
has demonstrated two important characteristics of 
transactional governance under JCT80. First, it is apparent 
that the project architect plays a central role in the 
administration of the contract between client and general 
contractor. Secondly, we have shown that it is difficult for 
JCT80 to maintain strong norms of accountability for both 
architects and building producers. Both of these 
characteristics are attributable to the interactive, lengthy 
and complex nature of building production, together with the 
uncertain environment in which it is situated. 
In some respects the transactional role of the architect 
resembles that of the specialised manager / co-ordinator of 
"firm-like" clusters of transactions 112. The--architect is 
expected to gather information and direct members of the 
building team, adjust prior decisions in the light of-new 
demands and supervise production on behalf of the "owner" of 
the residual profits. The issue of the accountability of the 
architect also resembles problems which were encountered in 
our discussion of contractual theories of the firm. Building 
transactions separate "ownership" of the transactional surplus 
from control over the deployment of productive resources. The 
112 Chapter V, supra. 
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relationship between the residual beneficiary and the central 
decision-maker may be vulnerable to "cheating" by. the agent- 
architect as she seeks to escape the costs of performing to 
the standards entailed by her contract with the principal- 
client. 
Within the institutional setting of JCT80 the problems 
of observation and monitoring which attend principal-agent 
transactions are complicated by the interaction of 
relationships between client-architect, client-general 
contractor, and client-general contractor-nominated sub- 
contractor. Architects' powers over critical transactional 
decisions may enable : opportunistic shifting to other 
participants of the costs of performing administrative and 
supervisory duties. Working rules which attempt to strengthen 
the accountability of the architect may attenuate the 
incentives of gc and nsc. s and provoke costly defensive 
practices by architects. 
With respect to relationships between client and building 
producers, the architect may be seen to serve three main 
transactional functions. First, as a specialised decision- 
maker, the architect provides a facility for client and 
building producers to make important decisions during 
execution. As such, the architect may be seen, -in general, as 
a relational alternative to the ex ante irrevocable decision- 
making practices of classical contract, and a means of 
reducing error costs. More specifically, this aspect. of the 
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architect's transactional role represents an alternative to 
evolutionary decision-making by client and building producers, 
or reliance on unilateral. decision-making governed by 
"aspirational" norms. 
Second, the architect may function to protect clients' 
shares of the transactional surplus from appropriation by 
building producers. This aspect of the architect's role is 
evident in the supervisory powers of inspection and testing, 
and is also an important dimension of the adjustment 
machinery. That JCT80 provides an integrated framework of any 
kind for ordering changes to time, quantity, quality and price 
constraints restricts the scope for building producers 
opportunistically to threaten to withhold co-operation during 
execution of the transaction. The fact that decisions about 
'adjustments are made in an institutional setting which does 
not entail negotiations between client and gc constitutes a 
further limitation. 
Third, the architect may serve to reduce, or aid in the 
resolution of, conflicts between building producers. This paart 
of her role may be particularly significant with respect to 
the interactive, but quasi-autonomous relationships between 
gc and nsc. In the event of conflicts between these actors 
over contract terms or management of their. separate on-site 
operations, an architect may issue Instructions and make 
contractually authoritative rulings. 
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Notwithstanding these benefits, the distinctive 
combination of relational and "firm-like" governance 
instruments which is embodied in the role of the architect is 
undoubtedly transaction costly. In addition to the direct 
costs of the fee for supervisory and management services, the 
presence of the architect may create new sites for friction 
and opportunistic behaviour. Whether the working rules of 
JCT80 represent the best feasible accommodation to the 
exigencies of building production is unclear. However, this 
analysis of contractual management has clarified two issues 
which would be important to subsequent research. First, we 
have identified relevant comparisons between alternative 
working rules of contractual management. Secondly, 
interrelationships between the norms governing the activities 
of different participants have been highlighted. A third 
theme, which is as yet implicit in our discussion but will be 
an explicit focus of the next. chapter, is the relationship 
between "public" norms of contractual governance and the 
private rules of JCT80. 
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Chapter IX Enforcement 
Enforcement is at once the simplest and most complex 
dimension of the Joint Contracts Tribunal Standard Form of 
Building Contract. (1980 ed. ) (JCT80). Viewed solely from the 
perspective of instrumental goals, institutional analysis of 
legal enforcement would seem to be straightforward1. Sanctions 
and remedies, one might suggest, ought to function to protect 
individuals, ' shares in the transactional surplus from the 
opportunism or incompetence of other participants. Within the 
interactive setting of building production, however, 
implementation of this goal raises difficult issues : of 
accountability, governance costs and the distribution of 
transactional power. 
At the heart of the "implementation dilemmas" of JCT80 
are the public rules which constitute the legal-cultural 
setting of the building contract. This institutional setting 
determines access to sanctions V and shapes enforcement 
possibilities. As is evident from the dramatic changes in 
negligence liability over the last twenty years, courts' 
definitions of the appropriate scope and limits of theories 
of liability are critical to the availability of, legal 
I Note that a complete institutional analysis of enforcement would also confront 
interrelationships between different sources of sanctions. Economic context, legal culture and 
commercial morality may each supply their own brand of transactional glue. Each shapes economic actors' 
accountability for their decisions and influences the distribution of transactional power within 
building contracts. These distinct forms of governance may or may not work in concert. The sanctions 
of law, commerce, and industry morality may transmit clear signals or mixed messages: Infra, part E. 
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sanctions2. 
Relationships between public norms and the private rules 
of building transactions are also significant to the operation 
of enforcement instruments. Access to legal remedies, for 
example, depends on there being in place a nexus between 
public and transaction-specific rules. Transactional 
understandings which do not conform to models of legally 
enforceable terms therefore are not amenable to legal 
sanctions 3 
More specifically, the institutional setting of the 
building contract influences the potential form of some 
private remedies and their costs. Some transaction-specific 
remedies are reinforced by the public regime4, while in other 
instances reliance on one type of enforcement instrument 
precludes access to another5. The private provision may be 
2 Infra. 
3 This aspect of availability is particularly significant to co-ordination of the construction 
process. As is apparent from our discussion in earlier chapters, building production demands co- 
operation between independent resource suppliers and requires flexibility in adapting to change. Unless 
a participant's interests in on-going collaboration can be formulated as a term which courts will 
endorse, breach of such relational norms is not subject to legal sanctions: see supra, chapter IV, for 
general discussion of duties to co-operate, see, chapter VII, supra, especially at fn. 79 for discussion 
of "duties to co-operate" in the context of selection of participants during contract planning. 
4 For example, Clients' contractual power to withhold payment of the contract price (a "private" 
or "self-help" sanction), is reinforced by the public norm which endorses such "self-help" actions up 
prior to the stage when the building is "substantially completed" in accordance with the specification: 
Hoenig v. Isaacs [19521 2 ALL ER 176 (nb. withholding payment was held not to be justified in this 
case); as applied in Bolton v. Mahadeva [1972] 1 WLR 1009; Ibmac Ltd v. Marshall (Homes) Ltd. (1968) 
208 EG 851. The Law Commission was critical of the public norm which enables clients to withhold 
payment on the grounds that it was unjust, particularly in view of the fact that builders probably 
would not understand the drastic implications of agreeing to a contractual provision which postponed 
payment until completion of the work: Law Commission, Report of the Law Cortmission. No. 121: Pecuniary 
Restitution for Breach of Contract (London: HMSO, 1983) at para 2.32. The powerful dissent to this 
Report by Commissioner Brian Davenport explicitly addresses the transactional security and 
accountability rationales for using the public regime to reinforce the position of clients. 
5 For example, the incorporation of a liquidated damages clause as a sanction against breach of 
a particular contract term prevents the non-breacher from using the ordinary unliquidated damages 
remedy where the loss occasioned by breach is greater than the sum stipulated: Cellulose Acetate Silk 
Co. Ltd v. Widnes Foundry (1925) Ltd. [1933] AC 20. (Although note that if the agreed damages clause 
is thought to be penal, when assessed by reference to what was contemplated by the parties at 
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used to overcome shortcomings in the public'remedy or it may 
seek to mould a public sanction to . transaction-specific ends6. 
The analysis in this chapter focuses on institutional 
limitations on the power of legal sanctions in the governance 
of building production. The discussion does not attempt fully 
to analyse every aspect of the building contract which may be 
viewed as part of the machinery of enforcement. It aims, 
rather, to use in-depth analysis of a selected enforcement 
issues as a means of illustrating wider problems of governance 
and accountability. Underlying our particular focus on 
specific examples, there is a general argument that problems 
associated with the implementation of legal sanctions are 
largely attributable to an uneasy relationship between the 
polycentricity of building production and the working rules 
of legal remedies intended to protect economic interests. 
The analysis is divided into five sections. Part A 
focuses on the institutional context of legal sanctions. It 
identifies four specific "implementation dilemmas" and 
discusses their implications for-transactions governed by 
JCT80. 
formation, a non-breacher who can show that its realised loss in fact exceeds the sum stipulated may 
be able to invoke the penalty clause in its favour: Wall v. Rederiaktiebolaget Lugudde (1915) 3 KB 66. 
On this point the English jurisprudence may be contrasted with the position articulated by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Elsiey Y. J. G. Collins Insurance Agencies (1978) 3 DLR (3d) 1, where it was held 
that such a penalty clause functioned in the same way as a liquidated damages clause, ie:, It would 
limit the breaching party's liability). 
6 For example, under clause 26 of JCT80, the gc is empowered to claim compensation from the client 
for its "direct loss and/or expense" occasioned by breaches for which the client is accountable. White 
the sanction - compensatory damages - is identical to that which would be available under the public 
regime, the contractual provision circumvents doctrinal and process cost limitations on gc. s' access 
to the damages remedy. By bringing a contractual claim under clause 26, the gc avoids the risk that 
its loss will be viewed as too remote, and the costs of invoking legal proceedings against a 
recalcitrant client. 
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Part B describes and analyses the particular sanctions 
which may be invoked against. - building producers and 
professionals whose performances fail to conform to 
contractual decisions respecting quality. This section 
addresses the problems which arise from the interactive nature 
of different participants responsibilities with respect to 
production and monitoring. It will be seen that it is 
difficult if not impossible to accommodate the complex system 
of discrete and overlapping duties institutionalised by JCT80 
within the traditional normative framework governing access 
to legal sanctions. 
Part C focuses on the issues raised by the transactional 
sanction against delay. This section explores conventional 
justifications for judicial policing of agreed damages clauses 
and considers how far these rationales are applicable to 
transactions governed by JCT80. 
Part D addresses the isse of clients' legal power to 
sanction nominated participants. It examines the structural 
changes to the network of contractual relationships which were 
introduced by JCT80. The discussion goes on to illustrate the 
manner in which the JCT's attempted resolution of the 
accountability costs associated with the cost-pass-through 
mechanism has engendered new costs of transactional fit. 
Part E explores the transactional implications of formal 
legal sanctions in the light of insights derived from the 
contracting continuum. 
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A. "Implementation Dilemmas" 
1. Apportionment and Accountability 
Legal sanctions are subject to a range of procedures and 
doctrines which function to apportion liability between 
contributing participants7. Such institutional practices meet 
many of the enforcement needs of complex and polycentric 
transactions. They permit recognition that time, quality or 
co-ordination failures within building transactions may be due 
to a combination of inadequate performances by two or more 
participants. Working rules which enable such "compound" 
breaches to be addressed within a single process would seem 
to entail lower administrative enforcement costs and lower 
risks of error than rules which treat the contractual 
obligations of each participating individual as discrete. 
On the other hand, the legal instruments by which 
apportionment and contribution are secured may reduce the 
s weight of the sanction confronted by each defaulter. Law 
defines penalties for breach by reference to the loss to the 
client rather than the bad faith or incompetence of the 
7 The Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 now provides a basis for direct apportionment of 
liability and contribution between participants in building production who are found to be in breach 
of their contractual obligations. Quite apart from this Act, theories of concurrent tortious and 
contractual liabilities and contributory negligence, doctrines such as remoteness of damage, and the 
idea of causation, have all been asserted as a basis for what would in substance amount to 
apportionment: see discussion, infra. 
8 This problem is particularly acute in the context of accountability for breach of qualitative 
standards: infra. 
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defaulter. There is no difference between the penalties 
attached to breaches which are compound in character and those 
stemming from the actions of a single participant. Although 
the total remedy available to a client is the same whether a 
loss is attributable to breach by one or several participants 
in building production, the implications-for a defaulter are 
very different. Whereas a sole defaulter is held accountable 
for the entire loss and thus subject to the full penalty for 
breach, apportionment doctrines and contribution procedures 
divide the single "penalty. -pie" 
into liability shares. These 
shares are then distributed between different actors in 
according to the degree to which each person is implicated in 
causing the loss. Apportionment therefore reduces the weight 
of the sanction faced by a defaulter who can show that others 
are implicated in the-loss to the client, relative to the 
sanction faced by a sole defaulter. 
Outright rejection of apportionment, however, is not "a 
solution to this problem of accountability. Doctrinal and 
procedural bars to double recovery prevent clients invoking 
full damages sanctions against every participant implicated 
in a compound breach. In the absence of apportionment, 
therefore, there would be no legal power to maintain the 
accountability of each individual defaulter. 
Viewed solely from the perspective of protecting the 
economic interests of clients, the distribution of liability 
for breach may be of relatively little significance. If, on 
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the other hand, the primary objectives of legal sanctions are 
to maintain accountability, prevent cheating and deter risk- 
shifting, it is important that the sanctions available against 
one participant do not attenuate the incentives of others. 
The dilemma of apportionment and accountability is well 
illustrated by the House of Lords decision in East Ham Borough 
Council V. Bernard Sunlev & Sons Ltd9. In this case the 
defendant-gc used a combination of mitigation and remoteness 
ideas to raise the issue of apportionment of liability between 
itself and the contract supervisor. Having conceded liability 
for breach of the specification, the gc argued that damages 
should. be assessed by reference to the cost of repair around 
the date when it supplied defective input rather than the 
actual cost when the repairs were carried out10. This 
contention was based on an arbitrator's finding that the 
defective input would have been revealed by the type of 
inspection that an architect should normally make on a site 
visit. The gc maintained that as it could not reasonably have 
foreseen the architect's failure 'to notice non-conforming 
inputs at or shortly after delivery, its liability should be 
limited to reinstatement costs at that time. 
9 (1966) AC 406. In this case the defendant's failure to conform to contractual quality standards 
resulted in serious defects in a new school building. The building had been occupied by the plaintiff 
since handover in May 1954 although the Certificate of Practical Completion was not issued until 
November 1,1954. (The clients, presumably, wanted to use the building for the new school year and so 
went into occupation before the practical completion of the building). The architect had issued the 
Final Certificate in July of 1957, and essential repairs had been carried out during the winter of 
1960-61. 
10 This issue was not simply a question of mitigation in that the House of Lords accepted that 
the plaintiff had not been dilatory in effecting the repairs: see, in particular, Lord Pearson's 
opinion: Lid, at 449. 
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The implication of this argument was that the portion of 
the client's loss due to inflation in building costs during 
the five or six year delay between discovery and replacement 
of defective inputs should be used to hold the architect 
accountable for his failure to live up to the contractual 
standards of supervision. While this strategy provided a means 
of sanctioning both gc and architect for their individual 
breaches, the effect of using the remoteness principle in this 
way would have been to reduce the weight of the sanction 
against the gc. 
In finding for the client, the House of Lords firmly 
rejected the apportionment argument. The transaction between 
client and gc was treated as discrete and bilateral. 
Underlying the opinions, there is a premise that the client 
should not be prejudiced by the architect's failurell. Nor 
should the gc, itself in breach, be permitted to point to the 
breach of another participant as a -means of evading its 
responsibilities under its contract with the client 12 
This decision maintained the heaviest possible financial 
sanction against the gc. The dilemma which it poses, however, 
is that the elimination of residual costs to the client left 
no basis on which to ground a legal sanction against the 
11 For example, in response to the remoteness argument, Lord Upjohn, while not explicitly 
rejecting the arbitrator's findings commented that:. "[t3he parties must have contemplated that the 
architect might fail to notice some defective work..., it was surely `on the cards, that he might fail 
to notice the defective work", ibid., at 445. - 
12 For example, in response to the defendant's argument about the responsibility of the architect 
for poor quality supervision, Lord Upjohn commented that: $'I am at a loss to understand why the 
negligent builder should be able to limit his liability by reason of the fact that at some earlier 
stage the architect failed to notice the defective workmanship": ibid. 
471 
architect for supervisory failures. 
2. Personal Character of the Contractual Sanction 
Recent decisions of the House of Lords have curtailed 
subsequent building owners' access to legal sanctions where 
building defects do not result in consequential damage to 
persons or property other than the building itself 13 
Subsequent owners may be able to use legal sanctions against 
surveyors and other building professionals who were involved 
in the exchange transaction by which the building was acquired 
and failed to warn of a defect which results in economic loss 
to the purchaser14. However, they no longer have the legal 
power to bring equivalent sanctions against those who 
participated in the production. process, unless the building 
is a residential property15. 
The implications of this. development are_ profound. It 
means, in effect, that producers and . professionals 
involved 
in transactions governed by JCT80 are immune from liability 
for a large class of defects once the client sells the 
building. That part of the risk of qualitative defects which 
result in economic loss is to be assumed by. building 
professionals associated with the purchase transaction may 
13 D. & F. Estates v. Church Commissioners for England [1989] 1 AC 177; Murphy v. Brentwood 
District Council [1990] AC 414. 
14 Smith v. Eric S. Bush; Harris v. Wyre Forest District Council [1990] 1 AC 831. 
15 if the building is residential, a subsequent owner's interests may be protected under the 
Defective Premises Act 1972 if it is not already covered by an approved statutory insurance scheme. 
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serve to protect the economic interests of some subsequent 
building owners16. However, this strategy of protection entails 
an arbitrary transfer of risk away from producers- and a 
significant reduction in the power of legal remedies to 
promote accountability for the quality of producers' 
performances 17. 
3. Cost-Pass-Through and the Problem of Consistency 
The cost-pass-through machinery of JCT80 relies on there 
being in place a set of consistent contracts and it assumes 
that there are no blockages in the system. At first sight, the 
problem of consistency appears to be difficult but not 
insurmountable. The process of formulating an integrated 
package of bilateral contracts to govern a complex and 
polycentric process such as building production would 
undoubtedly strain scarce rationality resources, and incur 
heavy transaction costs. However, the. standardised contracts 
16 Note that the principle of negligence liability developed in Smith v. Eric S. Bush & Harris 
v. Wyre Forest District Council, supra, note 14 was intended to protect purchasers of "modest homes". 
The premise underlying the opinions in the case was that purchasers of less modest homes would buy 
contractual protection against economic toss through the direct purchase of the services of a surveyor 
before committing themselves to buying a home. of course, this solution also entails shifting risks 
from producers and production professionals to exchange professionals. It should also be recognised 
that where subsequent owners do not have grounds for a sanction against exchange professionals, the 
risk which has been shifted away from building producers and professionals, is assumed by owners (or- 
more likely their insurers). 
17 The position which has now been achieved by the courts with respect to subsequent owners' 
access to Legal sanctions where they have acquired a defective building is close to that advocated for 
clients in a recent report of the construction industry's Insurance Feasibility Committee, "Build: 
Building Users' Insurance Against Latent Defects", (NEDO) (London: HMSO, 1988). This report recommended 
that building producers' and building professionals' Liability to clients for defective work ought to 
expire at the end of the contractual period for rectifying defects. For a critical comment on this 
Report, see, Ian Duncan Wallace, "Defective Work: The New Flavours" (1990) 6, Construction"Law Journal 
87. 
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of the JCT enables individual actors to avoid, or at least 
drastically reduce, such demands on resources. Even if the JCT 
failed to achieve complete harmonisation between the main form 
and the array of sub-contractual relationships involved in 
building transactions, that the JCT produces a model contract 
at all ought to facilitate the creation and / or adjustment 
of sub-transactions. 
However, there are both theoretical and practical 
obstacles to harmonisation. At the simplest level, the 
(standardised) contracts of some important participants in 
building production - the professional consultants - are not 
under the auspices of the JCT. Thus, delicate decisions about 
risk-allocation, negotiated by the Tribunal, may be undermined 
by the decisions of other individuals or agencies. 
Second, although the standard form contract may be 
structured to encourage the use of other contracts from the 
same family in all related transactions, there is no legal 
mechanism of compulsion. Moreover, the. power of market forces 
and other economic pressures to induce conformity is likely 
to be highly variable. For example, gc. s may be. in a 
relatively strong position to ensure that the terms on which 
a "labour-only-sub-contractor" participates in a transaction 
are consistent with the gc's undertakings under a main form. 
It may be more difficult to ensure conformity where the Bill 
of Quantities specifies components for which there are few 
suppliers. In this context, the fact that the gc is required 
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to use the specified components, 'together with the small 
number- of potential sources, may afford the supplier 
relatively greater transactional power to secure advantageous 
terms. 
There is, in addition, a substantive problem in drafting 
contract terms that will provide a baseline for cost-pass- 
through. This machinery of accountability requires the gc to 
perform two roles that are to some extent incompatible. As an 
autonomous input supplier, the gc is responsible for procuring 
inputs, assembly of some building components, and co- 
ordination and supervision of the production process. With 
respect to this aspect Of their participation in building 
transactions, gc. s are "personally" accountable to clients and 
sanctions are directed at failures by gc. s to conform to the 
contractual standards. 
The cost-pass-through machinery requires that the gc also 
perform a purely. procedural function. As the only building 
producer bonded to the client by contract, it is the latter's 
point of entry into the network of transactional relations 
between building producers1s. In this guise, the gc exists only 
to channel sanctions against opportunism and incompetence to 
the relevant actor. Discharge of this function requires the 
gc to undertake formal contractual responsibility for matters 
over which it has no control, and for which it has not 
"personally" assumed the risk. 
18 Supra, chapter VI. 
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Tensions between personal and procedural aspects of the 
gc's role-are illustrated by those provisions of JCT80 which 
seek to protect gc. s against the disruption costs of breaches 
by specialist sub-contractors and suppliers. The extension of 
time machinery, for example, protects the gc from the impact 
of "delay on the part of" nominated sub-contractors (nsc. s) 
and nominated suppliers (ns)19. However, there is a difference 
between the risk that a breach of the time constraint by a nsc 
will cause the gc to be late in completing the gc's portion 
of the Works, and the "pure" delay due to breach by a nsc20. 
A contractual objective of reducing opportunism and 
incompetence would entail holding nominated participants 
accountable for failures to meet the time constraints 
contained in their sub-contracts. 
The cost-pass-through mechanism as currently instituted 
in JCT80 seems incapable of meeting both of these 
transactional objectives21. If the gc, who has a direct 
contractual link with a nsc or ns, . 
is sheltered from the 
impact costs of a breach by one of these actors, it will not 
incur any recognisable loss. Whereas the client, who bears the 
19 Clause 25.4.7. 
20 Suppose, for example, that a nominated sub-contractor is appointed to install and erect the 
pre-stressed concrete columns which constitute the skeleton of the building and the period of the sub- 
contract is five weeks. The sub-contractor arrives on the site two weeks later than the date when it 
was due to start and takes 7 weeks to complete the sub-contract Works. The delayed start causes the 
gc to adjust other parts of its programme and result in a delay to the gc's part of the project of 
five days. The tardiness of the nsc in execution of the contract results in a further ten days delay 
to the progress of the gc. The breach by the nsc has therefore resulted in 15 days delay to the gc. 
The gc may readily be sheltered from the impact risk by the extension of time machinery. However, 
there remains the problem of holding the nsc accountable for breach of two terms of the sub-contract - 
delay in starting (two weeks) and taking longer than stipulated (another two weeks). 
21 See Westminster City Council v. J. Jarvis & Sons [1970] 1 All ER 943. 
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cost of delay as manifested in extensions of time and the 
claims -machinery, would not have a contractual nexus on which 
to ground a claim22. 
Viewed from the perspective of accountability- and 
contractual "discipline", there is a further problem. Even if 
there exists a theory of liability on which clients might base 
a claim sanctions would be limited to the loss to client 
rather than the conduct of the defaulter23. The more 
effectively a gc or architect managed to limit the impact 
costs of delay "on the part of" a nominated participant, 
therefore, the smaller would be the financial sanction against 
the defaulter 24 
These pragmatic problems of term-formulation, timing and 
bargaining power, are exacerbated by the approaches of 
. appellate courts to the cost-pass-through device. When 
confronted with building contracts, these agencies have 
responded with contradictory "intuitions of justice", the net 
effect of which have been to undermine the contractual 
machinery. 
22 In the light of the Jarvis decision, ibid., the JCT has to some extent abandoned cost-pass- 
through as the mechanism for holding nsc. s accountable for breach to time obligations: infra. However, 
the problem remains significant because clause 25.4.7 also covers delay on the part of a nominated 
supplier, and the contractual regime makes no provision for a collateral warranty between client and 
nominated supplier. 
I ph 
23 It appears from the comments made in some of the opinions given in Mur v. Brentwood District 
Council, supra, note 13 that the negligence theory developed in Junior'Books Ltd. v. Veitchi Company 
Ltd. [1983] 1 AC 520, might remain available to clients: see, in particular, the comments of Lord 
Bridge at 441E. 
24 Under the extension of time machinery, the gc is required to use its "best endeavours" to 
mitigate the disruptive effect of all "Relevant Events". With respect to the specific risk of "delay 
on the part of" a nominated participant, the definition of the contingency contains an internal 
mitigation norm. That is, the extension is only available to the gc who can, show that it'"has taken 
all practicable steps to reduce or avoid" disruption to its progress: clause 25.4.7. 
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One such intuition of justice-appears-in a tendency to 
treat individual contracts within the system constituted by 
building contracts as discrete transactions between competent 
business actors. The contract under review in any particular 
conflict is assumed to be a complete expression of the 
parties' intentions, and only those involved in the particular 
contract are assumed to be implicated in the outcome. One 
consequence of this perspective is that implied or default 
terms which would exist primarily to engage the cost-pass- 
through machinery are viewed as "terminal" allocations of 
responsibility 25. Thus courts have tended to reject arguments 
that such a term ought to be read into the relationship 
between client and gc on the basis that it would be unjust to 
hold gc. s accountable for losses due to default on the part 
of another producer26. 
In other instances, judges confronted with competing 
interpretations of building contracts have. reacted to 
intuitions that transactions between client and gc are part 
of a wider network of contractual relations. These responses 
are shaped by perceptions that gc. s are unduly restricted in 
their contractual decisions, and have been particularly 
visible in interpretations of the nexus between clients, gc. s 
25 That is, it is assumed that the loss will be borne by the party held accountable by the Court. 
26 Good examples of this intuition at work can be seen in T. A Bickerton v. North West Metropolitan 
Hospital Board (1970] 1 WLR 607, (HL), discussed, supra, chapter VIII; Gloucestershire County Council 
v. Richardson (1969] 1 AC 480, (HL), discussed infra, and John Jarvis Ltd. v. Rockdale Housing 
Association Ltd (1987) 3 Construction Law Journal 24. Ian Duncan Wallace has described this intuition 
in terms of judges having "given way to immediate and insufficiently analysed instincts of sympathy 
for main contractors": Ian Duncan Wallace "The Bickerton Albatross Once More" (1987) 3 Construction 
Law Journal 274 at 274. 
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and nominated participants. Judgments are influenced by 
concerns that gc. s have insufficient "freedom" to negotiate 
terms with a nominated sub-contractor or supplier, and fears 
that practical realities or procedural obstacles may prevent 
gc. s channelling a sanction to the defaulter27. 
On several occasions these "intuitions of justice" have 
disrupted or blocked the operation of the cost-pass-through 
mechanism. Take, for example, the majority opinions of House 
of Lords in Gloucestershire County Council v. Richardson28. In 
this case, the conflict between client and gc centred on 
defective concrete columns which had been supplied and erected 
by a nominated supplier. Significantly, to the majority in the 
House of Lords, the nominated supplier was the only 
manufacturer of the product, the price of the sales contract 
was lower than had been anticipated29, and the contract 
included a term limiting liability for defects to replacement 
of defective items3o. 
The client brought an action against the gc based on the 
latter's "procedural role" in the cost-pass-through machinery. 
The complicating factor was that the concrete columns met the 
specification given in the Bill of Quantities. As the 
supplier, and hence the gc, had complied with the express 
27 Supra, chapter VI. Note that this construction of the building contract as part of a wider 
matrix of 'contractual relations is also informed by an "instinct of sympathy" for gc. s: ibid. 
28 Supra, note 26. 
29 The Contract Bills had allowed L7000 as a prime cost sum for concrete columns and-the price 
of the sale contract was L4941: ibid. 
30 Clause 4 of the sellers standard conditions of sale: ibid. 
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quality standards of the contract, (conformity with the 
Contract Documents), the decision centred on the possibility 
of implying into the main contract, the quality norms-of the 
Sale of Goods Act31. 
There were two interpretive strands to the majority 
opinions in favour of the gc. Lord Pearce, and to a lesser 
extent, Lord Wilberforce, believed that the main contract 
implicitly excluded the possibility of incorporating the 
merchantability standard where the gc obtained input on a 
"supply only" basis rather than a contract "to supply and 
erect". This inference was drawn from a difference between the 
terms of the main contract with respect to the appointments 
of nominated suppliers and nominated sub-contractors. In 
particular, the main contract afforded the gc a veto against 
the nomination of a nsc, but not in the case of a materials 
only suppliers. According to Lord Pearce: 
This ommission cannot be unintentional. -It seems 
..... to point to an intention that the contractor is 
not undertaking liability for materials provided by 
a nominated supplier. Otherwise he must surely have 
been given, as in the case of a nominated sub- 
contractor, an opportunity of making reasonable 
objections, and a right to insist on an indemnity 
from the supplier32. 
On the basis of this difference in drafting, it was thought 
that the gc ought not to be held presumptively accountable to 
the client for defects in the performance of a nominated 
31 in a case decided just before the Richardson decision, the House of Lords had held that 
building contracts were governed by the implied conditions of the sale of Goods Act: Young & Marten 
Ltd v. Mcmanus Childs Ltd. t19691 1 AC 454. 
32 supra, note 26 at 495E. 
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supplier, although it would have been liable if the columns 
had been supplied and erected by a nsc. 
The second strand in the majority decision appears in the 
reasons given by Lord Upjohn. He rejected the idea- that 
different provisions in the main form had any real 
significance: 
The truth is that this complex agreement ... 'made 
no provision for the parties' intentions in this 
matter at all. It was quite unnecessary that the 
contract should do so, for this was not a matter 
that had to be dealt with once and for all at that 
stage unless the parties chose to do so. If the 
point ever occurred to them, which is unlikely, they 
did not provide for it in their contract.... 
Normally it seems to me that the usual rule of 
implied warranty must apply to the goods to be 
supplied by the contractor through the nominated 
. supplier 
33 
In this instance, however, it was thought that the warranty 
should not be implied. Lord Upjohn was concerned that the gc 
had been excessively constrained in its bargaining with the 
supplier.. by the latter's prior agreement with the client on 
price- and liability terms. It. would thus be inequitable to 
hold the gc accountable for the whole of the client's losses 
from breach when the gc's recovery from the supplier would be 
restricted by the terms of the limitation clause. 
An important premise underlying Lord. Upjohn's analysis 
was the belief that judges lacked the legal tools by which to 
reach'the ideal solution. In the absence of the legal power 
33 Supra, note 26 at 502F-503A 
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to imply into the main contract quality terms which were co- 
extensive with the input supplier's limitation on its 
liability to the gc, it was thought preferable that the client 
should bear the entire loss, and the nominated supplier should 
escape without any liability34. 
The cost-pass-through mechanism is a particularly 
intriguing implementation dilemma. In practical terms it may 
be feasible for the JCT to clarify specific terms in the light 
of judicial decisions, and where necessary supplement cost- 
pass-through with direct contractual warranties. However, the 
underlying dissonance between the nature of the building 
transaction and judicial conceptions of contractual relations 
is much harder to address. Every attempt to redraft contract 
terms generates the possibility of litigation over 
interpretation and contemporary decisions of appellate courts 
reveal similar "intuitions of justice" as were evident in the 
Richardson case35. 
34 
Compare the dissenting judgment of Lord Pearson. He started with the premise that suppliers 
of defective inputs, whatever their label, should be held accountable for the quality of their 
products. In the absence of express contractual provisions which would achieve this end, the only 
machinery for securing accountability "gap-filling" by judicial implication of the necessary quality 
terms into the main contract. Recognising that this strategy functioned only as a procedural device, 
Lord Pearson saw that it was necessary to restrict the scope of the term to be implied in the contract 
between gc and client, to the scope of the liability contained in the contract between gc and supplier. 
The analytical methodology used by Lord Pearson is similar to that subsequently adopted by the Privy 
Council to deal with the analogous problems generated by the doctrine-of privity in the context of 
international shipping cases: New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v. A. M. Satterthwaite & Co. Ltd. (The 
Eurymedon) (1974] 1 All ER 1015; Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd. v. Salmond & Spraggon Pty 
(Australia) Ltd. (The New York Star) [1980] "3 All ER 257. In these decisions, the Privy Council 
explicitly acknowledged the importance of implementing the commercial objectives underlying the 
contractual provision. This goal was achieved despite the highly uncertain "fit, $ between the 
transactional purpose of the Himalaya clause and classical conceptions of contractual relations. 
35 See, for example, John Jarvis Ltd. v. Rockdale Housing Association Ltd, supra, note 26. 
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4. Concurrent Liabilities 
Recent judicial developments have not only limited the 
use of negligence principles as a basis for sanctions where 
the relationship between plaintiff and defendant is not part 
of a single contractual setting, but also restricted 
concurrent liabilities under contractual and tortious theories 
of recovery. A working rule which limits access to legal 
sanctions in this fashion has implications for procedural and 
substantive aspects of participants' remedies against one 
another. 
At the time when JCT80 was drafted, the. practice of 
relying on concurrent but independent duties in contract and 
tort to overcome limitations on the availability of 
contractual sanctions was commonplace36. During the early 
1980's this practice continued and was further encouraged by 
the decision in Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi Company Ltd37. 
More recently, however, the Court of Appeal, in two important 
decisions, has cast doubt on the possibility of concurrent 
liabilities in tort and contract. between participants in a 
36 These arguments had been developed primarily to take advantage of differences between the 
treatment of contract and negligence theories in statutory regimes governing time limits on 
commencement of actions and contribution. Note that before the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, 
the courts' power explicitly to apportion damages was limited to actions involving joint tortfeasors: 
Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935). 
. 
37 Supra, note 23. Note that the decision in this case was predicated on the assumption that the 
Veitchi, in its role as nominated sub-contractor, could simultaneously owe contractual duties to the 
gc, and tortious duties to the client, where the three individuals were part of a single transactional 
network. 
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building transaction38. 
The issue in Simaan General Contracting Company v. 
Pilkington Glass Ltd (No. 2) (Simaan)39 was whether the gc 
could use negligence as a basis for sanctioning a nominated 
supplier where there was no formal contract between gc and 
supplier, but each was contractually linked to the same sub- 
contractor. The Court held that economic relationships between 
individuals who had failed to undertake contractual 
obligations towards each other, would not be governed by a 
negligence norm where the individuals concerned were situated 
in a shared context and had, by contracts with another actor, 
formulated the risks and liabilities which they were prepared 
to assume. 
In Greater Nottingham Co-operative Society v. 
*Cementation Piling and Foundations Ltd (Cementation) 40, by 
contrast, the'parties to the action, client and nominated sub- 
contractor, had adopted a contractual framework of governance. 
38 See also the comments of Lord Scarman, speaking for the Privy Council in Tai Hing Cotton Mill 
Ltd. v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] 1 AC 80. In response to the argument that tortious obligations 
ought to be inferred to make up for failures of the contractual relationship to protect the plaintiff's 
economic interests, Lord Scarman stated that: 
Their Lordships do not believe that there is anything to the advantage of the Laws 
development in searching for a liability in tort where the parties are in a 
contractual relationship. This is particularly so in the commercial relationship. 
Though it is possible as a matter of legal semantics to conduct an analysis of the 
rights and duties inherent in some contractual relationships ... either as a matter 
of contract law when the question will be what, if any, terms are to be implied or as 
a matter of tort law when the task will be to Identify a duty arising from the 
proximity and character of the relationship between the parties, their Lordships 
believe it to be correct in principle and necessary for the avoidance of confusion in 
the law to adhere to the contractual analysis: on principle because it Is a 
relationship in which the parties have, -subject to a few exceptions, the right to 
determine their obligations, and for. the avoidance of confusion because different 
consequences do follow according to whether liability arises in contract or tort. 
at 107. 
39 119851 3 ALL ER 705. 
40 11988] 3 WLR 396. VV 
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The collateral contract contained qualitative standards which 
were to govern the defendant's performance with respect to 
design and the selection of goods and materials. However, 
there was no express term dealing with the quality of 
workmanship. When negligence in the execution of the sub- 
contract caused damage to an adjoining building, revealed the 
unsuitability of the original design41, and resulted in a 33 
week delay to the project, the client sought compensation for 
its economic losses on the building transaction42. Curiously, 
the plaintiff did not pursue a contractual claim in the Court 
of Appeal, but based its argument on the negligence theory 
advanced in Junior Books. 
Faced with a precedent which had been thoroughly 
discredited, and contractual "silence" on the issue. of quality 
of workmanship, the Court of Appeal found unanimously in 
favour of the nsc. The existence of a contract which said 
nothing about the relevant risk was held to exclude the 
possibility of an independent tortious route to a legal 
sanction. In this case, therefore, it was the fact of a 
contract between the parties which barred the way to a direct 
41 The Official Referee had found as a fact that there had not been any breach of the design 
obligation in that it had been reasonable to believe that the original plans would be suitable, given 
the information available at that time: Ibid. 
42 There were three main heads of loss: 
a) the additional costs under the main contract entailed by the revised piling scheme amounted 
to L68 606; - 
b) the costs of meeting the gc. s contractual claims' for direct toss/ expenses and fluctuations 
during the 33 weeks amounted to L79 235; and 
c) the consequential economic tosses to the client attributable to delayed completion amounted to L282 
697. - 
Ibid. 
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claim in negligence43. 
The return to a sharp separation between tortious and 
contractual liabilities has important practical consequences 
for building transactions. First, it curtails the possibility 
of using negligence principles to circumvent privity, or 
supplement the cost-pass-through mechanism. Participants in 
building transactions have no choice but to use the 
contractual conduits. If there is a blockage or a gap in the 
liability channel due to insolvency, the expiry of a 
limitation period or a missing term, for example, the loss 
will simply lie where it falls. 
This aspect of the recent developments is particularly 
significant to relations between producers and professional 
consultants. Despite the "intimacy" of their working 
relationships and the ease with which performance costs may 
be shifted between them, these classes of participants do not 
have a direct contractual connection. That architects, 
quantity surveyors, and gc. s each- have an independent 
contractual relationship with a client, provides a basis for 
invoking sanctions where inadequate performance by one such 
participant results in economic loss to another. However, 
while the contractual channel may afford a means of 
compensating the "participant-victim" of opportunism, there 
43 For useful comments on the implications of this case for the structuring of transactional 
relationships between participants in building production, see, Michael Webster, "Implied Exclusion 
Clauses -- The Cementation Case" (1990) 6 Construction Law Journal 7; John N. Adams & Roger Brownsword, 
"From Jarvis to Junior Books: Tortuous and Tortious Constructions" (1989) 5 Construction Law Journal 
3; see also, ap ssim, Hilary Nicholls "Contractors' 'Duty to Warn' Following D&F. Estates and 
University of Glasgow v. Whitfield" (1989) 5 Construction Law Journal 175. 
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remains the problem of ensuring that sanctions are passed on 
to the-defaulter and do not rest with the client. 
Secondly, the decision in Cementation may have further 
restricted clients' access to remedies where there are latent 
defects in a building. During the late 1970's and early 
1980's, negligence theories were routinely used to delay the 
date on which the procedural time clock would begin to run. 
Although the tortious theory was not strictly necessary for 
clients who could show that a qualitative failure was due to 
egregious opportunism, it was significant where defects were 
attributable to incompetence. At a time when "damage" was 
broadly defined to include defects in the structure of a 
building, judicial willingness to find concurrent duties in 
negligence afforded clients greater protection than might be 
available under the contractual regime 
44 
Today, neither clients nor subsequent building owners are 
able to use tortious arguments as a basis of sanctioning 
producers or professionals unless a defect due to negligence 
causes consequential damage to persons or property other than 
44 The differences between the two theories of liability were most evident in litigation over 
latent defects during the five year period between the House of Lords' decisions in Anns v. Merton 
London Borough Council (1978] AC 728 and Pirelli General Cable Works Ltd v. Oscar Faber and Partners 
[1983] 1 All ER 65. Whereas clients who used a contractual theory would have six or twelve years from 
the date of breach within which to bring an action (depending on whether or not the contract was under 
seat), the Anns decisions suggested that a cause of action in negligence might not accrue until defects 
in a building became "discoverable". This interpretation of Anns was adopted by the Court of Appeal 
in a number of decisions before Pirelli, see, for example, Lewisham London Borough Council v. Leslie 
& Co. (1979) 250 EG 1289; Cri v. Torfaen Urban District Council (1982) 261 EG 679; Dennis v. 
Charnwood Borough Council [19821 3 WLR 1064. In Pirelli, the House of Lords held that for the purposes 
of a negligence action, time would begin to run at the point when relevant and significant damage first 
occurred. Plaintiffs in negligence actions, therefore, might find that they were statute-barred where 
the damage to a building was not observable within six years. However, even the more restricted accrual 
date of Pirelli maintained the possibility of bringing a cause of action for a. longer period than would 
be available for breach of a contract that was not under seal. 
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the building itself45. With respect to clients, however, the 
Cementation decision suggests that even within this limited 
sphere it may be difficult to use negligence liability after 
expiry of a contractual limitation period. The robust 
rejection by the Court of Appeal of "default" tortious 
liabilities between those who are connected by contract raises 
the spectre that in future contractual silences may be held 
implicitly to exclude duties owed to clients to avoid causing 
consequential physical damage 46 
One response to the current uncertainties surrounding 
default standards of performance and time limitations on 
actions would be for clients to seek (and pay for) additional 
security by insisting that producers assume contractual duties 
of care. Whether such a term would in fact extend the period 
within which clients may bring legal sanctions depends on the 
meaning to be attributed to critical provisions in the Latent 
45 D&F Estates v. Church Commissioners, supra, note 13; Murphy v. Brentwood District Council, 
supra, note 13. If a latent defect does cause such damage, sanctions against gc. s or architects appear 
to be available to subsequent building owners for a period of three years (personal injury) or six 
years (property damage) from the date on which relevant and significant damage first occurred. 
46 This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that JCT80 provides for the gc to Indemnify the 
client against liability for consequential physical damage arising out of the gc. s activities on the 
site during production: clauses 20 & 21. Clients face the risk therefore that courts, following the 
logic of the Cementation analysis, may hold that the parties' limited contractual provision for the 
contingency implicitly excludes a default norm which would hold the gc accountable in negligence for 
consequential physical damage due to defects in the building where the damage does not occur until the 
building is in use. A further complicating factor would arise from the interaction of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977 with the contractual norms. Were the contractual-indemnity clauses to be viewed 
as a limitation on the gc. s' liability in negligence, they would be subject"to the provisions of the 
Act. Liability for death or personal injury caused by defects in the building, therefore, could not 
be excluded or restricted, and restrictions on liability for property damage caused by such defects 
would be subject to a reasonableness test: s. 2, Unfair Contract Terms Act. If, on the other hand, the 
effect of Cementation is that gc. s are not subject to duties of care except to the extent that they 
are expressed in the contract, then the analysis is rather different. The contractual provisions 
governing indemnities would not be a limitation, but an assumption of liability in negligence. While, 
in theory at least, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, is intended to govern terms which define 
obligations, as well as those which restrict or exclude duties, in practice. it would seem that the 
Cementation argument is far less amenable to the controls of the Act. 
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Damage Act of 1986. This legislation provides that where 
damage results from alatent defect due to "negligence", the 
person incurring damage has three years from the date when the 
damage became "discoverable" in which to commence 
proceedings47. 
The Act does not define "negligence". If the term is 
interpreted to include breach of contractual duties of care, 
clients would clearly be able to use such norms to enhance 
their access to sanctions. If, on the other hand, the 
negligence norm of the Act is taken to refer exclusively to 
the tort of negligence, actions based on contractual duties 
of care would continue to be governed by the conventional 
limitation period of six (or twelve) years from the date of 
breach. 
Restrictions on tortious liabilities appear also to have 
inhibited further development of contributory negligence as 
a defence to actions for breach of contract. In the context 
of building contracts this would have the effect of 
eliminating a potentially powerful tool of apportionment. 
Historically, English courts, when dealing with contractual 
sanctions, would use concepts such as "causation", 
"mitigation" and "remoteness" to define risk allocation and 
effect implicit apportionment 
48, but deny loss-sharing when 
47 ALL actions are subject to a final Limitation date of fifteen years from the original date of 
breach. 
48 See, for exampte, O'Connor v. B. D. Kirby & Co. [1972] 1 0B 90 (causation); Weld-Blundell v. 
St ens [1920] AC 956 (remoteness and causation); Jamal v. Mootla Dawood Sons & Co. [1916] AC 175 
(mitigation). For a recent example, of the use of causation / remoteness arguments to apportion 
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the defendant raised the contributory negligence defence 49. 
During_ the early 1980's the Official Referees had begun to 
admit the defence where a gc could show that the architect, 
or another participant linked only to the client, - was 
implicated in a compound breach. This practice was implicitly 
endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Forsikrinasaktieselskampat 
Vesta v. ButcherSO, where it was accepted that contributory 
negligence should be incorporated into the working rules 
governing sanctions for breach of contract. However, in 
upholding the decision of the trial judge51, the Court of 
Appeal held that contributory negligence would be available 
only where a defendant owes duties in negligence which are co- 
extensive with, but independent of, its contractual 
obligations. It is precisely this possibility of liability in 
the tort of negligence independently of contract which appears 
to have been eradicated by the decisions in Simaan and 
Cementation 52 . 
liability in a construction context, see, Frost v. Moody Homes Ltd. (1990) 6 Construction Law Journal 
43. 
49 For a helpful review of the jurisprudence in this area, see the opinion of Neill LJ., in A. B. - 
Marintrans v. Comet Shipping Co. Ltd (1985]'1 Lloyd's Reports 568. 
50 (1986] 2 Lloyd's Reports 179. 
51 E19861 2 Alt ER 488 
52 For differing perspectives on whether recognition of the contributory negligence defence Is, 
or would be, a desirable development in construction contracts, see David I. Bristow "Contributory 
Fault in Construction Contracts" (1986) 2 Construction Law Journal 252 and Michael' J. Smith 
"Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v. Butcher and Others: The Fish Farm Fiasco Contributory 
Negligence, Contracts and Construction" (1988) 4 Construction Law Journal 75. 
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B. Quality 
1. Introduction to the contractual Regulation of Quality 
a. Standards and Sanctions 
Within the institutional setting of building production, 
qualitative standards are readily defined, but may be 
difficult to enforce. We have already seen that the planning 
process provides a forum for the development of transaction- 
specific rules. In addition, qualitative aspects of the 
performances of building producers and professionals are 
governed by public legal regimes such as the Building 
Regulations, the Sale of Goods-Act, and the Supply of Goods 
and Services Act. 
As we move from question of standards to sanctions, 
however, enforcement issues become more complex. Quite apart 
from the implementation dilemmas described above, the power 
of legal sanctions to deter opportunism or protect against 
incompetence is limited by critical characteristics of 
building transactions. The interactive and cumulative nature 
of building production, for example, simplifies concealment 
of defective work and inputs, and hence exacerbates the costs 
of detecting failures to meet contractual standards. Moreover, 
the relative inexperience of many clients and the "one-off" 
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nature of their participation in building production renders 
client- observation and monitoring an unreliable means of 
evaluating producers or the professionals to whom the task of 
supervision is delegated. 
Nor is evaluation of performances by reference to the 
"outcome" of the transaction an ideal solution. Building 
producers' and professionals' shares in the transactional 
surplus take the form of a fee which is paid by the end of the 
production phase. Returns to clients, by contrast, are derived 
from the building in use. That clients' interests lie in the 
services supplied by an unusually durable product exposes an 
information gap between production and evaluation of 
buildings. Judgments about how far a building, as produced, 
conforms to a client's expectations must be postponed, at 
least to some extent, until a building user has experience of 
the performance of the building. The time which it takes for 
users to acquire relevant information about building defects 
affects the power of legal remedies to. operate as a safeguard 
against opportunism or incompetence. The costs of establishing 
and pinpointing fault, for example, are likely to increase 
with the duration of building use. Time-lags between execution 
of the building transaction and the evaluation of performance 
also provide scope for incompetent or opportunistic defaulters 
to disappear or otherwise 
, 
shield themselves from legal 
sanctions. 
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b. Classification of Building Defects under JCT80 
JCT80 classifies building defects into two main 
categories. First, some aspect of the building as produced may 
fail to conform to the decisions which were made during 
planning. Second, a building may be defective despite having 
been produced precisely in accordance, with the specification 
of the building concept. In both instances the failure may be 
trivial or important and may affect the performance of the 
building, its safety in use, maintainance costs, or market 
value. An additional question which is raised by "conforming" 
defects is whether the building, as produced, in fact meets 
the clients needs. 
The former type of deficiency - the non-conforming defect 
- may be seen as redistribution of shares in the transactional 
surplus from clients to the building producer responsible for 
that part of the project. The primary beneficiary of 
redistribution through "conforming" defects, is the 
participant - architect, specialist designer, or nominated 
sub-contractor - who produced the-unsuitable plans. However, 
within the complex and interactive process governed by JCT80, 
responsibility for quality cannot be defined in quite such a 
discrete fashion. Architects, Clerks of Works and gc. s have 
supervisory duties which may generate liability for non- 
conforming defects. With respect to conforming defects, the 
organisation of building production raises the issue. of how 
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far building producers ought to be held accountable for 
failing to intervene when their location and expertise 
provides a basis for identifying problems in a design or 
specification. 
2. Non-Conforming Inputs 
a. Production Sanctions 
(i) Description of the Sanctions 
Contractual remedies against gc. s for non-conforming 
inputs are available to clients whether the defective inputs 
affect the market value, the cost-in-use, or the safety of the 
building. Clients, by virtue of the contract, are entitled to 
a product with complies exactly with the decisions which-were 
made during planning. Gc. s' liability for non-conforming 
defects may be "personal" or "procedural" in function 53 . In 
the latter case, the liability of the gc incorporates formal 
responsibility for every participant with whom it has a 
contractual relationship, including the nominated 
participants 54. 
During production, conformity with the documents defining 
the building concept is enforceable against the gc by way of 
53 Supra. 
54 See discussion, infra. 
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a transaction-specific remedy. This enforcement instrument 
combines literal performance with the sanction of empowering 
clients to withhold interim payments. JCT80 authorises the 
architect, upon discovery of non-conforming inputs, to 
instruct the gc to replace defective materials or rectify poor 
quality workmanship55 and to refuse to certify for payment 
work which has not been properly executed56. In addition to 
the costs of removal and replacement, the gc is contractually 
accountable for disruption costs57. These financial sanctions 
are reinforced by the client's power unilaterally to terminate 
the contract if the gc- persistently refuses to rectify 
defects 58 . 
This enforcement instrument is available to clients 
throughout site production and until the end of the "Defects 
'Liability Period" (DLP)59. The DLP begins on the day named by 
the Architect in the certificate of "Practical Comp letion"60 
and continues for the time agreed between client and gc during 
planning, and stated in the Appendix 61.. At the end of the DLP, 
the architect is to conduct a comprehensive review of the 
buildings. Deficiencies which appear during this period and 
55 Clause 8.3: supra, chapter VIII. 
56 Clause 30.2.1.1. 
57 That is, the gc is not entitled to any relief from the disruption to its progress, and it will. 
be liable to the client if completion is delayed by the discovery of non-conforming inputs. 
58 Clause 27.1.3. 
59 Clause 17. 
60 Clause 17.1. The importance of Practical Completion Is that It is the date from which the 
Client normally goes into occupation of the building. The Certificate of Practical Completion is also 
significant to the gc as it triggers release of one half of the sum which has been deducted by clients 
from the interim payments during production (the Retention): clause 30.4. 
61 JCT80 provides for a default norm of six months: Appendix. 
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are attributable to non-conforming inputs are- to be specified 
in a schedule of defects prepared by the architect62. The gc 
is to be given this schedule within 14 days of the end of the 
DLP and is normally required to remedy all problems identified 
at its own cost63. Once the architect is satisfied that the 
defects set out in the schedule have been rectified, she is 
to issue the "Certificate of Completion of Making Good 
Defects"64. 
Gc. s' incentives to remedy defects- during the DLP are 
primarily financial. The "Certificate of Completion of Making 
Good Defects" triggers release of the second half of the sum 
which the client has withheld from interim payments during 
production (the Retention)65. In addition, this Certificate 
paves the way for final accounting of the transaction and 
issue of the Final Certificate. 
With respect to the issue of quality control, the Final 
Certificate has one important effect. That is, it releases the 
gc from liability for inputs which were required to meet the 
qualitative standard of "reasonable satisfaction". of the 
Architect, unless arbitration proceedings have been launched 
or fraud can be shown 66 . 
62 Clause 17.2: Note that clause 17 also empowers the architect to issue specific Instructions 
during the OLP requiring particular defects to be made good within a reasonable time from the issue 
of the instruction: clause 17.3. 
63 Clause 17.2. 
64 Clause 17.4. 
65 Clause 30.4.1.3. 
66 Clause 30.9.1. 
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The literal enforcement regime is subject to an important 
limitation in that the sanction is available only for a short 
period during the useable life of the building. Once the 
Certificate of Completion of Making Good Defects has-been 
issued, the client loses the contractual power to compel the 
gc to return and rectify defects. Nor can clients draw on 
"public" legal norms to reinforce demands for exact 
compliance. Specific performance is seldom awarded for breach 
of building contracts and is not available once the gc has 
vacated the site67. 
The client's primary remedy against the gc for non- 
conforming inputs which are discovered after the Certificate 
has been issued is the action in damages for breach of 
contract. English courts tend to use the reinstatement measure 
as the quantification principle for breach of quality terms 
in building transactions 68. The pure reinstatement sum may be 
modified, however, by doctrines such as remoteness of damage, 
mitigation, causation, and, perhaps also, contributory 
67 For applications of the traditional rule denying specific performance as a remedy for breach 
of building contracts, see, Flint v. Brandon (1808) 3 Ves. 159; Wilkinson v. Clements (1872) LR 8 Ch. 
96; Wood v. Silcock (1884) 50 LT 251. For exceptions to the traditional rule, see, Wolverhampton- 
Corporation v. Emmons (1901] 1 08 515 and Carpenters Estates -Ltd v. Davies (1940] Ch. 160. The 
principles developed in these tatter decisions enable specific performance to be awarded where three 
conditions are met: 
I) the work is precisely defined; 
if) damages will not adequately compensate the plaintiff; 
iii) the defendant is in possession of the land on which the building is. to be done. 
68 Mertens v. Home Freehold Co (1921] 2 KB 526, Smith v. Johnson (1899) 15 TLR 179* East Ham 
Borough Council v. Bernard Suntey F -Sons Ltd., supra, note 9; The Board of Governers of the Hospital 
for Sick Children & ano v. McLaughlin & Harvey plc (1990) 6 Construction Law Journal 245. 
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negligence 69 . 
Gc. s are exposed to the risk of contractual sanctions for 
a period of six or twelve years from the date of breach 
depending on whether the contract was under seal. In addition, 
s. 32 of the Limitation Act extends clients' power to invoke 
a legal sanction if the defect results from an opportunistic 
breach of contract. Under this section, the commencement of 
the limitation period is delayed where the client can show 
fraud or deliberate concealment of defects. In such cases the 
cause of action does not accrue until the date when the client 
discovered or ought "with reasonable diligence" to have 
discovered the fraud or concealment70. 
(ii) Institutional Analysis of the sanctions 
The limited duration of the transaction-specific sanction 
seems to be explicable in terms of the organisation of the 
construction industry. As we have seen, producers' inability 
to manipulate demand compels gc. s to seek economic security 
69 Supra. Within the context of building production, the doctrine of mitigation raises two 
practical problems: the time at which damages should be assessed, and credit for "betterment". On the 
issue of date for assessment, see, Dodd Properties (Kent) Ltd. Y. Canterbury City Council [1980] 1 WLR 
433; William Cory & Son v. Wingate Investments Ltd. 17 Building Law Reports 104; see, generally, Ian 
N. Duncan Wallace, "Inflation and the Assessment of Construction Cost Damages" (1982) 98 Law Quarterly- 
Review 406. On the issue of costly mitigatory actions which result in benefits to the plaintiff, see, 
generally, British Westinghouse Co. v. Underground Electric Railways Co'of London [1912] AC 673; Lodge 
Holes Colliery Company Limited v. The Borough of Wednesbury [1908] AC 323; and the discussion in The 
Board of Governers of the Hospital for Sick Children v. McLaughlin & Harvey plc, supra, note 68. 
70 Before 1980 the only exemption stated in the Limitation Act was "fraud". However, in an 
important series of building contract cases, the courts had interpreted the section to mean that 
clients could rely on the exemption if there was deliberate concealment of defects: see, Beaman v. ARTS 
Ltd. [1949] 1 KB 550; Clark v. Woor [1965] 2 All ER 353; Applegate v. Moss [1971] 1 QB 406; Lewisham 
London Borough Council v. Leslie & Co. (1979) 12 Building Law Reports 22. 
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by committing resources to an on-going programme of 
contracts7.. Management of such a programme, it might be 
argued, would be difficult, if not impossible, were clients 
able to force gc. s to return and effect repairs months or 
years after a building is in use. 
Conventional rationales for refusing specifically to 
enforce building contracts are also superficially plausible. 
Repairs to a defective building, no less than initial 
production, create scope for cheating on quality margins. The 
risk of incompetence or opportunism is exacerbated where 
execution of an activity involves dimensions of skill and 
effort which are difficult to measure. That specific 
performance would compel the person who was responsible for 
defects to return, perhaps reluctantly, to effect the repairs, 
. lends credence to the belief that this remedy would 
necessarily entail careful supervision of the building 
producer(s). The costs of such monitoring, the argument 
concludes, are in most instances likely to exceed the net 
benefits to clients of the power to coerce the original gc to 
repair defects. ., 
However, to focus exclusively on the implications for 
producers, or courts, of gc. s in fact returning and, executing 
repairs may be to miss the point of a literal enforcement 
71 Supra, chapter VI. 
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sanction72. Protection of clients' interests by way of a 
property rule rather than the liability rule of compensatory 
damages would not necessarily result in the gc doing the work 
itself. Rather literal enforcement, like the damages remedy, 
creates a framework within which gc. s would bargain with 
clients for release from their transactional undertakings. 
. In theory, at least, the bargaining frameworks instituted 
by. . property rules and liability rules differ in their 
distribution of contractual power. Liability rules cast a 
protective shadow over the defaulting party in that they 
constitute a limiting price for the breach which is generally 
less than the cost to the defaulter of performing the 
contract. By contrast, if the non-defaulting party's interests 
in: performance are protected by a property rule, the outcome 
of post-breach negotiations is shaped by the non-defaulter's 
power ultimately to compel the other to incur the cost of 
performing ß. 
Such comparisons between property rule and liability rule 
forms of legal sanction are based on the premise that 
compensatory damages are measured by reference to the market 
72 This discussion draws generally on Calabresi & Metamed's important anataysis of property rules 
and liability rules, and subsequent developments of this argument in the context of specific 
performance: Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, "Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral" (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089; see, generally, Allan Schwartz, "The Case 
for Specific Performance" (1979) 89 Tale Law Journal 271; William D. Bishop "The Choice of Remedy for 
Breach of Contract" (1985) 14 Journal of Legal Studies 299; Thomas S. Uten, "The Efficiency of Specific 
Performance: Towards A Unified Theory of Contract Remedies" (1984) 83 Michigan Law Review 341. 
73 L 
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value of the expected performance74. Where, as in the case of 
building transactions, damages are based on the cost of 
completion, the distinction between property rule and 
liability rule protection is less stark7s. Empowering clients 
to, extract the cost of rectifying defects from a defaulting 
gc. has similar implications to literal enforcement in that 
clients are in a relatively strong position to bargain for a 
share in a gc's profits from breach. Yet the damages sanction, 
as. measured by the cost of completion, is not identical to 
literal enforcement76. In the former instance, though not in 
the latter, the defaulting party's liability is contained by 
judicially developed working rules such as the idea of 
mitigation and the doctrine of remoteness. 
Analysis of the implications of substantive and 
procedural norms which limit gc. s' contractual liability is 
complicated by the dual role of such qualifying doctrines. 
Restrictions on a contractor's accountability for the 
consequences of its breach might be viewed as a judgment that 
part of the risk of loss ought to be borne by the non- 
74 As the analysis has been developed in the law and economics literature, this measure of damages 
is viewed as a means of allocating to promisees the risk that a contract will not be performed because 
the resources are valued more highly in another use. In addition to the references cited above, see, 
for example, Richard A. Posner Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1977); Anthony 
T. Kroronan, "Specific Performance" (1978) 44 University of Chicago Law Review 351. 
ß For economic analysis of the differences between "market value" and "cost of completion" 
measures of damages, see, Don Harris, Anthony I. Ogus, & Jennifer Phillips, "Contract Remedies and 
the Consumer Surplus" (1979) 95 Lew Quarterly Review 581; Timothy J. Muris, "Cost of Completion or 
Dimunition in Market Value: The Relevance of Subjective Value" (1983) 12 Journal of Legal Studies 379. 
76 Ibid. 
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breaching party, or was not included in the'contract pricer. 
Within neoclassical law and economics, for example, the 
argument that a promisee-buyer ought to bear the risk that a 
promisor-seller may receive abetter offer from another buyer 
during the period between formation and performance of a 
contract is a common justification for limiting the original 
buyer's damages to reasonably foreseeable losses78. 
Quality control in building production raises different 
issues. There does not seem to be any good reason to use 
public rules of law to -limit clients' reliance on the 
competence and good faith of building producers. Gc. s who feel 
that" such limitations are necessary may always alert the 
client during planning. The parties might then negotiate: an 
appropriate, and "reasonable" limitation or exclusion clause, 
and discount the contract price. In the context of qualitative 
defects, therefore, it might be argued that courts are right 
to be sceptical of attempts by gc. s to invoke the limitation 
doctrines of common law. 
On the other hand, building defects are frequently the 
result of compound breaches. More often than not a participant 
who is connected to the transaction only by contract with the 
client is also implicated in the problem. In such 79 
n Such judgments are particularly visible when compensation is withheld or reduced on the grounds 
that the loss is "too remote", or might have been avoided if the non-breaching party had taken 
reasonable action in the face of the breach. 
78 Supra, chapter 111. 
79 Typically, breach by a producer will be compounded by inadequate supervision, see, for example, 
East Ham Borough Council v. Bernard Sunley, supra, note 9; see, discussion infra. 
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situations, the client is to be used as a cost-pass-through 
mechanism for channelling sanctions to the appropriate person. 
When used in this context, principles such as causation, 
remoteness of damage, and contributory negligence, would serve 
not so much to limit the client's compensation, but as a basis 
for passing liability through the network of contracts80. 
b. supervision sanctions 
The justification for empowering clients to bring 
sanctions against architects for quality failures due to non- 
conforming defects is straightforward. The architect, though 
not directly engaged in construction of the building, supplies 
supervisory services for which she is compensated in the fee 
for the project. In order to ensure that architects do not 
chisel on their supervisory obligations, they ought to be 
accountable for failures which would have been avoided by 
competent supervision. 
The primary obstacles to implementation of this goal 
relate to standard-setting and targetting. Definition of the 
quality of monitoring services which the architect is to 
supply is made more difficult by the complex character of 
supervision. Relevant performance norms are required not only 
to establish standards of professional competence in the 
80 See, generally, the discussion of apportionment and cost-pass-through, supra. 
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execution of specific supervisory tasks such as inspection or 
certification, but also to govern discretionary judgments 
about how much supervision is necessary, and the need for 
intervention in the production process81. 
The issue of targetting concerns relationships between 
the supervisory responsibilities of the architect and other 
participants. The gc has a contractual duty to supervise 
production as does the Clerk of Works. These participants, 
like the architect, are paid to monitor execution of the 
transaction. Enforcement of these overlapping obligations, 
through the mechanism of legal sanctions, is impeded by_the 
problems of apportionment and accountability described above. 
A further question which may arise concerns the scope of 
the protection afforded to other participants by the presence 
of project architects. This issue has been raised in the 
context of relationships between architects and building 
producers, and between architects and building workers on the 
site. Gc. s, for example, have sought to argue that their 
liability to clients for defects in a completed building ought 
to be limited because the architect failed to identify 
defective work during the production and make an appropriate 
intervention 82. It has also been suggested that an injured 
81 See, generally, Anthony M. Dugdale Professional Negligence (London: Butterworth, 1989) (2nd 
ed. ); lan" N. Duncan Wallace 'Liability of Professionals in Construction Contracts" (1984-5) 1 
Construction Law Journal 4; Andy Khan, "Standard of Proof in Professional Negligence" (1984-5 1 
Construction Law Journal 182. For economic analysis of the issue of professional liability in the 
context of legal services, see, Cento G. Veljanovski & Christopher J. Whelan, "Professional Negligence 
and the Quality of Legal Services - An Economic Perspective" (1983) 46 Modern Law Review 700. 
82 East Ham Borough Council v. Bernard Suntey & Sons Ltd., supra, note 9. 
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building worker ought to be able to invoke sanctions against 
the architect for negligent supervision where injuries 
resulted from an unsafe method of production adopted by the 
gc83 .. 
The institutional culture within which building 
transactions are situated offers two possible strategies for 
defining supervisory standards: express contractual terms, and 
reliance on the common law norms which govern- transactions 
between professionals and their clients. Neither strategy is 
transaction costless. A decision to use the express term route 
may entail the clients and architects incurring the direct 
negotiation costs of creating qualitative standards to govern 
supervision. 
In addition, there may be more subtle costs. Quantity and 
quality of supervision inputs are not matters which are easily 
expressed in' specific contract language. Such terms, 
therefore, tend to be formulated either in the language of 
"aspirational norms", such as 
. 
"best efforts" or 
reasonableness, or by reference to observable proxies, such 
83 Compare Clayton Y. Woodman & Son (Builders) Ltd. [1962) 2 All ER 33 where the CA held that 
the architect was not accountable to an injured worker for the unsafe production method adopted by the 
gc, with Clay v. A. J. Crump & Sons Ltd. [1964) 1 08 533 where the architect was liable to a building 
worker. One difference between the two cases was that in Clay, the unsafe procedure (demolition 
contractors leaving a wall standing) was also a breach of the contractual specification and the. 
architect had relied upon the contractor who asserted that the watt was safe. In effect, the sanction 
available to the injured worker was derived from the fact that the architect's failure to monitor 
compliance with the specification would constitute a breach of the architect's contract with the 
client. In Clayton, by contrast, the unsafe procedure was not a contravention of a specific contractual 
term. There was no indication, therefore, that the architect had failed adequately to supervise 
production. 
&' For discussion of the specific content of architects' duties, see Dugdale, Professional 
Negligence, supra, note 81; Duncan Wallace, "Liability of Professionals in Construction Contracts", 
supra, note 81. 
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as frequency of visits. Aspirational norms are subject to the 
same problems of specificity and monitoring which may affect 
common law standards of reasonableness. The alternative 
strategy of reliance* on proxies, raises the question of "fit" 
between the observable measure of performance and the quality 
of supervision85. 
Negotiation costs may be avoided or reduced by reliance 
on the standardised "Conditions of Engagement" produced by 
the RIBA and the terms institutionalised in the Supply of 
Goods and Services Act. Whether or not these terms constitute 
an "ideal" definition of what the client might legitimately 
expect from an architect in supervising the Works, they 
provide a baseline sets of working rules which the parties 
might use or adapt as required. 
'-' The Conditions of Engagement limit the supervisory role 
of the architect to protection of clients' interests in the 
outcomes of building transactions, that is, securing finished 
buildings which conform to decisions made during planning. 
85 Supra, chapter IV. - 
86 These terms reflect the standards formulated by Pearson LJ., in Clayton v. Woodman, supra, note 
83. He states that the duty of the architect was simply "to make sure that the owner will have a 
building property constructed in accordance with the contract", at 40. See also, Mocatta J. in AMF 
(international) Ltd. v. Magnet Bowling Ltd. (19681 1 WLR 1028, commenting on the decision in Clayton 
v. Woodman & Son. He asserts that the Clayton case: 
.., further establishes than an architect has no right to instruct a builder'how his 
work is to be done or the safety precautions to be taken. It is the function and right 
of the builder to carry out his own building operations as he thinks fit. The 
architect, on the other hand, is engaged as the agent"of the owner for whom the 
building is being erected, and his function is, inter alia, to make sure that in the 
end, when the work has been completed, the owner will have a building property 
constructed In accordance with the contract and any supplementary instructions which 
the architect may have given. 
In the course of a comprehensive discussion of the role of the architect in building transactions, 
Official Referee, Judge William Stabb, GC., commented that: 
... the building owner is entitled to expect his architect so to administer the 
contract and supervise the work, as to ensure, so far as Is reasonably possible, that 
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While architects undertake to make such visits to the site as 
are necessary to see that production is proceeding in 
accordance with the contract87, there is an express disclaimer 
of responsibility for the methods of work adopted by the-gc. ý 
Reliance on the common law standards governing 
professional negligence produces much the same criteria of 
competence. Courts generally defer to professional definitions 
of'-the nature and quality of supervision that clients may 
legitimately expect. Although conflicts between the views of 
individual experts over the precise practice which ought to 
be followed may arise, standards of supervisory care are 
formulated by courts in such general terms that these 
conflicts are readily accommodated in findings of fact89. 
That the Conditions of Engagement purport to define 
architects' responsibilities for supervision in a manner which 
is distinct from gc. s' production and supervision duties 
accords with a transactional objective of targetting legal 
sanctions precisely. However, the dichotomy between monitoring 
compliance with plans and supervision over working. methods 
the quality of work matches up to the standard contemplated... . No one suggests that 
the architect is required to tell a contractor how his work is to be done, nor is the 
architect responsible for the manner in which the contractor does the work. What his 
supervisory duty does require of him is to follow the progress of the work and. to take 
steps to see that those words comply with the general requirements of the contract in 
specification and quality. If he should fail to exercise his professional care and 
skill in this respect, he would be liable to his employer-for any damage attributable 
to that failure. 
Sutcliffe Y. Chippendale & Edmondson (1971) 18 Building Law Reports 149 at 162. 
87 Clause 1.33 Standard Conditions of Engagement (London: RIBA Publications). 
88 Clause 1.34 of the Conditions of Engagement, ibid., stipulates that the architect is "not 
responsible for the contractor's operational methods ... nor for any failure by the contractor to carry 
out the work in accordance with the building contract". 
89 See Khan, "Standard of Proof in Professional Negligence", supra, note 81. 
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may be easier to articulate than to institutionalise. 
Moreover, as has been recognised in the courts, the formal 
separation between architects' and gc. s' responsibilities may 
require modification if a competent architect would- have 
reason to doubt the good faith or proficiency of a gc90. 
It is also possible to develop an intuitive sense of 
differences between the duties of architects and Clerks of 
Works based on industry understandings of their respective 
roles in building production91. For example, one might derive 
from the expectation that CW. s attend the site on a daily 
basis, and liaise with gc. s' representatives on production 
matters, a norm that CW. s should monitor on-going compliance 
on matters of detail. Architects, by contrast, would be 
expected to ensure that the building as a whole conforms to 
decisions which were made during planning92. 
90 For example, In Sutcliffe v. Chippendale & Edmondson, supra, note 86, Judge Stabb OC maintained 
that: 
[Tlhe degree of supervision required of an architect must be governed to some extent 
by his confidence in the contractor. If and when something occurs which should 
indicate to him a lack of competence in the contractor, then, in the interest of his 
employer, the standard of supervision should be higher. 
at 162. 
91 
See, for example, Kensington & Chelsea & Westminster Area Health Authority V. Wettern 
Composites and Others (1984) 1 Construction Law Reports 114. 
92 See, for example, Saunders v. Broadstairs Local Board (1890) Hudson's Building Contracts 4th 
ed. vol 2 at 164; Leicester Board of Guardians v. Trot lope (1911) JP 197 (Hudson's Building Contracts 
4th ed. vol 2 419. In the course of his judgment in the latter case, Channell J. commented that: 
Everybody knows that an architect cannot be there all the time, and everybody knows 
that the clerk of the works is appointed to protect the interests of the employwer 
against the builder, mainly because the architect cannot be there.. -.. ITlhere is no 
difficulty in seeing what are the respective functions and duties of an architect 
and of a clerk of the works ... the clerk of the works has to see to matters of 
detail, ... the architect is not expected to do so ... the architect is responsible 
to see that his design is carried out. That fairly indicates what the respective 
duties of each are, but it leaves one in each case to say whether the matter 
complained of is a matter of detail or a matter of seeing whether the design is 
complied with. 
Hudson, at 423. See also, Kensington & Chelsea Area Health Authority v. Wettern Composites, supra, note 
91. 
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Once again, however, this type of formulaic separation 
between the supervisory responsibilities of different 
participants generates classification problems. Enforcement 
of such transactional norms entails costly and potentially 
error-prone decisions as to whether a particular defect is due 
to failure to observe a matter of detail or inadequate 
monitoring of compliance with the building concept. 
The difficulties entailed in defining supervisory duties 
in a manner which is sufficiently distinct that the 
performances of each supervisor can be separately evaluated, 
and, where necessary, sanctioned, illustrates the larger 
issues of apportionment and accountability raised by 
contractual enforcement within building production93. The use 
of a damages remedy to sanction a supervisor for failing to 
provide the appropriate quality of monitoring services 
automatically reduces the weight of the sanction against the 
building producer who supplies, defective inputs94. Similarly, 
a finding that both architect and. Clerk of Works are 
implicated in a failure to detect defective inputs results in 
93 Sum 
94 For example, in Kensington & Chelsea Area Health Authority v. Wettern Composites, supra, note 
91, serious defects in the production of a hospital meant that the building owners had to spend L250 
000 on repairs. In its original form the action was against the sub-contractors (Wettern) who installed 
the defective components, and the manufacturers of the defective product, as well as the architect, 
(for inadequate supervision) and structural engineers (for design failures). By the time that the issue 
came to trial, the sub-contractors had gone into liquidation, and the action against the manufacturers 
had been dropped. The building owners claimed the entire cost of repairing the defects from the 
building professionals. Official Referee David Smout QC., exonerated the structural engineers, but held 
that the firm of architects was presumptively-liable for the full cost of repair on the grounds that 
they had failed adequately to supervise production. However, on the facts of the case, the architects' 
liability was limited to 80% of the cost of repairs because the judge believed that the Clerk of Works 
must also have failed to execute his supervisory obligations properly. As the Clerk of Works could not 
be found, the effect of the judge's decision on apportionment was to allocate 20% of the loss to the 
subsequent owner of the building. 
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neither participant incurring 100% of the sanctions. 
3. "Conforming" Defects 
JCT80 attempts to structure liability for "conforming 
defects" in line with the functional separation between design 
and production created by the Contracting System. Architects 
are accountable to clients for the costs of repair engendered 
by failures in the building concept. Similarly, the architect 
is responsible where the design, though functional, does not 
meet those clients' needs that were communcated during 
planning. By contrast, the express contractual duties of the 
gc are confined 'to execution of the Works in compliance with 
design decisions, the Bill of Quantities and Architects' 
IInstructions 96. 
Once again, however, the idea of sharp divisions between 
the transactional tasks of different participants sits 
uneasily with the polycentricity of building transactions. 
Enforcement problems arise because architects are not -the only 
participants who supply design services97. In addition,, gc. s' 
expertise in building production, raises the question of their 
accountability for defects in designs or in components 
materials which were specified in the Bill of-Quantities. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Clause 2.1, clause 4.1. 
97 Supra, chapter VI. 
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These issues are further complicated' by the role of 
nominated participants in building.. transactions. We have seen 
that packages of inputs supplied by this class of participants 
may include design, selection of materials and assembly 
services98. The inclusive nature of specialists' services 
promotes discrete allocations of responsibility for distinct 
segments of the building, but conflicts with conventional 
divisions between designers and producers 99 . 
Within the JCT's contracts, this dilemma was 
traditionally managed by . 
the strategy of channelling all 
sanctions against nominated participants through the agency 
of the gc10°. Interestingly, the problem of the under-inclusive 
nature of gc. s' duties to clients (that is, the fact that gc. s 
do not have design duties) was overcome by the willingness of 
judges to imply warranties of quality into the main 
contract101. Once gc. s' performances were held to be governed 
by norms of fitness and merchantability, clients' power to 
bring an action which would eventually result in sanctions 
against a nominated participant was greatly enhanced 102 
Clients were able to obtain remedies where the design or 
selection choices of specialists proved to be unsuitable, 
98 Supra, chapter VI. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Young & Marten Ltd. v. McManus Childs Ltd., supra, note 31; see also, Test Valley Borough 
Council v. Greater London Council (1979) 13 Building Law Reports 63; Independent Broadcasting Authority 
V. EMI Electronics Ltd. and BICC Construction Ltd. (1980) 14 Building Law Reports 1; Holland. Hannen 
& Cubitt (Northern) Ltd. v. Welsh Health Technical Services Organisation (1981) 18 Building Law Reports 
80. 
102 Ibid. 
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defective or inadequate. While the initial action would be 
brought against the gc, it typically functioned only as' a 
procedural device. Damages paid by a gc to a client would be 
recoverable by the gc in an action against the specialist. 
On the other hand, the use of cost-pass-through, in 
general, was undermined by judicial concerns over the 
potentially over-inclusive nature of gc. s' obligations for the 
performances of participants nominated by clients103. Under 
JCT80 the problem of sanctioning nominated sub-contractors for 
design failures has now been addressed by the introduction of 
a direct collateral warranty between client and specialist104. 
With respect to plans produced by other design 
consultants, the architect remains presumptively accountable 
to the client105. This working rule is quite extensive in that 
it governs the design of building components where the 
architect is not involved in production of the plans, and has 
no specialist knowledge106. The, scope of the duty is perhaps 
best understood in terms of the architect's role as adviser 
103 Supra, see also, chapter VI. 
104 Nominated sub-contractors are now directly accountable to clients for design failures which 
reflect professional incompetence: clause 2.1 NSC/2, infra. 
105 Moresk Cleaners v. Hicks (19661 2 Lloyd's Report 338 (note that the designer in this case was 
described in the pleadings as a nominated sub-contractor); see also, Richard Robert Holdings Limited 
v. Douglas Smith Stimson Partnership (1989) Construction Law Journal 223. Donald Keating suggests that 
the architect's responsibility is limited to ensuring that the client has an effective contractual 
remedy against a person to whom responsibility for design has been transferred: Keating, Building 
Contracts (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1978). By contrast, Hudson's Building and Engineering Contracts 
(edited by Ian Duncan Wallace) justifies the extent of the architect's duty by reference to formal 
limitations on the power to delegate legal responsibility for the task of design. That is to say, while 
the architect may legitimately ask someone else to design part of the building, she cannot, within the 
scope of the retainer, divest herself of responsibility for incompetence (or opportunism) in the 
execution of the task: Hudson's Building and Engineering Contracts (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1970) 
(10th ed. ). 
106 Richard Robert Holdings Limited v. Douglas Smith Stimson Partnership, supra, note 105. 
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to the client. That is to say, architects who lack expertise 
in the-design of particular building components may yet be 
expected to inform themselves -to 
the extent necessary to make 
a reliable judgment as to suitability, and advise clients 
accordingly107. Where the costs of acquiring relevant knowledge 
are excessive, (as assessed against the terms of the contract 
between architect and client), an architect may always protect 
herself by informing the client of her inability to evaluate 
the work of a specialist designer108. 
With respect to gc. s' accountability for conforming 
defects, the governing legal culture within which JCT80 is 
situated extends the sanctioning power of clients in two ways. 
First, the statutory conditions regulating the quality of 
goods and services govern gc. s' "personal" liability under 
building contracts as well as their procedural role109. In 
addition to 'exact compliance with the planning choices 
expressed in the Contract documents, therefore, gc. s are 
accountable for the "merchantability"_ of material inputs110, 
and for ensuring that building work is carried out with 
"reasonable care and skill"111. 
Secondly, a gc may be expected actively to intervene if 
107 Ibid. . 108 Ibid. 
109 See, generally, Michael Regan "Fitness, Duality and Skill and Care" (1987) 3 Construction Law 
Journal 241. 
110 Young & Marten Ltd. v. McManus Childs, supra, note 31; see also, s. 4 Supply of. Goods and 
Services Act 1982. 
111 Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, s. 13. 
513 
it believes that designs are defective or the materials 
specified. in the Contract Documents are not fit for the 
purposes of the building. This duty requires that the gc alert 
the architect, in the latter's capacity as agent to the 
client, to actual or potential problems in using the 
particular design or product for the purposes of the 
construction project112. As originally conceived, the duty to 
warn was based on recognition of gc. s' expertise in building 
production, and the obligation took the form of a contractual 
duty of care to be implied into the transaction between client 
and gc113. This approach may have been undermined by recent 
decisions restricting the use of negligence norms to plug 
contractual gaps114. However, as an alternative route to the 
same end, clients may be able to rely on the implied 
*conditions of the Supply of Goods and Services Act115. Duties 
to use reasonable skill and care in the execution of a 
building contract may be viewed as encompassing-an obligation 
to warn where a competent gc would have realised that there 
might be design or specification defects. 
Whether gc. s are also accountable to the client for 
breach of statutory standards governing building production 
112 
Equitable Debenture Assets Corporation v. William Moss and Others (1984) 2 Construction Law 
Reports 1; Victoria University of Manchester v. Hugh Wilson & Lewis Womerstey and Pochin (Contractors) 
Ltd. (1984) 2 Construction Law Reports 43. 
113 
Supra, chapter VII. 
114 
Supra; see also, Glasgow University v. Whitfield (1989) 5 Construction Law Journal 73; 
Nicholls "Contractors' `Duty to Warn, following D. & F. Estates and University of Glasgow v. 
Whitfield", supra, note 43. 
115 
As these default norms are implied by operation of law, they are insulated against judicial 
reluctance actively to plug contractual gaps with affirmative duties: supra. 
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is a contentious issue. Writing in- 1985, John Parris argued 
that while the JCT has attempted to shelter the gc from 
contractual liability for inputs which conform to the 
architect's designs but do not comply with statutory 
standards, clause 6.1.5 is ineffective to limit the 
accountability of gc. s under tortious theories of recovery116. 
Two such theories are available. It might be argued that a gc 
should be liable in negligence where a competent gc ought to 
have realised that compliance with the architect's designs 
would result in a building which failed to meet statutory 
standards. Alternatively, a building producer's failure to 
comply with statutory requirements might ground an action for 
breach of statutory duty without proof of fault. 
These arguments may be consistent with an objective of 
'increasing the weight of sanctions available against those 
implicated in production of a defective building. However, 
they are difficult to sustain in the light of legislative 
provisions governing enforcement of statutory standards and 
contemporary. judicial trends. The breach of statutory duty 
theory has had, at best, a tenuous status in the development 
of building control. The traditional governing framework for 
public regulation of building quality - the Public Health Acts 
- made no provision for civil liability117. During the early 
116 John Parris, The Standard Form of Building contract: JCT80, (London: Collins, 1985). 
117 Until 1966 the regulatory instrument used to implement building control was the local building 
bylaw. Since 1966 control has been based on the standards developed by central government in the form 
of the Building Regulations. 
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1980's, it briefly appeared as if the decision in Anns118 had 
opened-up-the possibility of actions for breach of statutory 
duty against building producers or professionals119. Subsequent 
decisions, however, have rejected this approach. In Worlock 
v. SAWS120, for example, Woolf J. declined to adopt the theory 
of liability suggested in Anns on the grounds that: 
It seems ... very difficult to accept that ... the 
plaintiff could establish an absolute duty against 
a builder by virtue of statute when the contract 
under which the building work was performed was one 
which created no such obligation 12T 
C. Time 
1. The Nature of the Contractual Sanctions 
JCT80 relies primarily on contract-specific financial 
sanctions to protect clients' interests in timely completion 
of a building project122. The Conditions empower clients to 
deduct or demand payment of agreed damages for unexcused delay 
in completion123. In addition, each of the 'alterpative 
118 Supra, note 44. 
119 See, for example, Eames London Estates v. North Hertfordshire District Council and others 
((1980) 18 Building Law Reports 50. 
120 (1981) 20 Building Law Reports 94. 
121 Ibid. at at 109; see also Taylor Woodrow Construction (Midlands) Ltd v. Charcon Structures 
Ltd. (1982) 266 EG 40; Perry V. Tendring District Council (1985) 3 Construction Law Reports 74. Note 
that the Building Act 1984 which introduces a new statutory regime governing supervision of 
construction projects to ensure compliance with the Building Regulations, expressly provides for civil 
liability: s. 38. 
122 Note that clients may, as a last resort, terminate the contract: clause 27. 
123 Clause 24.2. 
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provisions for managing cost fluctuations freeze clients" 
obligations to assume part of any increase in input costs'on 
the Completion Date124. Failure to complete on time, therefore, 
shifts to gc. s the entire burden of inflation. Finally, the 
Conditions authorise clients to deduct an agreed percentage 
of the sum due on each instalment from the payment certified 
by the architect125. As the Retention is not released until 
after the building is fit for occupation, it provides an 
additional inducement to timely completion. 
Administration of these sanctions is handled by the 
architect. The client's right to deduct the agreed sum arises 
only when the architect certifies that the gc has failed to 
complete the Works by the existing Completion Date 126 
Similarly, the client's obligation to pay for increases in 
input costs is fixed at the rates current when the architect 
certifies that production ought to have been completed127. The 
architect is not directly involved in establishing the bonding 
mechanism of the Retention fund, in that the percentage sum 
which is to be withheld from interim payments is agreed 
between client and gc during planning. However, release of the 
Retention to the gc is expressly made conditional on 
certificates issued by the architect. 128 
124 Clause 38, clause 39, clause 40. 
125 Clause 30.4. 
126 Clause 24.2. 
127 Clause 38.4.7; clause 39.5.7; clause 40.7.1.1. 
128 Clause 30.4. 
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The agreed damages sanction may be viewed as a means for 
the building producers to control exposure to risk and d-a 
mechanism by which clients may enforce time constraints. 
Access to this sanction enables clients to avoid the costs, 
uncertainties and potential errors of adjudicative 
processes129. This alternative to the ordinary damages award is 
particularly significant in the light of the assessment 
problems which attend breaches of time provisibns130. Losses 
due to delay are unusually difficult to measure. Clients face 
incentives to adapt themselves to the progress of the project. 
They may, for example, occupy those parts of the building 
which are useable, and simply endure the stress and 
inconvenience of continuing building operations. Although such 
costs are genuine, potentially substantial, and attributable 
to breach by building producers, they are difficult to recover 
in an action for damages. For public clients in particular the 
losses may be even less concrete. The unavailability of a new 
public facility at the time originally envisaged may cause 
widespread inconvenience, and dissatisfaction, but the costs 
to those who were to have used the facility, are neither 
sufficiently definite, nor adequately connected to the breach 
to be recoverable. 
Even in those instances where clients are able to show- 
that late completion resulted in specific economic losses 
129 Justin Sweet "Liquidated Damages in California" (1972) 60 California Law Review 84. 
130 Temloc v. Errill (1988) 4 Construction Law Journal 63. 
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which would not have been incurred had the building been 
finished on time, the costs of invoking the general damages 
remedy against a recalcitrant. gc may be prohibitive. There is 
always the possibility that the gc will dispute liability, 
rendering legal action more complex, time-consuming and 
costly. Losses resulting from breach of time obligations are 
also vulnerable to disqualification by the operation of the 
remoteness doctrines. 
Limitations on clients' power to sanction producers for 
failure to meet a production deadline, whatever their source, 
may feed back into governance of the production process. Gc. s, 
and other producers, who know that the costs to clients of 
penalising delay may be prohibitive, are in a relatively 
stronger position to chisel on time margins, than if clients, 
'access to a sanction against delay were more straightforward. 
In terms of governance of complex transactions, therefore, 
agreed damages provisions may be viewed as an attempt to 
furnish clients with a weapon by which credibly to threaten 
to impose costs on breach131. 
The power of such a threat, and hence, its credibility, 
however, is shaped by public rules which govern the use of 
agreed damages clauses. Within building transactions., judicial 
policing of agreed damages. clauses may appear in two normative- 
guises. First, the sanction may be challenged on the grounds 
that it should not be invoked in the circumstances that have 
131 Supra, chapter IV. 
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arisen. In this context the judicial role- involves "gap- 
filling" and decisions about risk-allocation. Secondly, judges 
are empowered to review agreed damages clauses by reference 
to a norm of "reasonableness". 
2. Risk-Allocation 
In the context of time margins, judicial gap-filling 
occurs "in the shadow of" the transactional provisions for 
managing disruptions. As we have seen JCT80 affords the gc a 
contractual right to an extension of time if its progress is 
impeded by events for which the client has assumed all or part 
of the risk132. With respect to these contingencies, therefore, 
clients' power to use the contractual sanction against late 
completion depends on the adjustment machinery having been 
properly administered. Where the architect has failed to grant 
an appropriate extension, clients face the risk that gc. s' 
will resist an attempt to apply the sanction on the grounds 
that their performance is no longer governed by the time 
constraint133. While such a challenge by a gc, if legitimate, 
would not necessarily destroy clients' power subsequently to 
insist on a reasonable completion date, it would have the 
potentially significant effect of eliminating clients' access 
132 Supra, chapter Vill. 
133 Holme v. Gp (1838) 3 M. & W. 387; Wells v. Army & Navy Co-operative Society (1902) 86 Law 
Times 764. 
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to liquidated damages 134 
Careful administration of the extension of time machinery 
is particularly important to the protection of clients' 
interests in timely completion because delay is seldom 
attributable to a single cause that is entirely at the risk 
of the gc. The consequences of dilatory performance by a gc, 
may be compounded by factors such as the architect's failure 
to issue instructions on time, or delay by a nominated 
participant. In such instances, preservation of clients' 
access to the sanction depends on the architect having 
adequately protected the gc's contractual rights not to be 
impeded by the client, or any person or event for which the 
client is accountable to the gc. 
Clients face a similar risk of being denied access to the 
contractual sanction when the contingency which hampers 
progress is not included in the list of "Relevant Events". Two 
contradictory strands appear in judicial decisions about the 
implications of contractual silences for clients' access to 
liquidated damages. One approach uses norms of contractual 
interpretation drawn from the assumption that standard form 
building contracts are contracts of adhesion designed by, and 
in the interests of,, the dominant party, here assumed to be 
clients. The alternative approach is shaped by-the traditional 
conception of building transactions as "entire" contracts 
under which gc. s assume the risks of all contingencies except 
134 Ibid. 
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for acts or ommissions of the client. 
The . former perspective 
has been used to justify 
withholding from clients the -legal power- 
to use the agreed 
danages sanction where the building contract is silent or its 
provisions governing the contingency causing delay are 
ambiguous135. It is thought that the scope of both the 
extension of time machinery and the sanction ought to be 
construed strictly against clients because these terms are 
inserted solely for their protection136. At least part of the 
risk of any contingency which is neither "obviously" the fault 
of the gc, nor expressly allocated to the gc, therefore, is 
assumed to have been allocated to the client137. 
Notice, however, the subtlety of this particular default 
norm - and the manner in which it shifts control over the 
*sanctions against delay from participants to courts. The only 
consequence which is said to follow automatically from a 
finding that the risk of a particular event-had not been 
assumed by a building producer is that clients lose the 
135 See, for example, Peak Construction (Liverpool) Ltd v. McKinney Foundations Ltd. (1970) 1 
Building Law Reports 111, see, in particular, the reasons of Salmon LJ. He asserts that: 
The liquidated damages and extension of time clauses in printed forms of contract 
must be construed strictly contra proferentem. If the employer wishes to recover 
liquidated damages for failure by the contractors to complete on time in spite of the 
fact that some of the delay is due to the employers' own fault or breach of contract, 
then the extension of time clause should provide, expressly or by necessary inference, 
for an extension on account of such a fault or breach on the part of the employer. 
See also, Bramall & Ogden Ltd v. Sheffield City Council (1983) (1985) 1 Construction Law Reports 30; 
and Bruno Zornow (Builders) Ltd. V. Beechcroft Developments Ltd. (1989) (1990) 6 Construction Law 
Journal 132. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. 
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contractual power to deduct or demand liquidated damages U8 . 
Clients may still use the ordinary unliquidated damages remedy 
to obtain compensation, if it is shown that among the. causes 
of delay there is 'an event of which the risk had -been 
allocated to the gc139. 
The view that the gc assumes all risks except for 
obstruction by the client, or where the contract provides 
otherwise, has quite different implications from the 
perspective shaped by the contra proferentem rule. While the 
extension of time machinery is again viewed as a means of 
protecting clients from the consequences of their own 
defaults, this result is. not in itself seen as "harsh" or a 
manifestation of the dominance of clients' interests in the 
private rules of the bargain140. The agreed damages clause is 
treated as serving the interests of both client and gc. 
Whereas clients' benefit lies in the ease with which delay may 
be sanctioned, gc. s are perceived to gain from-the certainty 
and manageability of their exposure to liability for breach141. 
This conception of the agreed damages clause as a benefit 
to client and gc underlies the position that formulation of 
a default norm to govern contingencies where the contract is 
138 Peak Construction (Liverpool) Ltd'v. McKinney Foundations Ltd, supra, note 135; Braman & 
Ogden Ltd v. Sheffield City Council, supra, note 135. 
139 Ibid. 
140 See, for example, Percy Bitton Ltd. 'v. Greater London Council (1981) 79 Local Government 
Reports 463; E. Turner and Sons Limited v. Mathind Limited (1989) 5 Construction Law Journal 273. See, 
generally, Terence M. Burke "Delay Under Australian Law" in Peter Gauch & Justin Sweet (eds. ) Selected 
Problems of Construction Law: International Approach (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1983). 
141 Ibid. 
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silent or ambiguous is distinct from the issue of clients' 
access_to. a sanction. Default norms are to be determined by 
reference to the premise that the gc is responsible for- timely 
completion except where delay is due to an event for which the 
client is contractually accountable142. With respect to the 
former class of contingencies, clients may obviously use the 
agreed damages sanction. Where, on the other hand, the gc's 
progress is impeded by the client, the power to insist upon 
timely completion and use the contractual sanction may be 
preserved by appropriate use of the extension of time 
machinery. 
3. Reasonableness 
The contradictory dimensions of courts' power to review 
liquidated damages clauses for reasonableness are particularly 
evident in the context of building contracts. One important 
objective of the sanction within these transactions is to 
discipline the gc and its input suppliers. The agreed damages 
clause, "held over the contractor at every turn, like an 
electric prodding iron"143, is intended to penalise opportunism 
and cheating on time margins. It is supposed to function, in 
part, to drive the gc to perform in accordance with the 
142 Ibid. 
143 Burke "Delay Under Australian Lau,,, supra, note 140 at 37. 
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contract144. However the declared purpose of the courts' power 
to review such clauses is precisely to prevent the terms being 
used in a manner that would -"penalise" breach or "compel" 
performance 145. _ 
At the heart of the conflict between courts' concerns and 
the -transactional objectives of agreed damages clauses are 
competing classical and relational visions of contractual 
sanctions. A crucial assumption of the former model is that 
transactors act in a competitive context. Markets are assumed 
ready and able to supply workable substitutes for the 
performance of a breaching party. It should then be a matter 
of indifference to the non-breacher whether she receives 
actual performance from her co-contractor, or compensation 
sufficient to enable her to obtain a substitute good or 
service. Viewed from this perspective, the primary and 
legitimate objectives of a liquidated damages clause are to 
enable the promisee to avoid the proof and error costs of the 
judicial process and the promisor to control exposure to 
risk146. 
Evidence that the parties settled on a genuinely super- 
compensatory damages sum suggests that there was something 
amiss in the bargaining process. Inadequate information 
interchange at formation,. for example,. might have misled the 
144 Ibid. 
145. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. V. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. (1915] AC 79. 
146 Sweet, "Liquidated Damages in California", supra, note 129; Kenneth W. Clarkson, Roger L. 
Miller & Timothy J. Muris, "Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense" 1978 Wisconsin Law 
Review 351. 
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promisor about the risks which it was assuming. Alternatively, 
both parties might have been mistaken about the implications 
of the contract, 
. 
the likely magnitude of loss, or the 
probability of the event which caused loss147. Intervention by 
courts in such transactions serves as a means of limiting what 
is perceived to be the unjustifed, and perhaps, inadvertent, 
contractual power of the promisee resulting from problems 
during formation 148 
By contrast, building transactions are typically situated 
in a very different economic environment. The quasi-rents 
which attach to performance by a specific gc may be such that 
clients cannot simply find a substitute without losing some 
of their investment in the transaction149. This context 
generates relations of power in which the client is at a 
disadvantage. Opportunistic producers may exploit their 
relative contractual power by cheating on time margins, or 
threatening to delay progress unless the contract is revised 
in their favour. Whichever strategy is deployed, its effect 
is to reduce the value of the transactional surplus due to a 
client. 
The position of clients within building transactions 
suggests that they are relatively powerless to counter 
147 Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott "Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation 
Principle: Some notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach" (1977) 77 Columbia 
Law Review 554. Sam Rea jr., "Non-Pecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract" (1982) 11 Journal of Legal 
Studies 35. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Supra, chapter IV. 
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opportunistic breaches of time constraints. While blatant 
cheating on time margins may be easier to observe than 
careless work or poor quality materials, it is difficult to 
counter. That producers have so much control over the pace of 
production suggests that an apparently excessive financial 
sanction may play an important role in enhancing clients' 
transactional security. 
At the simplest level, such a sanction would increase'the 
costs to gc. s (and other building producers) of tardy 
completion. This change in. the relative price of cheating on 
time constraints would in itself be likely to result in less 
opportunism than if the sanction were not "excessive". 
Moreover, a heavy penalty would equip clients with a more 
credible basis for resisting gc. s' threats . to delay 
production. Finally, a working rule which enabled parties to 
agree to apparently "penal" damages would afford gc. s' a means 
of signalling commitment and good faith at the beginning of 
a transaction. The enforceability of penalty clauses, 
therefore, might facilitate pre-contractual screening by 
clients 150 
One general objection to this argument is that an 
"excessive" penalty would afford clients "too much" power. Of 
particular concern is the fear that in transactions where the 
agreed damages sum is greater than the loss from breach, 
clients might opportunistically attempt to induce delay in 
150 See generally, supra, chapter IV; see also, chapter VII, supra. 
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order to reap the. benef its of the clause151. As there is no 
reason to prefer opportunistic .. clients to opportunistic 
producers, the argument continues, we should avoid working 
rules which might provide a site for strategic behaviour. 
That the decisions and actions of clients, or perhaps 
more commonly, those for whom clients are contractually 
accountable to building producers, may impede gc. s' progress 
is undeniable. However, the working rules of JCT80 
considerably limit the scope for clients to gain from 
opportunistic inducement.. of delay. Clients lose the 
contractual power to invoke the sanction where the gc's 
"breach" - that is, the delay - is attributable to any matter 
for which the client has assumed the risk, unless, of course, 
the gc has been granted an extension of time. If the gc 
receives such an extension it is not required to pay 
liquidated damages for its failure to meet the previous 
completion date. 
While the extension of time machinery does not absolutely 
secure the position of the gc against opportunism, 
particularly on the part of the architect152, it makes it 
unlikely that clients would perceive significant benefits from 
inducing delay. It appears therefore, that the shift in 
transactional power which would be created by acceptance of 
penalty clauses would enable clients better to resist or 
151 Clarkson, Miller & Muris, "Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense", supra, note 
146. 
152 Supra, chapter VIII. 
528 
discipline opportunistic producers without opening up 
substantial scope for reverse opportunism. 
D. Sanctions Against Nominated Building Producers 
The 1980 edition of the standard form contract has 
strengthened the machinery of enforcement with respect to 
specialist input suppliers. The approach which has been chosen 
entails three main changes from previous versions of the 
standard form contract. First, the JCT has reinforced formal 
distinctions between nominated suppliers and nominated sub- 
contractors. Secondly, the nomination procedures have been 
reshaped to clarify the procedural function of the gc as a 
liability channel. Finally, clients now have a direct 
contractual route to sanctions -against a 
nominated sub- 
contractor for those aspects of nsc. s' activities which do not 
fall within the JCT's definition of the role of the gc under 
the main contract. 
With respect to nominated suppliers, JCT80 has maintained 
the cost-pass-through machinery but addressed the problem of 
potentially inconsistent contracts. Clause 36 introduces two 
strategies for avoiding inconsistency. Under the first option, 
the architect's power to nominate is restricted to those 
suppliers who will undertake to indemnify the gc against 
liability to the client153. Alternatively, if the only terms on 
153 Clause 36.4 
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which a preferred nominee is willing to participate in the 
transaction entail limitations on its liability to the gc, the 
architect may invoke the provisions of clause 36.5. This 
working rule empowers the architect to nominate someone who 
will supply only on restrictive terms, so long as the 
architect obtains the gc's express consent154. Once the sales 
contract has been executed, the accountability of the gc, 
under the terms of the main contract, for inputs supplied by 
the nominee, is automatically restricted to the same extent 
as the supplier's liability to the gc. 
In the case of nominated sub-contractors, there are two 
mutually exclusive routes to the. imposition of sanctions 
against chiselling on time and quality margins. For those 
aspects of nsc. s' role in building production which involve 
the same type of inputs as are supplied by gc. s, sanctions are 
still to be channelled through the gc. With respect to the 
supply of design, selection, advisory or manufacturing 
services and the "impact" costs of chiselling by a nsc, the 
client may now rely on an integrated collateral contract 155 
The collateral contract empowers clients to enforce 
nsc. s' residual liabilities by means of a direct contractual 
sanction. The contract is to be executed during the nomination 
process and incorporates three main classes of obligations. 
First, the nominee undertakes to exercise reasonable skill and 
154 See chapter VII, supra, for discussion of the gc's veto power. 
155 NSC/2 or NSC/ 2a, depending on the method of nomination that is adopted: supra, chapter VIII. 
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care in design, selection of-materials and satisfaction of 
performance specifications156. Secondly, there is an express 
undertaking that the nsc will not cause delay to the gc's 
progress on the project157. Finally, the nsc is accountable for 
losses to the client-which arise where inadequate performance 
by a nsc, or its withdrawal from the transaction during 
execution, makes it necessary for the architect to re- 
nominate158. 
The collateral contract is clearly a response to the 
accountability problems which have thwarted attempts to use 
the cost-pass-through machinery as a means of disciplining 
nsc. s. The contract clarifies the responsibilities of nsc. s 
and facilitates clients' access to sanctions. A further 
governance benefit associated with this strategy lies in the 
relative ease with which working rules of the transaction 
between client and nsc may be modified. Whether one is 
concerned with JCT-driven changes to the standard terms or 
transaction-specific adaptations, the existence of a distinct 
contract governing relations between clients and nsc. s would 
seem to reduce the need for other participants to be actively 
involved in revisions. 
However, the benefits of moving towards separate 
156 Clause 2.1 NSC/2. 
157 Clause 3.4 NSC/2. In theory at least, the sanction available to clients for breach of this 
term would be agreed damages that the client could have deducted from the gc absent the extension of 
time. The primary issue that might arise relates to whether the nsc had notice at the time of 
appointment of the amount and rate of the liquidated damages clause in the main contract. 
158 Clause 6 NSC/2. See chapter VIII, supra. 
531 
contracts to govern a polycentric process such as building 
production should not be exaggerated. One important problem 
which may arise is the issue of transactional "fit". Under 
JCT80 the nexus between client, gc and nsc is now governed by 
three distinct but integrated packages of working rules: the 
main contract (client and gc), the sub-contract (gc and nsc), 
and the collateral warranty (client and nsc). That the JCT is 
the drafting agency for each form might suggest that there is 
no need to worry about consistency and coherence. However, the 
reality of the process within which the standard contracts 
are formulated means that discrepancies, contradictions and 
ambiguities between the different documents are likely to 
arise. 
Take, for example, the issue of nsc. s' accountability for 
compliance with contractual specifications. Both the main 
contract and the standard form of sub-contract use the 
performance norm of exact compliance with the documents on 
which the, producer tendered159. Under cost-pass-through, 
therefore, the contractual regime would afford the client an 
action against the gc, and the gc an action against the nsc 
for any deviations from the specification governing the Sub- 
Contract Works. The collateral contract between client and 
nsc, by contrast, institutes a lower standard of performance 
in that nsc. s undertake only to exercise "reasonable skill and 
care ... in the satisfaction of any performance 
159 Clause 2.1 main form, Article 1, NSC/4. 
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specification"160. Clients who seek to hold nsc. s directly 
accountable under the collateral warranty for deviations from 
the specification, therefore, may be met with the defence that 
the nsc's performance conformed to the contractual standard 
of care. 
At a theoretical level, it is not difficult to imagine 
how the discrepancy between these working rules might be 
addressed in a manner which furthers a transactional goal of 
accountability. It is important to recognise, however, that 
there may be practical obstacles to implementation of this 
goal. A change to the working rules of the collateral contract 
from the negligence standard to a governing norm embodying 
strict compliance would presumably be resisted by the same 
industry interests which obtained the lower standard in the 
first place. Nor does it seem possible for courts to take the 
initiative. Change might potentially be achieved if judges 
were to institutionalise a practice of giving priority to the 
strict liability norm of the cost-pass-through mechanism over 
the negligence standard of the collateral contract. However, 
such a practice would appear to be completely antithetical to 
the classical ideas of discreteness, party-autonomy, and 
respect for the express terms governing economic. relations 
between individuals, which seem to have. such a tenacious hold 
on contemporary judicial decision-making. 
160 Clause 2.1.3 NSC/2. 
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E. The-Transactional Implications of Legal Sanctions and the 
Contracting Continuum - 
Our analysis of formal enforcement instruments has 
demonstrated that there are tensions between crucial 
characteristics of the process governed by JCT80 and the model 
of economic relationships embedded in the institutional 
culture of legal sanctions. Building production is 
polycentric. Relations between participants are complex and 
interactive. As in the case of "firm-like" transactions, it 
may be difficult, if not impossible, clearly to separate the 
contributions of different participants to the final 
product 161 
Legal sanctions, by contrast, are predicated on 
assumptions of discreteness. The model transaction embodies 
obligations that are sharply defined, tasks which are 
expressed in a measurable form, and explicit allocations of 
risks. Above all else, the governing legal culture. demands 
divisions between the transactional roles of contractors and 
separability of their outputs. 
The opposition between the production needs of=mutuality 
and fusion and the legal-cultural requirements of 
distinctiveness that is so evident in building transactions 
has complicated implications for governance. On the one hand 
161 Supra, chapter V. 
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the interdependent character of "building production may 
engender potentially serious costs in maintaining the 
accountability of producers and professionals for the quality 
of inputs which they supply. Armed with the knowledge that it 
is costly for clients to monitor each participant to ensure 
compliance with transactional understandings, opportunistic 
individuals are well-placed to cheat or engage in other forms 
of strategic behaviour. 
This contractual power-dynamic suggests that any strategy 
which might increase the measurability of producers' and 
professionals' decisions and activities during production 
would help to limit the scope for opportunism. That law 
promises access to a particular class of sanctions where tasks 
are discretely defined, risks are clearly allocated, and 
execution is measurable, would seem, therefore, to afford 
clients a means to obtain more protection against opportunism 
than would available "outwith". the shadow of the law. 
However, as this chapter has shown, accommodation of the 
building transaction to the institutional structure of law is 
far from transaction costless. Nor are legal sanctions, when 
deployed in this context, necessarily able to deliver on their 
promise of greater accountability. At the simplest level, the 
moulding of the building contract into. the form required by 
law entails the costs of spelling out tasks, procedures and 
allocations of risks. While this process may have the 
beneficial effect of facilitating planning and pricing for 
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those who would use the contract, it may also generate subtle 
governance costs. 
For example, a high degree of detail in the explicit 
working rules of long-term, polycentric transactions will, tend 
to increase the complexity of decision-making and management 
procedures. Specificity, within such transactions, is not just 
a matter of spelling out who does what, where, when and how, 
but also entails the development of formal procedures for co- 
ordinating the tasks and decision-making responsibilities 
assigned to different participants. Of course, transactional 
connections between individuals would need to made whatever 
the form of the governing framework. However, the 
institutional setting within which tasks are organised and 
change is accommodated shapes the costs of this management 
. process. Relational understandings, discretionary norms, and 
practices of' compromise constitute a different and less 
overtly complex institutional, setting to that created by 
formal administrative and supervisory procedures which are 
amenable to legal sanctions. 
Nor is complexity the only issue. There is. a real 
question as to whether the model of contracting embedded in 
legal sanctions is capable of governing the process of 
building production. We saw in chapter. IV, for example, that 
participants in relational transactions may develop informal 
methods of operation which bear little relationship to the 
governing legal culture. Indeed the formal working rules of 
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the parties' contract and the governing legal culture of which 
the contract is a part, may be of scant interest or relevance 
until a disruptive event causes a shock to the -working 
relationship. The role of legal sanctions in such situations 
is highly ambiguous. Far from functioning as a means of 
channelling conduct into commercially appropriate behaviour, 
law may constitute an instrument of contractual power. Resort 
to a formal contractual regime which has been tacitly 
discarded, therefore, may in itself be a strategic move and 
a manifestation of transactional dominance rather than a good- 
faith attempt to resolve a problem 162 
Our discussion of legal sanctions has shown that the 
transactional architecture of JCT80, as it is shaped by law, 
can be used strategically by participants in building 
*production to avoid or limit responsibility for defective 
performance. The use of distinct bilateral contracts in which 
risks and duties. are precisely. defined to govern polycentric 
economic activity tends to generate "gaps", inconsistencies, 
overlaps and ambiguities in the network of contractual 
commitments. These problems of co-ordination and constistency 
may not matter during the ordinary course of "healthy" 
building transactions. Where things go wrong however., they may 
become a site for strategic manouevering by producers and 
professionals who seek to avoid or limit accountability for 
their actions and decisions during production. We have seen, 
162 Supra, chapter IV. 
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for example, that contractors may use the presence of terms 
in their own contracts which address analogous issues to the 
matter in dispute as a basis for arguing that they should not 
be held accountable where the contract is silent. 
Alternatively, a participant may seek to limit its own 
liability by pointing to the working rules governing the 
transactional responsibilities of other participants. 
Transaction costs arising out of the relationship between 
the public norms of legal sanctions and the transactional 
needs of building production would seem to be ineradicable. 
Closer accommodation of the JCT contract to the requirements 
of law simply introduces a different set of complications and 
costs than those which are engendered by a less precise match 
between public and private governance norms. That there is no 
simple solution to the problem of using legal sanctions to 
maintain accountability does not detract from the value of the 
analysis used in this thesis. Institutional analysis clearly 
provides a basis for exploring the_ implications of the 
adjustments to law embodied in JCT80 for the distribution of 
transactional power. Moreover, by highlighting difficulties 
that economic actors may confront in using legal sanctions to 
maintain transactional security, the analysis challenges 
conventional assumptions about the instrumental role of law 
in the governance of contractual relations. 
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Chapter X Conclusions 
The institutional analysis developed in this thesis 
raises substantive and methodological issues. At the level of 
methodology, our transaction cost analysis of JCT80 has 
implicitly revealed some of the limitations of the sharp 
abstraction associated with neoclassical economic analysis of 
law, and explicitly demonstrated the importance of "rich" or 
"thick" descriptive analysis of complex contracting. 
The traditional virtue of neoclassical economic analysis 
of law is said to be its emphasis on key variables. The 
ability to predict the impact of changes in legal rules on 
social and economic behaviour is derived from the analyst's 
reduction of complicated reality into a very few essential 
relationships. In the case of JCT80, the complex and 
polycentric nature of the building transactions raises serious 
doubts about the power of this type of analysis to explain 
what exists, predict responses to change, or formulate 
workable proposals which would constitute unambiguous 
improvements to problems. Moreover, the example of the 
building contract suggests that simplification around a 
specific set of variables creates the danger of presenting a 
particular picture or "story" of contracting activity that is 
far removed from the transactional realities. 
The type of institutional analysis developed here 
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provides the theorist with an important set of conceptual 
tools with which to explore complex contracting. Our rich and 
detailed description has provided a basis for examining small- 
scale interactions between rules and behavioural choices, 
identifying sources of contractual frictions, and accounting 
for divergence between theoretical prescriptions and 
transactional decisions. That individuals' choices with 
respect to economic relations are treated as constrained by 
their context, and essentially comparative, opens up a new 
perspective and fresh analytical questions. 
On the other hand, it is important to be realistic about 
the strengths and limitations of comparative institutionalism. 
The methodological insistence on detail and specificity 
renders it difficult to draw broad policy implications from 
the observed reality. While the analysis can readily be used 
to demonstrate that the resolution of one problem in a 
particular manner would simply generate a new set of costs and 
dilemmas, it does not appear to drive substantive conclusions 
as to which of the various packages of costs and dilemmas is 
preferable. 
However, this air of neutrality can be misleading. The 
research agenda and direction of the comparative 
institutionalist are no less shaped by values than those of 
other scholars. A reluctance to advocate change therefore may 
reflect a judgment that although the contracting practice 
under review may not embody efficiency on a grand-scale, the 
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status quo probably represents the imperfect best that can be 
attained in a less than ideal world. 
It should also be recognised, 'however, that the analysis 
may be used in a manner which has more critical "bite". As we 
have shown, comparative institutionalism may expose dimensions 
of contracting practices which are obscured in other 
analytical approaches. With respect to JCT80, for example, the 
tools of comparative institutionalism enabled us to address 
the issue of the distribution of decision-making power within 
the working rules of the building transaction. Development of 
this issue might potentially form part of a larger critique 
of the images and the realities of contracting practices in 
contemporary society. 
Quite apart from its potentially misleading appearance 
of neutrality, institutional analysis may be vulnerable to the 
criticism that it is itself overly complex. It is sometimes 
argued, for example, that there is little analytical advantage 
to be gained from assessing the intricacies of reality through 
the lens of an over-elaborate theory. That the explanation of 
social and economic "facts" entails a process of selection is 
undeniable. However, the comparative institutionalist does not 
contest the importance of criteria of relevance or dispute the 
need for systematic mapping complex reality onto a relatively 
simplified theoretical matrix. What is at issue is not the 
question of whether to abstract from every day detail, but 
what should remain as part of the phenomena to be explained. 
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To the comparative institutionalist, it is simply 
inconceivable that analysis of contractual governance would 
assume away the context and culture which are taken to shape 
transactional decision-making. 
At a more substantive level, the thesis has made two 
general points. First, it has highlighted the issue of the 
decision-making power within contractual relationships. The 
economic fact of decision-making power appears in all three 
models of contractual governance. However, the forms in which 
decision-making power may be manifested are shaped by the 
nature of the transaction and the institutional setting. This 
aspect of the thesis raises the question of how such forms of 
"internal" decision-making power ought to be conceptualised, 
processed and evaluated within debates over contractual 
governance issues. 
Secondly, our analysis has raised questions about the 
role of law in the governance of complex transactions. Our 
analysis clearly does not support the conventional laisser- 
faire image of law, as a pure facilitator of economic activity. 
Neither does the traditional instrumental vision in which 
legal change generates adjustment to new market conditions 
seem to be borne out in our story of the building contract. 
Nor, finally, is it at all obvious that law functions as a 
beacon of commercial morality, promoting good-faith and 
sanctioning deviance. 
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that law and 
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the legal process operates purely as a "default" dispute- 
resolution service for those who cannot find a less costly 
means of managing conflict. From what we have seen of a 
particular type of complex transaction, it would appear that 
the law pertaining to protection of economic interests may 
play an important role in shaping the distribution of 
transactional power and constituting sites for strategic 
manoevering. 
With respect to the analysis of the building contract, 
the thesis has demonstrated that polycentricity may be a 
source of substantial transaction costs. While building 
production to some extent involves idiosyncratic investments 
and is clearly shaped by uncertainty, its overriding 
characteristic is the interactive interdependent, and 
multipartite nature of participation. This finding suggests 
that polycentricity might be added to the conventional 
analytical matrix of the transactional economists. 
More generally, our analysis of the building contract has 
created a basis for further research. This might take an 
overtly comparative form. JCT80 is not the only standard form 
of building contract even within the UK. Construction is a 
major industry throughout the world and standardised contracts 
are common. The type of analysis developed in this thesis 
would seem to be capable of generating useful insights-into 
the rationales for, and implications of, both variations or 
similarities between forms of transactional governance. 
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Alternatively, a subsequent research agenda might focus 
on empirical analysis of contracting behaviour during 
production. In the course of evaluating the general hypothesis 
- that the building contract might be viewed as a choice 
between imperfect decision-making frameworks for managing 
transaction costs - the analysis has generated a number of 
more limited propositions regarding the transactional 
implications of particular governance choices. Further 
exploration of these propositions through investigation of 
actual examples of planning, management and enforcement 
practices as they are in fact instituted within building 
transactions would not only shed further light on the 
organisation of building production but also enhance our 
understanding of complex transactions more generally. 
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